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ABSTRACT 
 
In the Crosshairs: Second Amendment Lawyers and Cases 
in 
State and Federal Appellate Courts 
 
H. Carl Taylor, III 
 
Judicial behavior, the types of activities and behaviors judges become involved with in their 
capacity on the bench, has a profound and lasting impact on the types of decisions rendered by 
judges across all courts that comprise the American judiciary (Baum 2000; Baum 2006; Maveety 
2002). There is a growing realization that judicial behavior encompasses more than just the making 
of good laws and public policy decisions (Baum, 2000; Baum 2006; Hammond, Bonneau, & 
Sheehan 2005; Comparato 2003). For example, Songer & Haire (1992) explore integrated 
approaches to the study of judicial voting through obscenity cases in the U.S. Courts of Appeals. 
Creating an integrated multivariate model that combines five approaches to judicial voting, the 
authors find that this new model correctly predicts about 80% of the judges’ votes on obscenity 
cases with an error reduction rate of almost 46%. My dissertation focuses on the judicial behavior of 
state Supreme Court and U.S. Courts of Appeals judges through the lens of Second Amendment 
claims and issues, a polarizing American political issue over the last fifty years.   
Through a descriptive and logistic regression analysis of the extent of 488 Second 
Amendment court rulings made in state courts of last resort and U.S. Courts of Appeals rendered 
between 1960 and 2009, I theorize that state Supreme Court selection methods, the presences of a 
state intermediate appellate courts, U.S. Courts of Appeals majority presidential party nomination 
panel, along with state and federal appellate circuit  political ideology, urban/rural dynamics, gun 
ownership percentage, and homicide rates will have an impact on the outcome of Second 
Amendment decisions at these various judicial levels. For instance, an elected state Supreme Court 
system is more likely to produce a gun rights ruling, while an appellate panel with a majority of 
judges appointed by Democratic Presidents would be more likely to produce a gun control ruling. 
The results indicate state and appellate circuit political ideology (conservativeliberal spectrum) 
and gun ownership percentages affect the outcome of Second Amendment decisions in state 
Supreme Courts and the U.S. Courts of Appeals, while homicide rates affect these decisions in state 
courts of last resort. As such, a conservative political ideology and high gun ownership percentage 
in a state or appellate circuit means that it is more likely for their judges to produce a gun rights 
ruling, while a liberal political ideology and low gun ownership percentage means that the state or 
appellate circuit is more likely to produce a gun control ruling. One chapter explores these 
dynamics at the state Supreme Court level, while a second chapter does the same in the U.S. Courts 
of Appeals. 
A third substantive dissertation chapter considers the impact of legal participation, litigation 
strategies, venue-shopping, along with interest group coordination, networking, and organization, in 
planned telephone interviews with pro-gun and gun control Second Amendment interest group 
lawyers who have litigated cases in these two levels of the state and federal judiciary between 1960 
and 2009. In this chapter, it is theorized that there will be clear differences between gun rights and 
gun control interest groups, and heavily funded and lesser funded interest groups, with regard to the 
five major interview issues listed above. Twenty-one interviews with interest group lawyers will be 
conducted between 24 August and 15 October 2010. 
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CHAPTER ONE 
 
CURRENT SECOND AMENDMENT LITERATURE AND INTRODUCTION TO THE 
RESEARCH SETTING 
 
The right of bearing arms for a lawful purpose is not a right granted by the Constitution; 
neither is it in any manner dependent upon that instrument for its existence. 
 
--Chief Justice Morrison Waite, United States v. Cruikshank, 18761 
 
 
I agree with the Court that the Second Amendment is fully applicable to the States. I do 
so because the right to keep and bear arms is guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment 
as a privilege of American citizenship. 
 
-- Justice Samuel Alito, McDonald v. City of Chicago, 20102 
 
 
 During the last forty years, the Second Amendment to the United States Constitution has 
become a focal point of political attention within the executive, legislative, and judicial branches 
of local, state, and federal governments across the country.  In fact, political attention that 
focused on the Second Amendment was amplified after the 2010 United States state and federal 
midterm elections as proponents of gun rights made dramatic electoral gains.  For instance, 
Kansas voters approved an amendment to the state constitution that affirmed the right of state 
residents to own firearms.  The Kansas “Right to Bear Arms” Amendment passed on 2 
November 2010 with the staggering support of 89 percent of the electorate.3   A similar result 
occurred in the neighboring state of Oklahoma, as U.S. Representative Mary Fallin (R-OK) 
easily won election to the Governor’s office.  Fallin’s twenty-point victory (60 percent to 40 
percent) over the sitting Lieutenant Governor, Jari Askins (D-OK), ensured that the Oklahoma 
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legislature’s bipartisan open carry of firearms bill would not be vetoed again in 2011, as it was 
under current Governor Brad Henry (D-OK) in early 2010.4 
 Focusing on the outcome of federal legislative midterm races, pro-gun candidates won 
seven seats in the U.S. Senate, including seats in Arkansas, Indiana, Ohio, North Dakota, 
Pennsylvania, West Virginia, and Wisconsin.  U.S. Senate Majority Leader Harry Reid’s re-
election in Nevada assured gun advocates that pro-gun legislation is more likely to make it to the 
floor of the Senate then would have been the case under under the number two (Richard Durbin, 
IL) or three (Charles Schumer, NY) ranking Democrats in the Senate leadership.  According to 
David Kopel’s voting math, based on campaign statements or policy positions of candidates, the 
Republican election wave that hit the U.S. House of Representatives saw an increase of almost 
nineteen pro-gun votes.  Congressional candidates endorsed by the National Rifle Association’s 
Victory Fund won 85 percent of their House races and 76 percent of their senatorial races.5 
If the 2010 elections brought significant legislative gains for gun rights advocates, one 
institutional bastion that remains up for grabs is the American judiciary.  This dissertation 
focuses on how the state and federal courts have dealt with the Second Amendment and 
associated issues.  It addresses the questions: What factors explain Second Amendment interest 
group cause lawyering and the inclusion of Second Amendment issues on the agenda (docket) of 
courts, and, second, what political factors effect judges when making Second Amendment 
rulings in state supreme courts and the U.S. Courts of Appeals? 
To address the first question, Chapter Two considers the impact of legal participation, 
litigation strategies, venue-shopping, interest group coordination, networking, and organization 
in telephone interviews with gun rights and gun control Second Amendment lawyers who 
litigated cases in these two levels of the state and federal judiciary between 1960 and 2009.  In 
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this chapter, it is hypothesized that there is a clear difference between gun rights and gun control 
interest groups, heavily funded and lesser funded interest groups, and local, state, and national 
interest groups with regard to legal participation, litigation strategies, venue-shopping, interest 
group coordination, networking, and organization. 
To address the second question, two chapters of this dissertation is focused on the judicial 
behavior of state supreme court and the U.S. Courts of Appeals judges regarding Second 
Amendment cases.  Judicial behavior, the types of activities and behavior appellate judges 
exhibit on the bench, has a profound and lasting impact on the types of decisions rendered by 
judges across all courts that comprise the American judiciary.6  There is a growing realization 
that judicial behavior encompasses more than just the making of good laws and public policy 
decisions.7  Donald Songer and Susan Haire explored integrated approaches to the study of 
judicial voting through obscenity cases in the U.S. Courts of Appeals.  Creating an integrated 
multivariate model that combined five approaches to judicial voting, the authors found that this 
new model correctly predicted about 80 percent of the judges’ votes on obscenity cases with an 
error reduction rate of almost 46 percent.8  Two chapters of this dissertation focuses on the  
behavior of state supreme court and U.S. Courts of Appeals judges through the lens of Second 
Amendment claims and issues, a polarizing American political issue over the last fifty years.  
Through a descriptive analysis of 488 Second Amendment court rulings made in state 
supreme courts and U.S. Courts of Appeals between 1960 and 2009, I theorize that state supreme 
court selection methods, political party identification of state supreme court judges, the presence 
of a state intermediate appellate court, U.S. Courts of Appeals majority presidential party 
nomination panel, along with state and federal appellate circuit political ideology, population 
density, gun ownership percentage, and homicide rates will have an impact on the outcome of 
 4 
 
Second Amendment decisions in these two judicial forums.  For instance, an elected state court 
of last resort system is more likely to produce a gun rights ruling, while an appellate panel with a 
majority of judges appointed by Democratic Presidents would be more likely to produce a gun 
control ruling.  The following sections set the political context for judicial decision-making 
regarding the Second Amendment and reviews important Second Amendment works and provide 
an introduction to the research setting for my dissertation. 
Constitutional Underpinnings 
Until the middle of the twentieth century, the Second Amendment to the United States 
Constitution was a little-visited and often dormant area of the Bill of Rights.  In fact, the annual 
commentary regarding the Constitution published by the Library of Congress in 1973 included 
less than a page and half of annotations regarding the Second Amendment, while other clauses, 
such as the Free Exercise Clause and the Freedom of Speech Clause, included citations of ten 
pages or more.9  According to the longtime Cato Institute staffer, Brian Doherty, before the 2008 
United States Supreme Court case, Heller v. District of Columbia, in which an ideologically 
divided Court overturned the District of Columbia’s gun ban and forbade future gun bans on 
federally governed areas,10 there had only been five other significant Second Amendment cases 
heard by the U.S. Supreme Court.11 
Of the five important Supreme Court Second Amendment cases listed by Doherty, three 
played a significant role in state law. After a white militia attacked Republican freedmen 
gathered at the Grant Parish Courthouse in Louisiana to protect it from a local Democratic 
takeover during Reconstruction, in United States v. Cruikshank, the Supreme Court ruled that the 
Second Amendment had “no other effect than to restrict the powers of the national 
government”.12  In Presser v. Illinois, the Supreme Court held that the Second Amendment 
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limited only the power of the U.S. Congress and the federal government to control firearms, and 
did not apply to the states.13   In Miller v. Texas, the Supreme Court ruled that the Second 
Amendment did not apply to state laws, such as the one in Texas that Franklin Miller had 
violated when he was convicted and sentenced to be executed for shooting a police officer to 
death with an unlicensed handgun.14  
While the Cruikshank, Presser, and Miller decisions played a much larger role in state 
law and government, another Supreme Court decision was the first to strike at the heart of the 
Second Amendment within the sphere of the federal governmental power.  In the wake of the 
Saint Valentine’s Day Massacre, in United States v. Miller, the Supreme Court upheld the 
constitutionality of the National Firearms Act against a challenge Jack Miller and Frank Layton.  
Miller and Layton argued that the law allowed the men to keep and use a sawed-off shotgun.  
The U.S. Supreme Court disagreed.15  The National Firearms Act of 1934 required certain types 
of firearms, including automatic rifles, sawed-off shot guns, and semi-automatic firearms, to be 
registered and taxes paid to the federal government every time the firearm was sold.  The Miller 
decision has become a flashpoint in the ongoing debate over the Second Amendment in America, 
as gun control advocates and state and federal judges have pointed to this decision for over six 
decades when rejecting legal challenges to new federal firearms regulations.  Curiously, gun 
rights advocates claim the Miller decision as a victory because interpretations of that ruling state 
that ownership of weapons for the preservation of a militia in the present day is exclusively 
protected by the Constitution.16 
Doherty’s fifth important Second Amendment Supreme Court decision struck at the heart 
of both state and federal law.  Building upon Heller, gun rights interests brought a similar case 
before the Supreme Court that was a clear challenge to a local gun ban in Chicago, Illinois.  In 
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McDonald v. City of Chicago (2010), an ideologically divided Supreme Court ruled that the right 
to “keep and bear arms,” outlined in the Second Amendment, was incorporated into the Due 
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, and thus, applied to all states.17  David Kopel 
explored the holdings of twenty-nine other Second Amendment cases handled by the Supreme 
Court.  None of the twenty-nine other cases have become as legally important as the six cases 
presented previously.18  Along with incorporation of the Second Amendment in state law, the 
McDonald decision cleared up much of the uncertainty left after Heller regarding the application 
of federal laws to states. Landmark cases, such as Heller and McDonald, illustrate the 
importance of the policy and the ideological polarization of the Second Amendment issue in the 
courts and in American society today. 
The deep sectional, cultural, and ideological divide in American life that has been evident 
within the Second Amendment debate has often times become expressed in legal terms and 
within the judicial arena.  The mere existence of the Second Amendment debates exemplifies the 
importance of the constitutive function of legality in American life.  The legality perspective has 
reduced and framed a cultural conflict into easily recognizable rights, constitutional power 
terminology, and a manageable and orderly bipolar debate that is often capable of expression in 
ideological or partisan terms.  Nowhere has this debate manifested itself more than inside the 
walls of state and federal courtrooms across the United States. 
Regarding this legality perspective, in United States v. Tot (1942), the Third Circuit Court 
of Appeals affirmed a lower court ruling that convicted Frank Tot of receiving firearms 
transported via interstate commerce after he was convicted of a violent crime.19  Tot was decided 
in accordance with the Miller decision because the appellate panel reasoned that the Second 
Amendment was not adopted with individual rights in mind; however, the panel’s interpretation 
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in the case changed Miller in that the case results were solely based on a flawed analysis of 
common law and colonial history.20  The Miller legal perspective—which holds that the Second 
Amendment does not encompass an individual right to keep and bear arms—was also adopted in 
several other Supreme Court and lower federal court decisions.  Since the Miller decision, lower 
federal appellate courts have interpreted the substance of the ruling differently.   
For instance, in Cases v. United States (1942)21, the First Circuit Court of Appeals 
created much confusion in the lower federal courts over the substance of Miller.  By challenging 
the logic of Miller, the Cases panel concluded that any person making a Second Amendment 
claim is required to have the maintenance and preservation of a militia as their main concern.  As 
such, the Cases decision forbade the federal government from prohibiting the possession and 
usage of firearms if the prohibition related to the maintenance of a militia.22  The same legal test 
was forwarded by the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals in United States v. Hale.23 
 After the Cases and Tot decisions of the 1940s, there was little Second Amendment 
litigation until the late 1960s and 1970s, when individuals began to challenge the gun control 
legislation passed by Congress in the 1960s.  In one of these cases, United States v. Warin 
(1976), the Sixth Circuit concluded, without any historical references and in accordance with 
Miller, that the Second Amendment does not guarantee an individual right.24  In the case, Francis 
Warin was convicted of possessing an unlicensed machine gun in 1970, and he argued that his 
ownership of the weapon was legal and in accordance with his official membership in an Ohio 
militia.  While the Warin decision seemed to have satisfied the tests established in Cases and 
Hale, the appellate panel that heard the case disagreed and upheld the initial state court 
conviction.  Again, like Cases and Tot, Warin changed the implication and interpretation of 
Miller in the sense that individuals could no longer possess firearms even in connection with the 
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maintenance of a militia.25  Again, these various legal perspectives regarding Miller have since 
been overturned by the Heller and McDonald majority, which asserted gun ownership as an 
individual right. 
In Adams v. Williams (1972), Justice Douglas argued that Miller did not prohibit the 
enactment of vigorous gun control laws on the state level.26  In Cody v. United States (1972), the 
U.S. Supreme Court ruled, in accordance with Miller, that the Second Amendment guarantees no 
right to keep and bear arms that does not have a relationship with the preservation of a militia.27  
Similar findings were rendered in United States v. Three Winchester 30-30 Caliber Lever Action 
Carbines28, United States v. Johnson29, Lewis v. United States.30 
 Cases decided over the last fifteen years have also exemplified the same perspective that 
appeared in earlier rulings.  For instance, in the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth 
Circuit case, United States v. Emerson (2001),31 the Fifth Circuit rejected the common legal 
perspective that the Second Amendment protected the interest of states in order to maintain their 
own militias and changed the paradigm of Second Amendment rights to include individual 
ownership of firearms.32  Interestingly, only one year later, in Silveira v. Lockyer (2002), the 
Ninth Circuit disagreed with the Emerson ruling and found that private individuals do not 
possess the personal right to own and operate firearms.33  
Seven years after the Silveira ruling, the same Ninth Circuit overturned the Silveira ruling 
in Nordyke v. King (2009).34  In Nordyke, the Ninth Circuit affirmed and expanded the Supreme 
Court’s Heller decision by clearly stating that the right to keep and bear arms was an individual 
right and should be incorporated against all states.  Subsequently, the Ninth Circuit set the 
decision aside and ordered an en banc rehearing of the Nordyke decision.  In the en banc review 
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of Nordyke v. King (2009),35 the Ninth Circuit ruled that the original decision should not be cited 
as precedent and that the review should be delayed until the Supreme Court ruled in McDonald. 
 The legal perspective has reduced and framed cultural conflicts in more gun policy areas 
than just simple ownership.  For instance, since the early 1980s, localities around the nation have 
attempted to ban the possession of personal firearms inside city limits in order to decrease 
violence and crime, even if an individual was a member of a local militia.  In Quilici v. Village of 
Morton Grove (1982), the Seventh Circuit ruled in favor of the Illinois town of Morton Grove, 
which, in 1981, became the first modern American town to prohibit the possession of firearms 
inside city limits.  The Court ruled that the local gun ban was valid under state and federal 
constitutions.36  Two years later, the same Morton Grove firearms ban was legally challenged 
once again.  In this case, Kalodimos v. Village of Morton Grove (1984), the Illinois State 
Supreme Court agreed with Quicili that the town ordinance did not violate state or federal 
constitutional provisions.37 
 Similar legal findings to Quicili and Kalodimos were made in two other state supreme 
court cases.  In Arnold v. City of Cleveland (1993), the Ohio Supreme Court ruled that an 
ordinance banning the possession and sale of assault weapons inside the city limits of Cleveland 
was constitutional.38  In Robertson v. City and County of Denver (1994), the Colorado Supreme 
Court ruled that an ordinance that banned the manufacture, sale, or possession of semi-automatic 
or automatic assault weapons within the limits of the City and County of Denver was 
constitutional.39  Eventually, the findings of the Quicili, Kalodimos, Robertson, and Arnold 
decisions were overturned after the landmark Heller decision. State and federal Second 
Amendment cases, like the ones discussed above, have framed a cultural conflict in easily 
recognizable terms. 
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The Problem of “Original Meaning” 
Along with important U.S. Supreme Court cases, it is also important to explore the 
original intent of the Founding Fathers when they framed the Constitution in 1787, and the 
conceptions of the Second Amendment in today’s American society.  Possibly no other 
amendment in the Constitution has created more interpretive disputes than the Second 
Amendment.40  Historical analysis of the right to bear arms has created two competing 
interpretations.41  The first interpretation guarantees a personal and individual right to bear arms, 
while the second version applies only to the right in association with militias.42  The scope of the 
Second Amendment has not traditionally been considered pressing because the approach of the 
courts has largely been focused on United States v. Miller, which reads that the Second 
Amendment only ensures that formal and organized state militias may remain armed.43  
From a constitutional development perspective, the eminent American historian Gordon 
S. Wood has eloquently written about the evolution of the sectional, cultural, and ideological 
divide in American life since the establishment of the nation.  Since the establishment of colonial 
America, the North and South regions of the country evolved differently and have been divided 
based upon geography, culture, and politics.  In one work, Wood illustrated how the American 
colonies emerged from a monarchical system, created a republic, and eventually evolved into a 
democratic society.  Wood’s focus was on representation, beginning with the colonial 
assemblies, arguing that the American colonies had a legacy of representative institutions, which 
helped in forming the necessary consensus in order to achieve the ultimate goal of 
independence.44  Along with the American political system, Wood delved into issues related to 
the same cultural and political divide in that different cultures and ideologies were predominate 
early on throughout the country.  Exemplified in conventions of the people in the states held to 
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ratify both the Declaration of Independence and the Constitution, the fear of governmental 
corruption by some citizens forced households to take up arms in order to ensure some level of 
security and autonomy from the state.45 
Wood examined how the American cultural and political divide was also defined through 
ratification of the Bill of Rights.  As James Madison proposed the Bill of Rights, ideological 
conflict between pro-government Federalists and states rightist Anti-Federalists, dating from the 
1787 Philadelphia Convention, threatened the overall ratification of the new Constitution.  The 
Bill of Rights was adopted in response to the Constitution's influential opponents, including 
prominent Founding Fathers, who argued that the Constitution should not be ratified because it 
failed to protect the basic principles of human liberty.46  
The Bill of Rights was influenced by George Mason's 1776 Virginia Declaration of 
Rights and other English lists of rights.  Like Anti-Federalist leader Patrick Henry, Mason was a 
leader of those who pressed for the addition of explicit States rights and individual rights to the 
Constitution as a balance to the increased federal powers, and did not sign the document in part 
because it lacked such a statement.  Mason’s efforts eventually succeeded in convincing the 
Federalists to add the first ten amendments, including the Second Amendment, of the 
Constitution.  Plainly, the addition and ratification of Bill of Rights was an attempt to soothe 
dissent against increased national power by leaders of more conservative, states’ rights-oriented 
southern states.47   
Linking Founders Views to Firearms Policy History 
Prior to the ratification of the Bill of Rights, an American “gun culture” was created in 
the years before the American Revolution.  In fact, the American Revolution was triggered by a 
gun confiscation mission ordered by the British General Thomas Gage, which led to fighting at 
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Lexington and Concord, Massachusetts.48  However, many scholars have rightly questioned the 
actual original intent of the Second Amendment.49  Does the Second Amendment grant 
individual citizens the right to keep and bear arms or does it only allow states to possess the right 
to have a militia for the protection of its residents?50 
According to Randy Barnett of the Georgetown University School of Law, before 
discerning the original intent of a constitutional statute, scholars should ask themselves why it is 
important to consult the intentions of the Framers.  Consequently, there are two reasons to 
examine the original intent of the Framers.  The first reason is a view that the Framers are 
wardens who issued specific commands to those leaders who were to come after them, and the 
meaning of the commands depends upon the Framers intentions.  The second reason is a view of 
the Framers as designers of the lawmaking machine.  To the extent that the Framers were 
designers, this view notes that scholars should consult them when it is important to know how 
the lawmaking process should work.  If scholars would focus on these two principles, they would 
be much more likely to hone in on the original intent of the Framers.  For instance, the original 
intent of the right to keep and bear arms is clearly linked to the maintenance of state militias.51  
However, simply looking at the original intent of the words located on the pages of the 
Constitution is not enough because what is in the document and the personal feelings of the 
Founders sometimes differ significantly.  The stance of several of the American Founding 
Fathers seem to be split on issues related to personal gun ownership and the Second 
Amendment.52  For instance, prominent Virginians George Mason, Richard Henry Lee, and 
George Washington presented unequivocal support for the personal right to bear arms after 
American independence.  During Virginia’s convention to ratify the Constitution in 1788, Bill of 
Rights author George Mason said, “I ask, Sir, what is the militia? It is the whole people. To 
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disarm the people is the best and most effectual way to enslave them.”53  Although supporters of 
the personal right to possess firearm were greater in number, alleged opponents of the Second 
Amendment also were very important in the founding of the United States.  Both Samuel Adams 
and Alexander Hamilton offered only tepid acceptance of the Second Amendment as it was 
originally written.54 
According to the Second Amendment, the exact meaning of the rights reserved by the 
statement is questionable.  If the preamble included in the amendment did not exist, then the 
amendment would reserve a personal right to keep and bear arms to all American; however, the 
preamble is present and can create problems regarding the meaning of the amendment.  While 
some scholars have interpreted the meaning of the Second Amendment to restrict the keeping 
and bearing of arms to members of the militia, others have forwarded a theory of a collective 
right for all Americans to bear arms.55  
It is clear, according to the constitutional scholar Leonard W. Levy, that “if all it (the 
Second Amendment) meant was the right to be a soldier or serve in the military, whether in the 
militia or the army, it would hardly be a cherished right and would never have reached 
constitutional status in the Bill of Rights.”56  Nonetheless, the right to keep and bear arms is not 
unlimited.  Public regulations and laws passed over the last fifty years on both the state and 
federal governmental levels specify the kinds of firearms that are lawful and the conditions 
through which weapons can be used and kept; however, no regulation may subvert that right to 
legally possess personal firearms itself.57 
According to political scientist Robert Spitzer, “the right to bear arms is prefaced by the 
necessity for the government to maintain a militia in order to ensure security for the nation”.58  It 
is important to note, as former Chief Justice Warren Burger argued, the word “because” should 
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be read as the opening line of the amendment.  As such, the amendment should be read as 
“[because] a well-regulated militia [is] necessary to the security of a free state, the right of the 
people to keep and bear arms shall not be infringed”.59  The intent of the Founding Fathers was 
that the keeping and bearing of arms should stem from a necessity for a government to keep, 
organize, and regulate a militia.60 
 The phrasing of to “bear arms” is connected throughout history to the possession of 
firearms and weapons for usage in a military capacity.61  For instance, in Aymette v. State, the 
Tennessee State Supreme Court ruled that the right to bear arms had a military sense and no 
other.62  Also in Hill v. Georgia, the Georgia State Supreme Court held that the right to bear 
arms is guaranteed for members of the local and state militia only.63  This traditional military 
conception of bearing arms is much different than the current notion of the Second Amendment 
to mean personal possession of firearms for hunting activities or for the protection of ones 
person, family, or property.64  Second Amendment matters now encompass issues relating to 
hunting activities, personal and familial protection, concealed weapons, gun permits, semi-
automatic and automatic weapons, gun bans, along with many others. 
Contemporary Legal Constructions of the Second Amendment 
According to the historian Garry Wills, the fearful atmosphere of the Cold War and the 
first cadre of Second Amendment scholars joined together to create a new paradigm through 
which stakeholders in the gun rights/control debate have viewed and argued the ramifications of 
Second Amendment political decisions.65  President Dwight D. Eisenhower stoked the flames of 
the Cold War and gun ownership at the very end of his term in office.66  On 17 January 1961, 
Eisenhower delivered his famed farewell address in which he warned Americans of the creation 
of a “military-industrial complex,” a process in which private companies gained increasing levels 
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of influence within the United States Department of Defense and federal government in general.  
Although an increase in defense spending became an important earmark in the national budget 
and provided an important boost to the nation’s flagging economy after war, the military build-
up also generated great political debate.67 
Eisenhower’s Cold War rhetoric correctly predicted a seemingly endless conflict against 
the aggressive communist enemies.68 Communism, a socio-political movement that developed in 
the Soviet Union and other satellite nations, attempts to establish a classless and stateless society 
that is organized upon collective property ownership.69  The basic tenets of communism directly 
conflict with the fundamental doctrine of freedom, life, liberty, and property important to 
American life.  Although the Cold War and the military-industrial complex did not provide arms 
to average American citizens, it did create a sense of suspicion among the populace that was 
firmly rooted in reality.  During the Cold War, Soviet communism, when judged versus liberal 
democracy, was evil, even if people did not know the full scope of the devastation of humane 
values, slave labor, and deliberate famine.70  The suspicion of attacks by enemies of the United 
States, when coupled with increases in urban gun violence increased personal gun ownership in 
America.71 
The anxious call during the mid-twentieth century for the need for private gun ownership 
stemmed from (or produced) three significant American political assassinations and the fearful 
atmosphere promulgated by the Cold War era of the 1950s and 1960s,72 while members of 
academia became prominent in the Second Amendment debate between the 1960s and the 1980s 
because of their association with gun control interests.73  The assassinations of President John F. 
Kennedy in 1963, presidential candidate and U.S. Senator Robert F. Kennedy (D-NY) in 1968, 
and civil rights leader Martin Luther King, Jr., in 1968, were each carried out with mail-order, 
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military surplus firearms obtained from different foreign and domestic firearms industry 
catalogues.  With three low-pressure clutches of firearm triggers, the contemporary gun rights-
gun control debate in American culture and politics had begun.74 
In addition to the three important political assassinations, a horrific shooting brought the 
debate over gun rights-gun control to a fever pitch.  On 1 August 1966, Charles Whitman, a 
mentally-disturbed student at the University of Texas at Austin and former Marine, climbed to 
the twenty-ninth floor observation deck of the school’s administrative building and shot forty-
eight people with numerous rifles, killing sixteen individuals.  Whitman’s victims included 
people inside the building and on the campus green below.  Directly before the shooting 
rampage, Whitman murdered his wife and mother in their homes. Nearly two hours after 
shooting began, Austin Police finally reached Whitman on the observation deck.  After a short 
gun fight, Whitman was killed.  As a result of the Whitman shooting rampage, President Lyndon 
Johnson called for stricter gun control policies.75 
 More than two decades after Eisenhower’s farewell address another American President 
and his wife stoked the underlying flames relating to firearms through their war on drugs.  In 
early 1982, First Lady Nancy Reagan began pushing a “Just Say No” to drugs awareness agenda, 
which aimed to discourage the usage of recreational drugs among America’s children and 
teenagers.76  As the First Lady said, “If you can save just one child, it's worth it…”.77  During the 
course of her five year awareness campaign, the First Lady traveled to sixty-five drug and 
violence plagued cities in thirty-three states.78  While the First Lady made public appearances on 
behalf of her agenda, the President busied himself by helping to enact significant policies 
responding to the perceived increased usage of drugs in America.79  
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By 1986, Reagan signed a massive drug enforcement bill that funded the war on drugs 
and required mandatory minimum sentences for all drug offenses.80  While some critics lauded 
this effort as a good first step, others heavily criticized the bill for helping to promote significant 
racial disparities in American prisons and doing nothing to reduce the availability of drugs on the 
streets.81  Reagan also created the Office of National Drug Control Policy (ONDCP) through the 
Anti-Drug Act of 1988.  The goal of the new office was to provide a central coordination point 
within the federal government for drug-related legislative, security, diplomatic, research, and 
health policy.  Headed by a director known as the “Drug Czar,” the office attained cabinet-level 
status in 1993 under President Clinton, but has since been demoted within the Executive Office 
of the President.82  Even though firearms played a central, active role in the associated violence 
of the drug trade, the various anti-drug enactments of the 1980s failed to address any firearm-
related reforms.83  
 Along with these important political assassinations, the Cold War, and the war on drugs, 
three different pieces of federal legislation stoked the flames of the debate over the Second 
Amendment.  The Firearm Owners’ Protection Act (FOPA) of 1986, passed against the protests 
of many gun control advocates and interest groups, was crafted in order to restrain many of the 
most rigorous provisions outlined in the federal Gun Control Act of 1968.  FOPA allowed 
licensed firearms dealers to distribute and sell firearms away from their business location, limited 
on-site dealer inspections performed by the federal Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms, 
prohibited the creation of a national gun registry, and allowed interstate ammunition sales.84  
A second piece of federal legislation, the Brady Handgun Violence Prevention Act, was a 
reaction to both FOPA and the attempted assassination of President Ronald Reagan and the 
shooting of White House Press Secretary James Brady by John Hinckley, Jr. in 1981.  The Brady 
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Bill, as it was commonly known, required all individuals wishing to purchase a firearm from a 
licensed gun dealer to go through a government background check before the sale was 
completed.85  The Brady Bill prohibited certain individuals, such as people who were under 
indictment, ex-convicts, fugitives from justice, the mentally disabled, illegal aliens, or former 
members of the Armed Forces discharged dishonorably, from shipping, transporting, buying, or 
owning any firearm.86  Concealed weapons laws are often associated with the Brady Bill; 
however, most concealed weapons laws were passed through other statutes, and have created 
significant debate within academic circles.87 
 In the weeks following President Bill Clinton’s signing ceremony for the Brady Bill, the 
NRA immediately brought suit in ten states that asked the federal courts to declare the Brady Bill 
unconstitutional.  This litigation effort culminated in the Supreme Court case, Printz v. United 
States.  In Printz, the Supreme Court held that a provision of the Brady Bill, that compelled state 
and local law enforcement officials to perform mandated background checks for a limited period 
of time, were unconstitutional violations of the Tenth Amendment to the Constitution.  However, 
the most important Brady provisions were upheld and the effect of this decision was negligible, 
as the vast majority state and local law enforcement officials continued to do the mandated 
background checks.88 
A third federal law, the Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994, was 
passed by a Democratically-controlled Congress and signed into law by President Bill Clinton in 
the wake of numerous gang-related killings, school shootings, and public mass killings with 
assault weapons in the 1980s and 1990s.  The piece of legislation banned the sale, ownership, 
and usage of nineteen named guns and 200 other guns that fell under definitions included in the 
assault weapons ban.  According to the Act, selected pistols, rifles, and shotguns were not 
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appropriate for usage by non-military personnel.  After the law was enacted, both foreign and 
domestic firearms manufacturers were able to skirt the periphery of the provision by making 
minor alterations to their firearms that allowed for the guns to be sold to the public.  A decade 
after the passage of the assault weapons ban, a Republican-controlled Congress and President 
George W. Bush allowed the law to sunset without reauthorization.89 
 Three events that occurred both during and after the life of the assault weapons ban 
focused attention on firearms, violence, and the failure of gun control laws in the United States.  
In a chilling account of the 1998 Columbine High School shooting, author Dave Cullen reported 
that shooters Eric Harris and Dylan Klebold bypassed the assault weapons ban and other gun 
laws by having adult friends Robyn Anderson, Phil Duran, and Mark Manes procure their assault 
weapons from the Tanner Gun Show in Denver, Colorado, in December 1998.90   This so-called 
“gun show loophole” utilized by the friends of the Columbine killers allows private sellers and 
individuals who were not engaged in business to sell guns at gun shows without conducting 
background checks.91 
Following the terrible attack at the high school, the only people ever charged with a crime 
for the massacre were Duran and Manes for providing the weapons to the underage shooters, 
while a parent of one of the victims of the tragedy, Tom Mauser, became a gun control advocate 
for SAFE (Sane Alternatives to the Firearms Epidemic) Colorado.  Mauser helped to legally 
close the gun show loophole in Colorado.  Mauser’s gun control success was limited to his home 
state, as the U.S. Congress failed to pass any significant legislation in response to the Columbine 
attacks.92 
 Similar to the Columbine High School attacks, the “Beltway Sniper Attacks” occurred in 
Maryland and Virginia a few years later and transpired by circumventing existing gun control 
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laws.  The spree killings, carried out by the former Army marksman John Allen Muhammad and 
his protégé, Lee Boyd Malvo, were perpetrated with a stolen Bushmaster XM-15 semi-automatic 
.223 caliber rifle equipped with a holographic sight for ranges of between 50 and over 100 yards.   
The Bushmaster rifle used by Muhammad and Malvo was an assault weapon that had been 
slightly altered by a foreign firearms distributor in order to conform to the principles outlined in 
the assault weapons ban; however, the weapon was still considered a semi-automatic assault 
rifle.93  After ten shootings in three weeks in the Washington, D.C. Metro area, the spree killings 
have become the perfect example of what can take place through the evasion of gun control 
laws.94 
 Following the expiration of the assault weapons ban in 2004, individuals who could 
complete the mandated background checks were then able to again purchase assault weapons.  
This is what occurred leading up to the April 2007 Virginia Tech massacre. Seung-Hui Cho, a 
U.S. permanent resident, South Korean national, and Virginia Tech undergraduate student, killed 
thirty-two people and wounded many more in an attack in two buildings on the Blacksburg, 
Virginia, campus.  The mentally-ill Cho purchased his selected assault weapons over the internet 
from a federally-licensed firearms dealer based in Wisconsin, and then completed the required 
background check at a pawnshop in the Blacksburg area.  The background check for the guns 
was approved because his juvenile mental health records had been sealed after his eighteenth 
birthday.  The Virginia Tech shooting brought strong calls for gun legislation that would align 
mental health officials with those conducting background checks in order to protect the public.95  
Four years later, no substantial state or federal laws have been passed in the wake of the 
massacre.  The various pieces of gun control legislation that have passed are not working and 
efforts following tragedies to pass important gun laws have failed, as well.  Even when political 
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leaders become aware of ineffective gun laws, these leaders have shown a consistent 
unwillingness to amend them.  Although many of these presidential pronouncements, 
congressional statutes, and actions of madmen provide stark examples of the deep sectional, 
cultural, and ideological divide in American life, they have also created a sense of need for 
greater gun control legislation and increased interest in the Second Amendment. 
Roots of the Political and Cultural Debate over the Second Amendment 
These historical, legal, and political debates over Second Amendment rights reflect a 
deep cultural and ideological divide in American life.  For instance, states that possess higher 
percentages of gun ownership are also some of the most conservative ideologically, while states 
that have the lowest percentages of gun ownership are some of the most liberal ideologically.  
Culturally, southern and western states have higher percentages of gun ownership and are more 
conservative than their liberal counterparts in the northeast and the Midwest.  This cultural and 
ideological divide shows that residents of Southern and Western states possess a perspective that 
is enamored with individualism and is almost suspicious in its fear of external manipulation and 
control of its interests by the state or federal government.  The same ideological divide has 
created a contrary perspective in the Northeastern and Midwestern states that assumes the need 
for civic control of license, greed, and disorderly interests to ensure a civil society through 
control over the sale, ownership, and usage of firearms.  
Three recent studies published by the non-partisan Pew Research Center for the People 
and the Press illustrate the same deep cultural and ideological divide.  A 2010 Pew Research 
Study on gun ownership and gun control reported that public support for governmental control 
over gun ownership is at a twenty-year low, while polling trends support the notion that the 
protection of gun rights has increased in support in every region of the country over the last five 
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years.  However, not every region is created equal when it comes to percentage of support for 
gun rights.  The Midwestern and Southern regions have overall support for gun rights, while 
Eastern and Western states possess a majority of citizens that continue to support gun control 
policies.  Political conservatives and self-described Republicans support gun rights twice as 
much as political liberals and self-described Democrats.96 
 Another Pew Research Study from 2005 reports that gun ownership is much more 
prevalent among Republicans and groups associated with the party than among Democrats or 
those associated with the political left.  Polling data shows that a solid majority of self-described 
political conservatives report that they own guns and keep them in their homes.  Gun ownership 
among conservatives rested at 59 percent, while gun ownership among liberals was polled at 23 
percent.97  Table One (taken from a third Pew Research Study) provides a visual representation 
of the deep sectional, cultural, and ideological divide in American life that is clearly reflected in 
Second Amendment policy and public debate.98 
Table One: Long-Term Trends Regarding Support for Gun Rights 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Pew Research Center for the People & Press. (2010). Public Divided Over State, Local Laws Banning 
Handguns; Since 2008, Increased Support for Gun Rights. Retrieved 14 August 2010 from http://people-
press.org/report/599/handguns. 
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 A Gallup polling trend analysis of stricter gun control laws conducted both before and 
after the 1995 bombing of the Alfred P. Murrah Federal Building in Oklahoma City, Oklahoma, 
shows some fluctuation in public opinion.  Table Two, below, shows that levels of support for 
less strict gun laws two years before the bombing at only seven percent.   Two years later, and 
right after the bombing, the same poll was conducted and found that the support for less strict 
gun laws had almost doubled, while those respondents wanting stricter gun laws decreased by 
more than five percent.99  
Table Two: Stricter Gun Laws—Gallup Trend 
Date More Strict 
Gun Laws 
Less Strict 
Gun Laws 
Kept as are 
Now 
No Opinion 
1995 April 
23-23 
62 percent 12 percent 24 percent 2 percent 
1993 67 7 25 1 
1991 68 5 25 2 
1990 78 2 17 3 
 
Source: Gallup Organization. (1995). Gallup Polling Trend (May 1995). In Bijlefeld, M., ed. The Gun Control 
Debate; A Documentary History. Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, p. 104-105. 
 
 
Because so few important constitutional questions regarding the Second Amendment 
were broached within the three branches of government prior to the current era, there was little 
scholarly interest in studying the Amendment.100  However, a number of events sparked a 
marked increase in interest in the Second Amendment as an assurance of a right to bear arms for 
individuals and militias and beyond over the last fifty years.  Even before this peaked interest, 
the National Rifle Association (NRA) campaigned on the premise that the amendment applied to 
private ownership of guns for all Americans.  Originally developed in conjunction with the 
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National Guard and devoted to military marksmanship, the NRA subsequently condemned the 
work of the National Guard as not doing the work of a real militia.101  
The Second Amendment and Interest Groups 
Typically confusion over the meaning of the Second Amendment, and an important 
factor in the formulation of the current notion of the Second Amendment, stems from the 
politically motivated reading of only a selected portion of its text.102  The Executive Director of 
the National Rifle Association (NRA), and a gun rights lobbyist Wayne LaPierre has either 
written or ghost-written numerous works in which he has only cited in error the second part of 
the Amendment.  In one instance, LaPierre, argued that interests outside the United States have 
attempted to have the right to bear arms taken out of the Bill of Rights,103 while LaPierre 
provided his understanding of the Second Amendment since ratification of the Bill of Rights in 
another work.104  LaPierre and other authors have increasingly focused solely on the second part 
of the Amendment, in which the right of the people to keep and bear arms shall not be taken 
away, while not acknowledging the first part of the Amendment, where it clearly mentions the 
importance of militias to the statute.105 
A cursory view of the NRA’s website, the preeminent American gun rights group, reveals 
no mention of the need for a well-regulated militia.  Instead, the NRA focuses its unwavering 
attention on the need for firearms programs that foster safe and responsible gun ownership and 
usage.106  It is clear that the process that crafted the Bill of Rights, and thus the Second 
Amendment, included numerous individuals and was established through a number of 
compromises essential to produce a document that was acceptable to a majority of the states in 
convention and was able to win the support of a majority of members of Congress.  Through 
these compromises within the legislative process, the conceptions of the language within the 
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Second Amendment have changed and are exposed to significant debate and 
misunderstanding.107 
Although Spitzer and other scholars have focused on the rights and liberties associated 
with the Second Amendment, other authors have attempted to examine the public policy 
consequences of the debate over the Second Amendment.  Legal scholar Mark V. Tushnet argues 
that in order to fully understand the debate over gun rights and gun control it is important to 
consider and examine public policy, as well as the law.108  From Tushnet’s analysis, it is clear 
that gun-related policies that survive political processes will do little to reduce violence and will 
be more likely to side with the arguments of gun rights groups, such as the NRA.  The argument 
that making it harder to buy guns at stores or gun shows will decrease gun ownership and 
violence is just not true.  When advocates of gun control win political or legal battles, typically 
they find it difficult to enact or sustain strong gun-control policies because a culture war over 
American civil liberties occurs.  Opponents of the passage of the Brady Bill helped to mobilize 
support for the Republican takeover of the U.S. Congress in the 1994 midterm elections.109 
 Comparatively, other authors have focused on policies that center upon the ownership of 
firearms in relation to the Second Amendment.  For instance, Dennis Henigan, Vice President of 
the Brady Center to Prevent Gun Violence, was the first author to link the increased gun 
ownership in America with the slogans of the gun lobby.  For more than forty years, the gun 
lobby has had remarkable success in blocking the passage of gun control legislation.110  Harcourt 
also considers firearms ownership, and the associated violence, from the perspectives of youth.  
Through structured interviews with youths detained in correctional facilities, the author finds that 
public policy and the law do not focus on the two issues that could help high risk youth, 
recidivism and gun ownership.111 
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According to Philip Cook and Jens Ludwig, the ever increasing percentage of gun 
ownerships in the United States has, in turned, swelled the number of individuals injured or 
killed by firearms.112  John Lott, Jr. examined Second Amendment gun ownership policy from 
the viewpoint of whether or not owning a gun saves or costs lives.  Tracking gun ownership and 
crime rate data for all U.S. counties between 1977 and 1994, John Lott, Jr. found that gun 
ownership has grown across all demographic groups, while national crime rates have been falling 
at the same time as gun ownership has been growing.  States that have experienced the greatest 
reductions in crime rates also possess policies that have allowed for the fastest growing 
percentage of gun ownership.113 
Alternately, Philip Ludwig and Jens Cook consider the policies related to the Second 
Amendment from a protective policy perspective.  In an offering published by the non-partisan 
Brookings Institute, the authors compare the United States with other developed nations, as the 
U.S. is clearly unique in that it has high rates of both gun ownership and homicides.  Although 
widespread gun ownership does not have an automatic increasing effect on the overall crime 
rate, gun use does make violence related to criminal activity more lethal, more prevalent, and has 
a unique capacity to terrorize the public.  Gun crime accounts for most of the costs of violent 
crime in the United States, which is more than $100 billion per year.114 
 While authors, such as Lott, Ludwig, and Cook, have focused their scholarly attention on 
support for a particular public policy position, others have explored Second Amendment policies 
associated with the various aspects of gun ownership.  For instance, in a new work, Robert 
Spitzer observes that in the United States someone is murdered every twenty-one minutes by 
firearms. According to the author, if gun policies were narrowly tailored to prevent guns from 
falling to the hands of those who would do harm then fewer people would killed by firearms.115  
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Instead of focusing directly on gun ownership, Colin Loftin, Milton Heumann, and David 
McDowall explored alternatives to gun control legislation.  The main alternative to passage of 
legislation that focuses explicitly on gun control is mandatory sentence laws.  Mandatory 
sentence laws would allow legislators to punish individuals who commit gun crimes without 
supporting legislation that infringes upon the right to bear arms.116 
Lott and John Whitley explored gun ownership through the lens of safe-storage laws. 
While many safe storage advocates voice the opinion that these types of laws save lives, the 
authors of this work provide a strong rebuke to that notion.117  Thomas Marvell examined the 
numerous 1994 federal and state laws that piggybacked the Brady Handgun Violence Prevention 
Act and banned the possession of handguns by individuals under the age of eighteen years old.  
Estimating the laws’ impacts on various crime measures, such as juvenile gun homicide rates and 
suicide rates, the author finds that even with many different crime measures and regression 
specifications, there is little to no evidence that suggests that the new gun laws had the intended 
effect of reducing gun violence and homicides prior to the application of the sunset provisions of 
the federal and state laws.118  
Conversely, Glenn Pierce and William Bowers explore the groundbreaking 1981 
Massachusetts-based Bartley-Fox Gun Act, which made the illegal carrying of any firearm 
within the state borders punishable with a mandatory one-year prison sentence.  Using FBI crime 
data inside interrupted time series analysis, the authors found that the law substantially reduced 
the amount of gun assaults; however, the law seemed to have increased the number of non-gun 
related armed assaults.  The authors also found that this law produced a reduction in gun 
robberies, while it also increased the amount of non-gun related armed robberies.  Many of the 
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non-gun related armed assaults and armed robberies were carried out with other weapons, such 
as knives and other sharp objects.119 
 Interest groups have also helped to shape the litigation over the Second Amendment.  In 
particular, interest groups have attempted to shape litigation in a number of different ways.  Lee 
Epstein and Joseph Kobylka argued that abortion and death penalty-related interest groups 
helped dramatically shape the debate over their respective issues.  Focusing on amicus curiae 
briefs, the authors found that interest groups affected abrupt legal change be offering numerous 
briefs that had a direct impact on the rulings made justices of the U.S. Supreme Court.120 
 Second Amendment interest groups have also played important roles in changing the 
legal perspectives of firearms law.  Brian Doherty’s gun rights account of the behind-scenes 
action before and during the consideration of the Heller decision provides significant background 
for understanding the thinking of Supreme Court justices on critical constitutional and policy 
issues.  Accordingly, Doherty provides extensive background about the maneuvering that 
allowed Associate Justice Antonin Scalia to deliver the majority opinion in Heller.  There seems 
to be a consensus among scholars that the four other justices in the majority forced Scalia to 
blunt the original language of the proposed decision or there was the potential for a defection, 
which would have been lethal to the outcome of the 5-4 decision.  Scalia’s original view on the 
case was that an individual right to own and possess firearms could be clearly established by the 
legal application of historical interpretation, grammar, and common sense.121 
Doherty provides other compelling stories about the plaintiffs' fight for the right to 
protect themselves and their families from violent, crime-ridden neighborhoods, the activist 
lawyers who worked exhaustively to affirm that right, and the forces that fought to stop the case 
from being heard, including city officials and the NRA.  For instance, Dick Heller, the eventual 
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plaintiff in the Heller case, was an avid firearms collector, weapons expert, and a licensed special 
police officer for the District of Columbia, who had to carry a gun in the federal office buildings 
in which he worked; however, he was unable to have one in his possession at home.  Living in a 
high-crime area of southeastern D.C., Heller had seen the area transform from a family-friendly 
environment to a rampant drug haven.  Heller was the natural choice in the case once the Cato 
Institute had completed its vetting process to determine the best possible plaintiff.122 
Although Doherty, Levy, and Mellor provide impenitent support for gun rights, others 
have published work about the horrors of gun violence in the streets of the United States.  For 
instance, in a fascinating personal account of horrors of gun violence in the streets of America, 
Geoffrey Canada notes that firearms are the reason why inner cities in New York, Los Angeles, 
Chicago, and beyond are so violent.  Essentially, the explosion of killings across the inner city is 
based upon decades of ignoring issues associated with guns, the failure to reign in the power of 
gangs, and collapse of support for increased sentencing on gun crimes.123  Alexander DeConde 
outlined many of the events that lead up to the passage of the Brady Bill and continued efforts in 
the U.S. Congress and state legislatures to pass increased gun control legislation.  For instance, 
in late 1999, a masked gunman short and killed three people in an Anaheim Medical Center.   
Three days later, investigators found that the total amount of money spent on treating gunshot 
victims was a sum equal to the spending on guns.  Once the California Assembly came back into 
session, they debated and ultimately rejected proposals to make gun crimes punishable by 
tougher sentences.124 
As the illustrated in this section, debate over the right to own firearms has affected 
American presidential policy, congressional public policy, and the judicial opinions, along with 
culture, cultural conflict, ideology, and academic interest.  From each of these different 
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perspectives, the deep sectional, cultural, and ideological divide in American life apparent within 
the debate over the Second Amendment is easily discernable.  The same firearms debate has 
often times been expressed in legal terms and also exemplifies the importance of the constitutive 
function of legality in American life.  Nowhere has this debate and legality perspective 
manifested itself more than inside the walls of state and federal courtrooms across the United 
States.  This dissertation focuses on the Second Amendment debate inside the state and federal 
judiciary across the country.  The following section provides an introduction to the research 
setting for the dissertation. 
Introduction to the Research Setting 
Every day federal, state, and local judges across the United States render decisions on 
issues ranging from mundane municipal parking violations to the polarizing political issue of the 
constitutionality of unlimited political campaign expenditures made by large private 
corporations.  These decisions, especially those regarding polarizing political issues, are crafted 
and affected by a number of internal and external forces, including the judge’s personal interests, 
his/her colleagues on the bench, the professional and personal circles the judges interact with 
outside the walls of their chambers or courtrooms, the presidential nominations that allowed the 
judges to achieve their professional standing, and the political and ideological forces that the 
judges must obey in order to maintain their professional standing, among many others.   
These internal and external factors affect judicial rulings, American public policy 
outcomes, and even the way the public goes about their lives on a daily basis.  Although relevant 
in so many ways, judicial behavior and the forces that affect that behavior have failed to 
determine differences in behavior between the many institutions of the state and federal 
judiciary.  Second, scholarship has failed to provide a descriptive analysis of the extent of 
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judicial rulings at the various levels of the judiciary.  Third, the literature has not explained the 
judicial outcomes of polarizing public policies, such as the Second Amendment.  Fourth, 
scholars have been unable to explain the behavior of the lawyers who litigate these important 
cases.  This dissertation attempts to do all four of these tasks.  The following paragraphs explain 
the research setting, objective, theory, and design of each chapter included in this dissertation.  
The second chapter will consider Second Amendment interest groups, cause lawyers, and 
strategic litigation through the lens of legal participation in firearms-related cases, the litigation 
strategies of Second Amendment interest groups and lawyers, the avenues through which Second 
Amendment interests and lawyers shop for court venues, the coordination and networking efforts 
of these related groups, and the interest group and legal team organization.  This chapter utilizes 
telephone interviews with both gun rights and gun control Second Amendment cause lawyers 
and group leaders litigating state and federal firearms cases for reputable firearms interest 
groups.  
The list of potential candidates for the leader and lawyer interviews was culled from data 
collected regarding state supreme court and federal courts of appeal cases in which a legal party 
either made a Second Amendment claim or cases where the central issue involved in the case 
centered upon Second Amendment issues that were litigated between 1 January 1960 and 31 
December 2009.  In this chapter, I theorize that there will be clear differences between gun rights 
and gun control interest groups, between heavily funded and lesser funded interest groups, and 
between local, state, and national Second Amendment interest groups, with regard to legal 
participation, litigation strategies, venue-shopping, coordination, networking, and organization.  
Sixteen interviews with both interest group leaders and lawyers were conducted between 24 
 32 
 
August and 15 October 2010.  The literature review, research design, results of these interviews, 
discussion, and conclusions are presented in chapter two. 
The third chapter of the dissertation considers the extent of state supreme court decisions 
in which a legal party either made a Second Amendment claim or cases where the central issue 
involved in the case centered upon Second Amendment issues that were litigated between 1 
January 1960 and 31 December 2009 through usage of logistic regression analysis.  Case-level 
data was collected from the legal search engine within the LexisNexis Academic database.  
Search terms for data collection included the following phrases: Second Amendment, concealed 
weapons, concealed weapons permits, automatic weapons, semi-automatic weapons, gun 
violence, gun show loophole, background checks, right to bear arms, sawed-off shot gun, assault 
weapon, convicts and firearms, and gun bans.  After data collection, a total of 269 cases fit these 
selected criteria. 
The dependent variable was the actual gun control or gun rights rulings, while the 
independent variables included state supreme court judge selection method, the presence of a 
state intermediate appellate court, state political ideology scores, state population density, state 
gun ownership percentage, and state homicide rate.  Logistic regression commands for the 
variables mentioned above were used within Stata, the statistical analysis program.  In this 
chapter, I theorize that elected state supreme court judicial selection methods, the presence of a 
state intermediate appellate court, a conservative state political ideology, low state population 
density, high gun ownership percentages, and low homicide rates increase the probability of a 
Second Amendment decision that will favor gun rights, while non-elected state supreme court 
judicial selection methods, the absences of a state intermediate appellate court, a liberal state 
political ideology, high state population density, low gun ownership percentages, and high 
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homicide rates increase the probability of a Second Amendment decision that will favor gun 
control.  The literature review, research design, results of this statistical analysis, discussion, and 
conclusions are presented in chapter three. 
The fourth chapter of the dissertation considers federal appellate decisions in which a 
legal party either made a Second Amendment claim or cases where the central issue involved 
centered upon Second Amendment issues that were litigated between 1 January 1960 and 31 
December 2009 through usage of logistic regression analysis.  As with the previous chapter, 
case-level data was collected from the legal search engine within the LexisNexis Academic 
database.  Search terms for data collection included the following phrases: Second Amendment, 
concealed weapons, concealed weapons permits, automatic weapons, semi-automatic weapons, 
gun violence, gun show loophole, background checks, right to bear arms, sawed-off shot gun, 
assault weapon, convicts and firearms, and gun bans.  After data collection, a total of 219 cases 
fit these selected criteria. 
The dependent variable was the gun control or gun rights rulings, while the main 
independent variable was the majority appellate panel presidential nomination, which means that 
if a panel had two Democratic-appointed judges and one Republican-appointed judge then that 
case was coded as a Democratic appellate panel decision.  Additional independent variables 
include appellate panel political ideology, population density, gun ownership percentage, and 
homicide rate.  Logistic regression commands for the variables mentioned above were used 
within Stata, the statistical analysis program.  
In this chapter, it is theorized that circuit courts that have panel decisions with a 
Republican majority, a conservative political ideology, low population density, high gun 
ownership percentages, and low homicide rates increase the probability of a Second Amendment 
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decision will favor gun rights, while circuit courts that have panel decisions with a Democratic 
majority, a liberal political ideology, high population density, low gun ownership percentages, 
and high homicide rates increase the probability of a Second Amendment decision that will favor 
gun control.  The literature review, research design, results of this statistical analysis, discussion, 
and conclusions are presented in chapter four.  The fifth chapter of the dissertation presents a 
summary of the findings in my dissertation, the research implications, and conclusions.  
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CHAPTER TWO 
 
SECOND AMENDMENT CAUSE LAWYERS 
       
 
As long as there are guns, the individual that wants a gun to commit a crime is  
going to have one and is going to get it. 
 
   --3UHVLGHQW5onald Reagan, 1984 
 
 
If I could have banned them all—“Mr. and Mrs. America turn in your guns”—I  
would have! 
 
--U.S. Senator Diane Feinstein (D-CA), 1995 
 
 
 Emboldened by the 2008 U.S. Supreme Court ruling, District of Columbia v. Heller, 
which affirmed an individual Second Amendment right to own and operate firearms inside a 
federal district and found several portions of the D.C. Firearms Control Regulation Act of 
1975 unconstitutional, the Second Amendment Foundation filed another suit in federal 
court.  Known as McDonald v. Chicago, the Second Amendment Foundation suit challenged a 
controversial municipal handgun ban within the City of Chicago, IL.1  In preparation for the 
McDonald case, the Second Amendment Foundation obtained the legal services of Alan Gura 
of the law firm of Gura & Possessky, P.L.L.C.  A rising star within the civil rights legal arena, 
Gura had also successfully represented Dick Heller in D.C. v. Heller.2 
 Leading up the U.S. Supreme Court decision, Gura handled the McDonald case in the 
circuit court, wrote the pleadings, devised hundreds of legal arguments, developed a litigation 
strategy, and filed the petition for certiorari before the U.S. Supreme Court.3  Working with 
the Second Amendment Foundation, the Illinois State Rifle Association, and Chicago attorney 
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David Sigale on the case, Gura’s arguments explicitly challenged only parts of the Chicago 
firearms ban.  In particular, Gura confronted the Chicago prohibition on handgun registration, 
the requirement that guns be registered prior to their acquisition by Chicago residents, the 
mandate that guns be re-registered annually, and the permanent inability to register a firearm 
that had its registration lapse.4 
 In McDonald v. Chicago, Gura’s knowledge of the case subject matter and the 
conservative bent of the U.S. Supreme Court paid off.  Justice Samuel Alito, writing for the 
majority, sided with Gura and the Second Amendment Foundation, concluding “that the Due 
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment incorporates the Second Amendment right 
recognized in Heller.”5  Not only did the Supreme Court agree with Gura regarding the 
unconstitutionality of the Chicago handguns ban, but the majority ruling incorporated, or 
applied the Second Amendment to state law.  With the skilled assistance of the Second 
Amendment Foundation in McDonald and the National Rifle Association in Heller, Alan Gura 
has become one of the preeminent gun rights and libertarian-affiliated lawyers in the United 
States.  The work of local, state, and federal gun rights and gun control cause lawyers, such as 
Gura, is the focus of this study. 
 This study concentrates on state and federal Second Amendment cause lawyers 
through the lens of legal participation in firearms-related cases, the litigation strategies of 
Second Amendment interests and lawyers, how Second Amendment cause lawyers shop for 
court venues, the coordination and networking efforts of related interests, and legal team 
organization.  This study utilizes telephone interviews with gun rights and gun control Second 
Amendment cause lawyers litigating state and federal firearms cases.  This study theorizes that 
there will be distinct differences between gun rights and gun control cause lawyers, between 
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heavily funded and lesser funded interest groups, and between local, state, and national 
Second Amendment cause lawyers, with regard to legal participation, litigation strategies, 
venue-shopping, coordination, networking, and organization.  The following section reviews 
important literature regarding cause lawyering. 
Styles of American Cause Lawyering 
 The average American private practice lawyer is often seen as a “hired gun.”  These 
individuals are thought to possess shifting values based on the cases they are preparing for and 
arguing in a legal setting.  However, some practicing attorneys do enjoy an established set of 
values that transfer into their working legal relationships.  These attorneys, known as cause 
lawyers, are committed legal professionals who pledge their time and legal skills in an attempt 
to further the establishment of a better society.  Essentially cause lawyers, motivated by their 
own personal beliefs, attempt to elevate the legal profession beyond a simple tool through 
which lawyers peddle their services for a fee without regard for the potential ends a case might 
create.  By attempting to connect personal morals with the legal profession, cause lawyers 
attempt to improve humanity by challenging what they perceive to be wrong with society.6 
Individual Client Lawyering 
 Four styles of cause lawyering have been proposed in order to better understand their 
efforts.  The first style of lawyering is known as individual client lawyering.  The foundation 
of the legal profession is the fundamental responsibility of an attorney to focus on the legal 
needs of their clients.  The simple goal of this form of cause lawyering is to provide clients 
access to legal services who might not have representation otherwise.  Most of the time, these 
clients simply cannot afford legal representation because of their financial situation, and thus 
have little to no access to the American justice system.7 
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 Individual client lawyers have been a mainstay within several different societal 
litigation movement efforts over the last fifty years.  For instance, Susan Olson found that the 
litigation strategy surrounding the individual client lawyers that served the disabled have been 
more decentralized at the state and local levels and featured greater client participation than 
was apparent in the 1950s and 1960s.8  Neal Milner found that the lawyers who worked on the 
legal protection of mentally disabled clients coped with what Stuart Schiengold labeled a 
“myth of rights,” which referred to having faith in the protective and transformational 
character of legal rights.  However, lawyers of the mentally disabled have also established a 
liberation ideology that accepted Schiengold’s “politics of rights,” which refers to rights as an 
instrument or resource that can alter one’s life and the behavior of others.9  According to 
Robert Mnookin and Robert Burt, children dealing with foster care, pregnancy, abortion, 
school discipline problems, the welfare system, and mental retardation have seen mixed rates 
of success when their cases were brought before the state and federal judiciary.  Essentially, 
success came down to resources.  Individual client lawyers that had resources were more 
successful.10  
Individual cause lawyers also played important roles in the anti-poverty movement.  
According to Joel Handler, Ellen Hollingsworth, and Howard Erlanger, anti-poverty lawyers 
piggybacked on top of President Lyndon Johnson’s Great Society anti-poverty initiatives.  By 
litigating cases at the same time as many of the Great Society programs, anti-poverty lawyers 
were much more successful.11  Beth Harris argued that lawyers played a secondary role in the 
anti-poverty movement by providing the resources and strategies for litigation, and lobbying 
elected officials on behalf of clients and regarding poverty issues.12  Providing a different 
perspective about cause lawyers fighting for the rights of the poor and disadvantaged, John 
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Kilwein argued that, contrary to the findings of other scholars, individual client lawyers in 
Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania did play an integral role in the lives of the needy.  Specifically, Kilwein 
argued that poverty lawyers tailored different litigation strategies to the types of issues faced by 
clients and groups.13 
 Cause lawyers have also been productive in fighting for the rights of workers, the 
condemned, the convicted, and animals.  Michael McCann powerfully illustrated that even when 
lawyers were unsuccessful in wage discrimination and pay equity battles on behalf of female 
workers, the battles helped to raise public consciousness about the rampant gender-based 
discrimination in the workplace.14  In a different work, Austin Sarat considered the impact of 
lawyers on the rights of condemned individuals.  Arguing that capital punishment lawyers 
created a political claim of “democratic optimism,” Sarat disagreed with the notion that the death 
penalty was rooted in reality, but founded on ignorance and misunderstanding, of which 
individual lawyers attempted to expose.15 
 Alternately, Susan Sturm explored the legacy and future of litigation surrounding 
corrections and convicted individuals.  Sturm investigated four main assumptions: that 
corrections litigation has contributed to a greater understanding of institutions; leadership and 
staff have contributed to American bureaucracy, and is associated with institutional order 
through the help of lawyers.  Sturm created these assumptions through careful review of 
important corrections cases from the 1970s and 1980s.16  In a final piece, Helena Silverstein 
examined the animal rights movement from the perspective of litigation practices.  The most 
important aspect of the work focused on the way litigation and associated strategies influenced 
the activities and opportunities of the movement for success.  She concluded that greater 
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societal reform regarding the rights of animals has been established through the work of 
individual animal rights lawyers.17 
Impact Cause Lawyering 
The second style of lawyering is known as impact cause lawyering.  This style of 
lawyering is often punctuated by the litigation of class action lawsuits or deliberately chosen 
cases.  In particular, impact cause lawyers have sought to solve unjust conditions within 
society through their litigation efforts.  In many of these rulings, a favorable decision will 
solve current societal problems, as well as future collective problems.  According to John 
Kilwein, effective impact litigation efforts should bring legal change to some practice, 
institution, or group of individuals who have been negatively affected by certain elements of 
society.18 
The effects of impact cause lawyering have long been seen within the African-
American Civil Rights Movement.  In fact, some of the first impact cause lawyers served 
groups affiliated with the civil rights movement.  In particular, scholars have focused on the 
attempts by the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP) Legal 
Defense Fund during the 1940s and 1950s to overturn institutional segregation in public 
education across the country.  Richard Kluger outlined how cause lawyers, such as the future 
U.S. Supreme Court Justice Thurgood Marshall, helped the NAACP Legal Defense Fund 
litigate a number of educational segregation cases culminating in the Brown v. Board of 
Education (1954) decision that prohibited racial segregation in educational facilities.  Calling 
the Brown decision one of the five most important U.S. Supreme Court rulings of all time, 
Kluger established the fact that Thurgood Marshall became the principal hero of the fight for 
civil rights for all people.  Instead of directly confronting the Plessy v. Ferguson (1896) 
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decision that upheld the constitutionality of racial segregation, Marshall decided that smaller 
court victories within the sphere of the “separate but equal” legal edict would be a better 
tactic.  This litigation strategy created by Marshall resulted in a string of smaller victories that 
eventually encouraged the NAACP legal team to challenge Plessy head on and succeed.19 
Mark Tushnet emphasized the internal workings of the NAACP’s Legal Defense 
Fund’s organization and their cause lawyers.  Tushnet’s basic argument suggested that the 
dedication, along with the significant political connections and legal skills of the NAACP 
legal team and other staff members of the Legal Defense Fund, were responsible for the 
ultimate success of this important interest group litigation effort.  Individuals including Walter 
White, Charles Hamilton Houston, and Thurgood Marshall, possessed the ability and 
perseverance to topple one of the foremost social and institutional arrangements in America, 
educational segregation.20   
Jack Greenberg provided additional insight into the inner workings of the NAACP 
Legal Defense Fund, as the author worked as Marshall’s legal assistant and eventually led the 
fund after Marshall’s departure.  While the author focused on the abilities of the lawyers he 
worked with, Greenberg also made sure to note that organizational conflict did undermine the 
group on several occasions when case representation and support were hotly debated.  
However, Greenberg argued that these instances of conflict only brought their colleagues 
closer together to fight against institutional segregation.21 
Like Greenberg, Michael Meltsner was a cause lawyer from inside the NAACP Legal 
Defense fund as an assistant under Thurgood Marshall and Jack Greenberg.  During his time 
with the Legal Defense Fund, Meltsner witnessed and participated in important litigation 
supporting the African-American Civil Rights movement across the United States, and the 
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South, in particular.  While Meltsner participated in the potent efforts associated with the 
Brown litigation, Meltsner also took part in other cases that tugged at his soul.  In particular, 
these litigation efforts surrounded cases, such as Griffin v. County School Board of Prince 
Edward County (1964) and Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Board of Education (1971), 
which attempted to dismantle the re-segregation efforts across the country in the years 
following the first Brown decision.22  
Stephen Wasby explored the litigation strategies of the American Civil Rights 
Movement between the late 1960s and the 1980s.  Wasby argued that earlier litigation strategy 
studies overemphasized the planned nature of the NAACP’s and other strategic litigation 
campaigns, and presented a different picture of what occurred during their litigation efforts.  
The picture of the NAACP civil rights litigation strategy created by Wasby focused attention 
on the problems faced by the lawyers litigating cases and noted how numerous aspects of the 
strategy were not planned, simple, or linear, in nature, as other scholars have argued.23  In a 
final piece, David Kairys became one of the preeminent civil rights cause lawyers living in the 
North between 1960 and 1970.  Kairys’ work focused on several successful race 
discrimination cases from Philadelphia he brought against the Federal Bureau of Investigation 
(FBI), and positively impacted the lives of local African-Americans.24 
Impact cause lawyering has also been a part of the American Women’s Rights 
Movement.  In particular, the lawyers of the movement focused on lobbying efforts at the 
executive and congressional levels for measures that helped gain more rights for women.  For 
instance, the Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972 was a successful federal attempt to 
outlaw racial and gender discrimination by employers and unions.25  In another effort, Title IX 
was passed, after intense congressional and executive lobbying efforts by lawyers, to end 
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gender-based discrimination in education.26  The culmination and, ultimately, the failure of the 
Women’s Rights Movement resulted in congressional passage of the Equal Rights 
Amendment (ERA), an amendment that would have added gender-based discrimination 
protection to the U.S. Constitution.  However, the ERA failed to gain ratification by the states 
before the deadline passed.27  However, Alice Echols argues that, even though lawyers lobbied 
Congress on behalf of the equal employment act and the ERA, cause lawyers played 
secondary roles in the movement.  Lawyers who supported women’s rights joined local 
feminist organizations represented women in legal cases that challenged the status quo.28 
Impact cause lawyers have also been successful within welfare reform litigation efforts.  
Martha Davis argued that cause lawyers played a significant role in the welfare rights movement.  
In the movement, lawyers developed and implemented an ambitious litigation strategy that 
fought for and won a “right to live” that required the federal government to guarantee a 
minimum standard of living for all individuals.29  Barbara Sard made the case that the state and 
federal courts, and in turn lawyers, played an important role in welfare reform.  By helping to 
establish a minimum wage, welfare rights lawyers were integral to the success of this 
movement.30 
Mobilization Cause Lawyering 
The third style of lawyering is known as mobilization cause lawyering.  Mobilization 
lawyers attempt to give their clients a greater understanding of their class and group.  
Attorneys attempt to communicate with their client that they are part of a historically 
oppressed group within society.  In order to achieve both of these goals, lawyers must create a 
new dialogue with clients and establish a better understanding of what the legal profession can 
achieve.  Along with performing their normal legal functions for clients, mobilization lawyers 
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engage clients in dialogue to create a state of collective affirmation.  Mobilization lawyers 
develop discussions between a number of clients in order for them to be made aware that they 
are part of a larger group of individuals who suffer comparable difficulties in society.  
Essentially, mobilization cause lawyers create dialogue between social group clients and the 
community that aides the growth of group mobilization.31 
One social group that has been able to establish a greater understanding of themselves 
through litigation was the gay, lesbian, and transgender movement.  According to Patricia 
Cain, cause lawyers played a prominent role in the lesbian, gay, bisexual, and transgender 
movement.  These cause lawyers often successfully took on state sodomy laws, which were 
one of the chief ways states targeted homosexual lifestyles and defined them as being deviant.  
For instance, Abby Rubenfeld, legal director of Lambda Legal, a civil rights organization 
focusing on homosexual communities, said that “sodomy laws are the bedrock of legal 
discrimination against gay men and lesbians”.32   
Patricia Cain explored the role of lawyers inside the gay and lesbian civil rights 
movement in a separate volume.  In particular, Cain provided a detailed examination of the 
legal strategies used by gay rights cause lawyers in court.  The litigation strategy employed by 
many gay rights cause lawyers tried to emulate the success of the African-American Civil 
Rights Movement by focusing on smaller local and state cases and achieving victories in these 
cases.  Unfortunately, the rate of success of gay rights cause lawyers was much less than that 
of the NAACP because of the social stigma of the gay community.  Cain argued that through 
many of these early litigation efforts the lawyers helped to mobilize the gay community in to 
being a cohesive unit when in court.33 
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Client Voice Lawyering 
The fourth style of lawyering is known as client voice lawyering.  According to John 
Kilwein, client voice lawyering involves more than a simple translation of a client’s story into 
a legal case.  Client voice lawyering involves clients gaining the ability to express their own 
personal story outside the scope of a courtroom.  Client voice lawyering scholars have argued 
that this style retains some usefulness, but the lawyering process could be improved if the 
voice of the clients could be heard.  This dialogue between clients, lawyers, and the public 
allows clients to learn about themselves and their social group, about the litigation process, 
and about mobilizing activities.34 
 Scholarship regarding cause lawyering styles, civil rights, and social movement 
litigation practices raises the question.  How have cause lawyers dealt with issues related to 
civil liberties?  These four lawyering styles help us to explain how lawyers have helped civil 
rights groups and other movement, but little work has been produced regarding civil liberties 
cause lawyering.  In particular, one of the most polarizing political issues in America today are 
those often associated with firearms.  Not only have firearms issues been legislated in 
Congress, but firearms policies have also been handed down from the White House.  Most 
importantly, Second Amendment issues have been brought to court by cause lawyers 
following different styles of lawyering with varying levels of success.   
 Why explore litigation to address issues related to firearms?  Often times American 
social and political movements, such as the African-American civil rights or the gun rights 
movement, begin with noble expressions of outrage and employ what Stuart Scheingold 
labeled a “myth of rights,” which refers to having faith in the transformational character of 
legal rights, and the “politics of rights,” which refers to rights as an instrument or resource that 
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can alter one’s life and the behavior of others.  In particular, Schiengold argued that the 
enduring faith most Americans place in constitutional government is the foundational point for 
making sense of the contours of the American political community.  Thus, Scheingold argued 
that American law is a principal and responsive element of American national identity and 
American politics itself.35 
Scheingold argued that the symbolic life of law surfaces as a “myth of ULJKWV
Scheingold’s “myth of rights” refers to the common assumption that litigation can evoke 
a declaration of rights from courts, that it can be used to assure the realization of these rights, and 
that realization is equivalent to meaningful legal, political, and social change.  In this way, the 
myth of rights expressed a faith in the promises of constitutional government.  Arguing that most 
Americans are responsive to the law, Scheingold thus suggested that the “myth of rights” 
augments American life in distinctive and creative ways.36   
Scheingold argued that the “myth of rights” facilitates a “politics of rights” in three 
important ways.  First, a claim of rights may activate political consciousness, and a belief in 
rights can help groups visualize and focus grievances and perceptions of unfairness that might 
otherwise remain unclear.  Second, a claim of rights could be useful for political organizations 
that would like to increase their publicity. Third and finally, the cumulative impact of 
consciousness and simplicity can encourage a realignment of resources and values at the public 
policy level.37  This study explores Scheingold’s “politics of rights” through the participatory 
practices, litigation strategies, venue-shopping, coordination/networking, and organization of 
local, state, and national gun rights and gun control cause lawyers. 
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Design of the Research 
This study examines the participation, litigation strategies, venue-shopping, coordination 
and networking, and organization of local, state, and national Second Amendment cause lawyers.  
These five main issue areas strike at the heart of cause lawyering and policy litigation.  The five 
main issues became the focal point of the questions asked during interviews with Second 
Amendment gun control and gun rights cause lawyers in this study.  The following few sections 
outline these five important interview areas, along with providing a rationale for the creation of 
hypotheses and specific questions to be used in interviews with Second Amendment cause 
lawyers.  
Interest Group Case Participation 
Interest group participation in the policy process and in case litigation in the courts has 
long been a part of the strategy employed by interests that want to get ahead on certain policy 
goals.  For instance, Paul Collins and Lisa Solowiej analyzed pluralistic, competitive, and 
conflictual interest group amicus curiae participation is in the U.S. Supreme Court.  They found 
that the federal appellate courts were open to an array of interests and that particular types of 
groups did not dominate amicus activity.  Nonetheless, when interests engaged in this express 
form of participation, they played a clear role in shaping the flow of information.38  Karen 
O’Connor and Lee Epstein updated a previous interest group amici participation study and found 
that amicus briefs are filed in more than half of all non-commercial cases, and in two-thirds of 
the cases when criminal cases are excluded.  The authors also concluded that even from their 
brief analysis, amicus curiae participation by interests has become the norm for legal 
participation by groups.39 
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Interest group participation in case litigation can take many forms.  Susan Olson argued 
that the use of case litigation is more generally a function of an interest group's political and legal 
resources and participation.  Thus, patterns of interest-group litigation might parallel patterns of 
group participation in other arenas.  A survey of interest-group litigation in private civil cases in 
the Minnesota federal district courts found that cases involving regulatory policy attracted the 
highest frequency of group participation efforts, but a greater number of cases involving 
redistributive policy attracted more group activity overall.  District court litigation also included 
more citizen groups relative to occupational groups than a survey of interest groups at the 
national level found.40 
Richard Kluger argued the strategic participation of the NAACP Legal Defense Fund in 
certain litigation efforts was paramount in their success.  Instead of confronting the Plessy v. 
Ferguson (1896) head on, Marshall and the NAACP Legal Defense Fund decided that smaller 
court victories within the sphere of the “separate but equal” legal statute would be a more 
successful tactic.  This litigation strategy created by Marshall resulted in a number of smaller 
victories that eventually encouraged the NAACP legal team to challenge Plessy head on and 
succeed.  The strategic participation in local and state cases allowed the NAACP to ultimately 
succeed in their efforts to achieve equality.41 
Kristin Goss argued that the National Rifle Association (NRA), the preeminent American 
Second Amendment interest group, has engaged in both preemptive and reactive legal action on 
behalf of gun rights clients.  The NRA employed preemptive legal action against the Chicago, 
IL, suburb of Morton Grove when it decided, by action of the town council, to ban the ownership 
and possession of firearms inside the municipal limits of the town.  The NRA engaged in 
reactive legal action most of the time.  In particular, the NRA flexed its legal muscle when the 
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group successfully sued Handgun Control, Inc. over postal discounts the group enjoyed in the 
early 1980s, and when the NRA unsuccessfully sued the Washington, D.C., city council over a 
local gun ownership and possession ban.42   
Osha Davidson argued that while the NRA focused their attention on litigating certain 
cases and issues, the majority of their participation rested in lobbying the U.S. Congress.  For 
instance, when the NRA was attempting to have the 1986 Gun Control Act repealed, the NRA 
concentrated on lobbying members of Congress rather than bringing lawsuits.43  Scott Melzer 
argued that the NRA was an active participant in policy litigation from the 1980s to the present.  
In particular, Melzer argued that once foreign and domestic gun manufacturers started to produce 
guns that bypassed certain provisions of the Brady Bill, the NRA began an assault on the statute, 
as well as the manufacturers.  In the end, the effort amounted to little as the NRA failed to have 
the bill ruled unconstitutional in the courts.44 
I suggest a similar dynamic is at work regarding interest group participation in the courts, 
as there is a potential dichotomy between gun rights and gun control interests and their use of the 
judiciary.  I hypothesize that there will be clear differences between gun rights and gun control 
interest groups, between heavily funded and lesser funded Second Amendment interest groups, 
and between local, state, and national Second Amendment interest groups with regard to way the 
interest groups decide to participate in cases.  This work and hypotheses propelled me to pose 
questions on the topic of legal participation during telephone interviews with Second 
Amendment interest group cause lawyers.  Interview questions for case participation focused 
attention on participation in Second Amendment case litigation, how cases get to certain interest 
groups, how and why interest groups decide to become involved with cases, and the factors that 
determine interest group participation in certain cases.  
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Interest Group Litigation Strategies 
 The litigation strategies used by various legal teams in the African-American civil 
rights movement, lesbian and gay civil rights movement, and other ideologically-based 
movements have been a central issue of study within the literature of interest group and 
judicial-based literature.  Stephen Wasby suggested that the common picture surrounding civil 
rights interest group litigation was one of success with ease after a planned and crafted 
litigation campaign was inaccurate.  Instead, Wasby argued that the majority of civil rights 
litigation that occurred after the Brown decision should be characterized as unplanned 
litigation activities that occurred throughout the “humps and bumps” of the civil rights 
movement.45  Mark Tushnet's classic study of the civil rights movement provided a history of 
this strategic litigation campaign in the years before the Brown decision.  Tushnet elucidated 
the NAACP’s litigation strategy during this period as one that focused on cases that the 
lawyers thought that they could win, along with great success and relative ease after a planned 
and carefully crafted litigation campaign both before and after the Brown decision.46 
 Since the mid-1970s, litigation within the civil rights arena was most notably carried 
out by Morris Dees and Joseph Levin of the Southern Poverty Law Center (SPLC) through 
lawsuits against racist organizations and by taking on controversial discrimination cases.  In 
particular, Dees became the primary creator of an advanced discrimination litigation strategy.  
Using civil lawsuits to gain court judgments for monetary damages against discriminatory 
organizations for illegal practices, Dees then used the court system to gain access to 
organizational assets, such as money or property, to have the judgment paid out.  SCLC 
lawyers used this innovative litigation strategy to hold the Ku Klux Klan (KKK) responsible 
for the acts of its followers.  By the early 1980s, Dees and the SPLC successfully sued the 
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KKK for the family of Michael McDonald, the black victim of a lynching in rural Alabama 
carried out by KKK members. In the judgment, the McDonald family was awarded seven 
million dollars.47  Eventually, the United Klans of America were forced into bankruptcy 
because of the judgment, and it caused their national headquarters to be sold in order to fulfill 
the judgment.48  
Patricia Cain explored the role of lawyers and their strategies inside the gay and 
lesbian civil rights movement.  For instance, lesbian and gay civil rights attorneys have relied 
on similar legal arguments and strategies that were developed by earlier civil rights lawyers 
fighting for racial and gender equality.  These lesbian and gay civil rights lawyers challenged 
discrimination against homosexuals through use of planned and carefully crafted litigation 
campaigns that focused on constitutional equal protection theories that were rooted in the 
Fourteenth Amendment.49  Much like Cain, Rebecca Salokar provided an in depth 
examination of the litigation strategy utilized by the gay and lesbian civil rights movement.  
Calling the litigation strategy used by the gay rights movement “systematic” in nature, Salokar 
noted that the litigation strategy was not national in scope; however, it was focused on cases 
that the various litigators could win in friendly judicial arenas.50 
In one of the first articles focusing on conservative cause lawyers, Karen O’Connor and 
Lee Epstein argued that, in fact, conservative interest groups do use the courts to litigate in a 
strategic fashion.  In particular, O’Connor and Epstein found that the strategic litigation 
employed by conservative groups mostly consisted of the use of amicus curiae briefs since the 
1970s.51  In a later work, Lee Epstein compared three types of conservative interest groups, 
including economic, social, and public interest groups, to determine how each conducts litigation 
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activities.  In her comparison, Epstein found that conservative social and public interest groups 
were more likely to utilize amicus curiae briefs than economic interest groups.52 
Steven Teles explored the nature of The Federalist Society, a preeminent American legal 
reform organization for conservatives and libertarians.  Teles argued that the rapid growth of The 
Federalist Society forced the organization to adopt unorthodox legal strategies to advance their 
conservative agenda.  Instead of working for direct legal change through the court system, 
members of The Federalist Society choose to act as an intellectual organization focused on 
networking between entrepreneurs who would bring legal action in the courts.53  Kim Scheppele 
and Jack Walker developed a model of interest group litigation that included organizational 
resources, conflict structure, sensitivity and structure of the political issue, strategies that gain 
influence, and universe of the political issue.  The authors discussed the two main litigation 
strategies utilized by interest groups: lawsuits and amicus curiae brief filings.54  
Lee Epstein and Joseph Kobylka also established the fact that the success and failure of 
litigation strategies by interest groups, and litigators in general, can greatly affect how those 
interests move forward inside and outside the courtroom.  As the authors noted, litigation 
strategies and tactics evolve over time, not just within the litigation of a case, but with a series 
of cases over time that might be litigated by a diverse set of individuals and groups.55   
Literature, such as the work reviewed above, drives this study to question whether gun 
rights and gun control interest groups utilize different strategies during litigation.  This study 
hypothesizes that there will be distinct differences between gun rights and gun control interest 
groups, between heavily funded and lesser funded Second Amendment interest groups, and 
between local, state, and national Second Amendment interest groups with regard to the 
strategies used during litigation.  This work and hypotheses propelled me to ask certain 
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questions on these topics during telephone interviews with Second Amendment interest group 
cause lawyers.  Interview questions for litigation strategies placed on emphasis the types of 
litigation strategies used by Second Amendment interest groups, the productivity of litigation 
strategies, and the level of influence opposing counsel has on litigation strategies.  
Interest Group Judicial Venue-Shopping 
The issue of venue-shopping in the policy process and in other political spectrums is a 
relatively modern topic that has ramifications on both the success and failure of interest groups 
regarding the policy issues that they support.  Douglas Besharov examined the idea of forum 
shopping with regard to tort reform.  Focusing on individuals injured abroad, returned home, 
and resorted to the American court system for remedy, Besharov found that these individuals 
shopped between forums because of antiquated jurisdictional rules.56   
The Harvard Law Review defined forum shopping as “a litigant’s attempt to have his 
action tried in a particular court or jurisdiction where he feels he will receive the most 
favorable judgment or verdict”.57  The American legal system has tended to treat forum 
shopping as unethical or inefficient.  Often times, interest groups that shop for forums are 
accused of abusing the adversary system and squandering precious judicial resources.  
However, this law review note from Harvard University argued that these traditional notions 
about forum shopping might be incorrect as the process is much more complex than these 
characterizations suggest.58 
Andreas Lowenfeld explored the idea of forum shopping in concert with international 
litigation, arguing that less than two decades ago forum shopping in international litigation 
efforts was a little used tactic.  By the 1990s, forum shopping in litigation regarding 
international issues had become a fine art.  While forum shopping used to be a dirty tactic, it 
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has become a litigation method used in almost 70 percent of international cases.59  Paul Rubin, 
Christopher Curran, and John Curran examined how litigants in rent discrimination cases 
shopped between different judicial venues.  In particular, the authors argued that litigation 
forum shopping, as opposed to lobbying a legislature, was a better method of helping 
individuals injured during rent discrimination cases.  Shopping between judicial venues helped 
rent litigators find forums where their cases would be heard by a preferential court.60 
 In a litigation-based venue-shopping effort, Andrew Bell argued that the rules by 
which a judicial venue is selected and settled upon for the resolution of any given 
transnational dispute have created a complex body of laws of great commercial significance.  
Venue-shopping allows for both plaintiffs and defendants to try to win their case in a selected 
forum.  Accordingly, Bell examined the fascinating competition to win the battle for venues in 
transnational litigation, finding that venue-shopping within the judiciary and for interests is a 
vital pre-trial process.61   
Thomas Holyoke argued that most research on the lobbying strategies of organized 
interests is venue specific.  Yet organized interests frequently lobby in many different kinds of 
institutional venues, including the judiciary, often on a single issue, such as the Second 
Amendment.  In testing a model regarding venue decision-making, Holyoke found significant 
variation in the levels of lobbying performed by different organizations on issues in different 
legal venues, while expectations of opposition from other interests are a significant factor in 
the decision to lobby or take a case to a particular venue.62   
Marc Busch examined the alternative dispute resolution legal process used in the 
World Trade Organization (WTO) for preferential trade agreements between foreign nations, a 
process that allowed for a rise in forum shopping because the WTO allows complaints to be 
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filed with local, regional, or multilateral legal venues.  Busch found that countries engaged in 
these legal complaints discriminated along overlapping international membership lines.63 
The scholarship regarding venue-shopping in general, and judicial venue-shopping 
specifically, concentrated attention on the notion that interest groups do shop between judicial 
venues when engaging in litigation.  Consistent with the literature, this study hypothesizes that 
there will be distinct differences between gun rights and gun control interest groups, between 
heavily funded and lesser funded Second Amendment interest groups, and between local, 
state, and national Second Amendment interest groups with regard to judicial venue-shopping.  
Interview questions for interest group venue-shopping focused on whether or not certain 
interest groups shop for venues, if certain levels of the judiciary are favored, and whether or 
not litigation strategy changes based on the venue selected for litigation. 
Interest Group Coordination and Networking 
Interest group coordination and networking is a part of the strategy employed by 
interest groups in pursuit of policy goals.  An example of interest group coordination and 
networking on behalf of litigation efforts comes from the gay and lesbian civil rights 
movement.  According to Patricia Cain, the gay and lesbian legal community developed solid 
communication networking systems to keep each lawyer and interested group apprised of 
important developments in cases involving lesbian or gay rights around the country and in 
developed democracies across the world.  This legal communication network that was 
developed after the Stonewall riots helped to create a legal services program for the 
homosexual community named Lambda.  The Lambda network helped to create a gay and 
lesbian legal strategy that was regional in scope because of the great geographical disparity in 
the rights given to gays and lesbians between states.64 
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 Interest group coordination and networking has also been important within the 
conservative legal movement.  Focusing on the Pacific Legal Foundation, the preeminent 
conservative/libertarian public interest legal group in the United States, Oliver Houck 
provided the background for the creation and early work of the legal group.  In particular, 
Houck argued that the Pacific Legal Foundation was integral in the creation of a much larger 
network of connected conservative interest groups with their eye on the state and federal court 
system as a means to forward a right-leaning agenda.65   
Ann Southworth argued that conservative interest groups and lawyers coordinated with 
other interest groups and lawyers, business leaders, clergy, and other conservative activists in 
support of conservative political issues, such as opposition to new regulatory policy, abortion 
regulations, separation of church and state boundaries, liberalized criminal laws, pro-busing 
laws, and opposition to the Equal Rights Amendment.  This coordinated network of 
conservative interest groups and lawyers gained critical support and resources for their legal 
efforts from foundations, such as the Heritage Foundation, the Cato Institute, and the 
Federalist Society, committed to supporting these causes and from an emerging policy 
research network capable of translating conservative and libertarian ideas into legislative and 
litigation campaigns.66   
John Heinz, Anthony Paik, and Ann Southworth found that conservative interest 
groups used extensive interest group networks to gain legal success.  In particular, 
conservative interest groups, including those from diverse areas of religious conservatives, 
libertarians, nationalists, and business interests, to litigate cases in state and federal 
courtrooms.67  In a later work focusing on the networks and organizations of conservative 
cause lawyers, Anthony Paik, Ann Southworth, and John Heinz argued that right-leaning and 
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libertarian interest group cause lawyers organize with interests that they agree with politically.  
The network of relationships established between lawyers and interest groups has helped to 
establish and maintain local, state, and national conservative coalitions between groups.68 
 David King and Jack Walker argued that interest groups have attempted to carve out 
their own policy niche through decentralized coordination with other interest groups.  
According to a survey completed by the authors, nearly 90 percent of interest groups claimed 
to coordinate all of their organized activities with other interests.  This high level of 
organization was fostered by the extent to which existing groups have joined together to help 
pay the initial expenses of newly formed organizations.  Coordination and communication 
between and among groups were also enhanced to the extent that staffers move between 
groups, as about three-quarters of groups employ permanent staff members who also held staff 
positions in other groups.69 
 Ken Kollman explored when and why interest group leaders in Washington sought to 
mobilize the public in order to influence policy decisions in Congress.  Of particular 
importance to this study was Kollman’s assertion that there is a distinct relationship between 
interest group lobbyists and legislators on policy issues on which they agree.  Coordination on 
policy goals between interest groups and politicians extended into the judiciary, as well.70   
This body of literature has focused attention on the potential for coordination and 
networking between different types of interest groups to occur in a dissimilar fashion.  This 
study hypothesizes that there will be distinct differences between gun rights and gun control 
interest groups, between heavily funded and lesser funded Second Amendment interest 
groups, and between local, state, and national Second Amendment interest groups with regard 
to coordination and networking.  Interview questions regarding this issue emphasized interest 
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group coordination and networking in the legal spectrum, coordination in general, 
coordination between both state and national organizations, along with interest group 
networking interdependencies and its effect on interest group litigation. 
Interest Group Legal Team Organization 
The organization of legal teams of local, state, and national interests has been a 
defining variable in the success of interest groups in the attainment of their public policy goals 
since interest group litigation started.  An example of the importance of interest group legal 
team organization comes from litigation efforts on behalf of the underprivileged.  Robert 
Moonkin and Robert Burt explored five case studies involving the underprivileged and the 
role and effectiveness of test case litigation brought by public-interest attorneys and resultant 
judicial policymaking in promoting the welfare and rights of children.  In each instance, the 
organization of the litigation team for each interest group was crucial in the success or failure 
of each case study and interest group.  Interest groups that had access to significant resources 
were much more successful that than those that did not have the same access.71 
In a seminal work on interest groups in American politics, E.E. Schattschneider argued 
that the scope of political conflict is an aspect of the scale of political organization and the 
extent of political competition.  Of particular importance are pressure groups.  Pressure groups 
are small-scale organizations while political parties are large-scale organizations.  Hence, the 
outcome of the political process depends on the scale on which it is played.  Since pressure 
groups are not universal, when conflicts are played out in narrow scope, most of the people are 
not represented.  Business-related groups dominate the pressure system, leading to an upper-
class bias.  This bias was strengthened by the tendency for participation in voluntary 
organizations to be related to upper social and economic status.  Thus, heavily-moneyed 
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interest groups have dominated the policy process.72  Agreeing with Schattschneider, Kevin 
Leyden examined the types of organized interests that get included in the policy-making 
process.  The analysis demonstrates that if a group expected to testify on specific policy 
issues, it must have had a substantial degree of organizational resources.73 
Monetary resources and staff-based work has also dominated the cause lawyering 
organizational literature.  Lynn Jones argued that one of the most important parts of a legal 
organization is its monetary resources.  Unfortunately, lawyers within many social movements 
have often been thought to have a negative impact on these movements for several reasons.  
First, litigation is costly because of the time, energy, and money needed for it to be completed.  
Second, spending monetary resources on litigation is inefficient because institutional issues 
hinder the ability of the courts to promote reform.  Third, the tendency of lawyers to prevent 
alternative social movement strategies exhausts resources.74 
Lynn Jones contended that cause lawyers bring several things to social movements.  
Most importantly, cause lawyers provide a certain set of resources to social movements.  
These resources include legal skills, prestige within the legal arena, organizational leadership, 
and monetary resources.75  This issue of monetary resources has also illustrated the differences 
between the funding levels of organizations.  Sandra Levitsky found that legal advocacy 
organizations within the gay community in Chicago, IL, had both the monetary resources and 
drive to dominate the gay movement because of their significant size, sophistication, and 
visibility within the media.  Smaller grassroots gay organizations simply did not have the same 
legal access as larger legal advocacy groups.  In fact, these smaller groups had less money and 
human resources to make the same difference as larger groups.76 
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Tim Howard examined how a small group of Florida cause lawyers brought down the 
big tobacco companies during the controversial Florida tobacco liability litigation efforts 
between 1993 and 1997.  Prior to this significant victory, big tobacco was thought to be 
unbeatable.  However, the author and five legal associates started with only a small 
organization, and eventually helped craft Florida’s Medicaid Third Party Liability Law, which 
created the foundation for the largest settlement in a civil case in U.S. history.  During the 
height of the litigation process, Howard and his law growing law firm amassed representation 
of more than 10,000 clients who sued large tobacco companies over the four year litigation 
period.77 
The important issue of organizational staffing has often been broached in the literature.  
Stephen Meili found that lawyers on staff in Argentine public interest groups were scarce.  In 
fact, fewer than twenty full-time cause lawyers worked for interest groups in the entire 
country.78  Susan Coutin argued that the legal staff of immigration interests played an 
important role in the daily operation of CARECEN and El Rescate, two Central American 
immigration interest groups, provided potential clients with initial legal consultations, gave 
legal advice, provided legal brief services, and collected information that helped to decide if 
the group would represent the client in legal proceedings.79 
Lucie White argued that FIDA-Ghana (Federacion Internacional de Abogadas), the 
first free legal aide services program in Ghana exclusively for women and children who 
otherwise could not afford it, created a nationwide network of legal services offices.  These 
offices were staffed by full-time lawyers, and provided direct legal assistance in civil cases.80  
Kevin den Dulk examined the culture of cause lawyers within the evangelical movement, 
arguing that conservative and evangelical organizations took major steps forward in the 1990s 
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by increasing the number of staff members and sponsoring major high profile cases, such as 
Paula Jones’ civil lawsuit against Bill Clinton.  Without the unwavering support of skilled 
staff members evangelical groups would have been unable to support the cases they 
sponsored.81 
This work regarding interest group cause lawyering organization suggests that the 
organizational structure of an interest group’s legal team is a crucial variable to the success or 
failure of litigation efforts.  This study hypothesizes that there will be distinct differences 
between gun rights and gun control interest groups, between heavily funded and lesser funded 
Second Amendment interest groups, and between local, state, and national Second 
Amendment interest groups with regard to organizational structure.  Interview questions 
regarding this issue centered upon interest group organization in the legal spectrum, 
organization of interest group legal teams, levels of organization, the types of people 
employed by interest group legal teams, the types of organizational strategies utilized by 
interest groups, and the sources of funding for interest group legal teams. 
Methodology and Data Collection Format of the Study 
 Telephone interviews were used to collect empirical data regarding Second Amendment 
interest group cause lawyer participation, litigation strategies, venue-shopping, 
coordination/networking, and organization.  According to Ronald Czaja and Johnny Blair, 
telephone interviews typically have low administrative costs, provide for a short period of study, 
and a wide geographic distribution for sampling.  Like administrative issues, questionnaire 
concerns vary significantly in telephone interviews.  Based on the type of questions asked, a 
telephone interviewer can use a lengthy survey instrument, employ questions of increasing 
complexity, and control the order of questions asked.  Scholars that use telephone interviews are 
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able to use open-ended questions and personal records.  On a personal level, telephone 
interviews provide for a good rapport between interviewer and respondent, allow sensitive topics 
to be broached, and allow non-threatening questions to be considered.  Overall, telephone 
interviews provide researchers with a high-quality empirical research method that has few 
administrative, survey, and data quality issues.82   
 The data collection format for this study regarding the factors that help explain Second 
Amendment interest group cause lawyers to participation in litigation, the strategies used in 
litigation efforts, court venue-shopping, coordination and networking between interest groups, 
and legal team organization utilized telephone interviews for the issues discussed in the 
preceding pages.  The list of potential candidates for the cause lawyer interviews was culled from 
data collected regarding state supreme court and U.S. Courts of Appeals cases in which a legal 
party either made a Second Amendment claim or cases where the central issue involved in the 
case focused on Second Amendment issues.  All interviews were conducted with lawyers who 
litigated a firearms-related case for a Second Amendment interest group between 1 January 1960 
and 31 December 2009 in these two levels of the judiciary.  Because of the date limitations 
represented in this study, no interview respondent litigated a case in the sample prior to 1980. 
Twenty-one total Second Amendment cause lawyers were interviewed.  Eleven gun 
rights and ten gun control Second Amendment cause lawyers were included in the interview 
pool.   Eighteen interview participants were taken from the cases in the samples used in Chapter 
Three and Four.  Three other interviews were completed as part of a snowball sample of 
potential cause lawyer names who were given to me during the first eighteen interviews.  All 
twenty-one interviews were conducted between 24 August and 19 November 2010.  While the 
telephone interviews were not timed, the average interview lasted forty-four minutes with the 
 68 
 
shortest lasting eight minutes and the longest lasting sixty-two minutes.  Interview recordings 
totaled fifteen hours and forty minutes. 
Dates and times were scheduled at least one week before the interview occurred and were 
completed between 10AM and 4PM on the dates specified with the respondents.  With the 
approval of the respondents, interviews were recorded using a small recording device.  Four of 
the twenty-one interview respondents asked that their names and interest groups not be used in 
this study.  As such, I have decided to simply number the respondents in interview date order and 
refer to each simply as “Respondent Six” or “Respondent Fourteen” in the text of this study.  
Without this pledge of anonymity, these respondents were reluctant to give any relevant 
information during interviews. 
Questionnaire design was completed, in conjunction with members of my dissertation 
committee, based on Second Amendment interest group participation in litigation, litigation 
strategies, judicial venue-shopping, coordination and networking between interest groups, and 
organization.  The questionnaire used in the interview included only relevant questions regarding 
these five topics.  The questionnaire employed both open-ended and closed-ended questions that 
allowed interview respondents to provide the interviewer with accurate and insightful responses.  
To fully engage the interview respondent, few notes were taken during the interview process.  
After completion of all the interviews, between 17 December and 23 December 2010, the 
interview recordings were reviewed and coded based on the responses given by the respondents 
in order to create a complete picture of the data collected.  The interviews conducted for this 
study fully conformed to the guidelines for research performed on individuals prescribed by the 
West Virginia University Office of Research and Economic Development. 
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Second Amendment Interest Group Cause Lawyering: Results and Analysis 
Although the previous sections have described important literature, theories, and methods 
that characterize interest group participation, litigation strategies, venue-shopping, 
coordination/networking, and organization as critical components of the operations of Second 
Amendment interest groups and their litigation efforts, a direct connection between the suggested 
issues and Second Amendment interest group cause lawyers also needs to be established.   
Table One illustrates the relevant demographic background of the interview respondents, 
as they relate to this study. 
Table One: Relevant Demographics of Gun Control Interest Group Cause Lawyers 
 
 National  
Interest Group 
State  
Interest Group 
Local  
Interest Group 
Total Gun Control Lawyers 5 3 2 
Interview Respondents 4, 12, 13, 19, 20 8, 9, 17 7, 15 
Funding Level High Moderate Low 
 
Table Two illustrates the relevant demographic background of the interview respondents, 
as they relate to this study. 
 
Table Two: Relevant Demographics of Gun Rights Interest Group Cause Lawyers 
 
 National  
Interest Group 
State  
Interest Group 
Local  
Interest Group 
Total Gun Rights Lawyers 6 3 2 
Interview Respondents 2, 3, 10, 11, 14, 18 5, 6, 21 1, 16 
Funding Level High Moderate Low 
 
Taken as a whole, the interview sample provides an interesting view of the litigation 
efforts of Second Amendment interest groups across the country.  Eleven interviews were 
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conducted with interest group cause lawyers that possess a national scope, while six were 
completed with state-level interest group cause lawyers and four with local-level interest group 
cause lawyers.  In total, eleven cause lawyers representing gun rights interest groups were 
interviewed, while ten gun control cause lawyers were interviewed.  
Six different national-level interest groups (three gun rights interest groups; three gun 
control interest groups) were represented in the respondent pool, while five state-level interest 
groups and four local-level interest groups were also represented in the pool of interview 
participants.  In total, fifteen different gun rights and gun control interest groups (seven gun 
rights interest groups; eight gun control interest groups) were represented in the respondent pool.  
Funding levels were taken from figures available on the websites of the represented interest 
groups.  The demographics outlined in Table One show that the interview respondent pool is 
representative of the interest groups and lawyers that currently practice law in favor of gun rights 
or gun control. 
Cause Lawyer Philosophy 
 From a philosophical standpoint, the twenty-one gun rights and gun control interest group 
cause lawyers interviewed for this study largely agreed with the philosophy espoused by interest 
group they worked for.  In fact, the seventeen interest group cause lawyers representing state and 
national Second Amendment interest groups reported that they always supported their interest 
group from a philosophical position.  Comparatively, the three of the four local interest group 
cause lawyers represented in this study reported that they did not always support the philosophy 
advocated by their interest group.  These two lawyers, one national gun control cause lawyer and 
one local gun rights cause lawyer, vividly illustrated the differences, or lack thereof, in their 
philosophical point-of-view: 
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 I almost always support the policies important to my superiors. I am fully invested  
in our agenda, and have a special interest in working cases that…that forward this 
plan. (Respondent Thirteen) 
 
If my group advocates for a particular philosophy that I cannot support, I would 
go into the (group) director’s office and tell him about it. In no way, am I going 
to neglect my personal values and goals to promote an agenda that I don’t think  
works or isn’t correct. (Respondent One) 
 
The three local interest group cause lawyers (one gun rights; two gun control), who 
reported that their support for the philosophy of their interest group wanes at times, made it clear 
that only certain issues affect their levels of support.  For instance, even though the local gun 
rights cause lawyer supports Second Amendment rights, he also supports legislation that would 
strengthen the background check process, so that individuals with mental illnesses have no 
chance to obtain a firearm.  His support for increased background check laws stem from an 
incident where a family member was harmed by an unregistered firearm brandished by an 
unstable individual.  The issues that affect support of the local gun control interest group cause 
lawyers differed.  For instance, these two lawyers explained the reasons and issues that affect 
their wavering philosophical support: 
Sometimes, I think, that the powers that be (in the interest group) aren’t worried  
about expanding gun registration laws. I really wish that they would. It pains me 
everyday to flip on CNN only to see lunatics shooting up schools.  
(Respondent Seven) 
 
 I think that the gun control movement as a whole, needs to focus on increasing  
awareness towards lackadaisical gun control laws…My guys need to be tougher  
on these laws. (Respondent Seventeen) 
 
Though philosophical issues are important issues covered in the interviews, the focus of 
the interviews was Second Amendment interest group participation, litigation strategies, venue-
shopping, coordination/networking, and organization.  The following pages outline the interview 
responses in these areas. 
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Interest Group Participation 
 For this study, interest group participation interview questions attempted to determine 
how Second Amendment cases get to interest groups for litigation purposes, how interest groups 
decide to participate in litigation, and why interest groups decide to participate in certain cases 
and not in others.  Table Two outlines important responses regarding how cases get to an interest 
group for litigation purposes.  
Table Three: How Cases Get to Second Amendment Interest Group Cause Lawyers 
 
Respondent(s) Cases Referred from 
Local Chapters 
Central Team 
Searches for Cases 
Intervene 
on Appeal 
1, 6, 7, 9, 15, 16, 17, 21    
2, 3, 10, 11, 12, 14, 19, 20 X X X 
4, 13  X X 
5   X 
8 X   
18 X  X 
Source: Interview Respondents One through Twenty-One83. 
Note: n=21 interviews;  
Note 1: Respondents 4, 12, 13, 19, 20 national level gun control interests, respondents 8, 9, 17 state level gun control 
interests, and respondents 7, 15 local level gun control interests; Respondents 2, 3, 10, 11, 14, 18 national level gun 
rights interests, respondents 5, 6, 21 state level gun rights interests, and respondents 1, 16 local level gun rights 
interests. 
Note 2: National interests have high funding levels, while state interests have moderate funding levels and local 
interests have low funding levels. 
 
According to Table Three, the most significant dividing line between the participatory 
litigation efforts of Second Amendment interest groups was money.  Consequently, Second 
Amendment interest groups that possessed a national scope, and significantly more monetary 
resources than their state and local counterparts, controlled more avenues that allowed groups to 
participate in gun-related litigation.  For instance, nine of the eleven national-level cause lawyers 
interviewed reported that they had cases referred from locally affiliated organizations.  Similar 
ratios are representative of the responses regarding central team searches for Second Amendment 
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cases and the ability or willingness to intervene in cases on appeal.  There were few differences 
between the participation efforts of gun rights and gun control cause lawyers and interest groups.  
According to two interview respondents, the reasons for these participatory efforts differ: 
Sometimes, we have one person looking for cases, other times we have bunches 
of people trying to find cases that fit our model and the issues we support. 
Regardless of our sources, we are always looking. (Respondent Thirteen) 
 
 Our local guys know what they are doing. In fact, I’ve practiced law with a few  
 of them. We trust a lot of their judgments regarding cases. They know what  
we want and, most of the time, they won’t waste our time with trivial (cases). 
(Respondent Three)  
 
Responses from the interviewed state and local cause lawyers regarding participation 
efforts differed wildly.  Taken as a whole, none of the three potential responses regarding 
participation received an affirmative reply from the four local lawyers.  State level cause lawyers 
reported similar findings.  Because of lesser funding and different organizational formats, state 
cause lawyers had fewer avenues where cases could get to them.  Given this, cases are still 
litigated by local and state interest groups; however, cases get to these groups through a number 
of back-channels, including the offering of informal legal advice and the acceptance of a case on 
a pro bono basis.  Accordingly, several local and state interview respondents outlined the reasons 
they used the specific avenues for participation outlined in Table Three: 
We have a couple of local groups…they work hard. They aren’t paid. They  
give us some (cases) every once and awhile. In fact, I think, we’ve been  
able to change the result of couple they have given us. (Respondent Eight) 
 
 Unfortunately, we only can do what we can do. Realistically, we can offer 
 help during the appeals process if we think we can be of service. Otherwise, 
 its tough for us. (Respondent Five)  
 
This study also posed questions to interview respondents regarding the process through 
which interest group legal teams decide to litigate cases.  Larger, national and state interests have 
continually followed potential cases that warrant consideration for litigation.  Because of this, 
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interest groups must decide which cases to take and which cases to decline.  In doing so, 
interview accounts reported that there was a clear distinction between levels of interest groups.  
In particular, large state and national Second Amendment interest groups decide to take more 
cases because they have the resources available to litigate them.  Winning was the most 
important component of deciding to participate in Second Amendment cases.  Nine of the eleven 
national interest group respondents reported that the potential of winning a case was most 
important factors in deciding to participate in litigation. 
For smaller, state and local interest groups, the decision to participate in cases was much 
more complex.  For instance, not only did smaller interests have to consider the monetary aspect 
of participation, but they also had to consider the potential outcomes after litigation.  As a small, 
local Second Amendment gun control cause lawyer reported: 
It’s hard for us. We don’t have the resources of the Brady group or the NRA.  
If we get involved, we have to consider tangible outcomes…after litigation.  
You know…potential television coverage of a case or membership drives  
afterwards would benefit. I worry about the solvency of our group all the time. 
(Respondent Fifteen) 
 
According to this local gun control lawyer, the decision to participate in litigation could 
potentially come down to the financial solvency of the group.  In the end, the group would be 
better off if they were able to capitalize on the news of their litigation.  Essentially, if the group 
was unable to guarantee news coverage or increased giving, then the likelihood of participation 
in a case would be small. 
Interview respondents were also questioned about the most important factors in deciding 
to participate in cases.  Responses regarding participatory factors created the first clear 
distinction between gun rights and gun control interest groups.  Of the eleven gun rights cause 
lawyers interviewed, ten responded that along with winning cases, the most important factor that 
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determines their participation in Second Amendment cases is ensuring constitutional standards 
are followed.  In fact, one national-level gun rights lawyer was adamant: 
It’s really about the legitimacy of the law. It’s clearly laid out in the Constitution 
that we have “the right to bear arms”…In my opinion, any violation of that is 
unfair. (Respondent Eighteen) 
 
The words of this national gun rights lawyer strike at the heart of majority of his brethren.  It is 
evident that most gun rights lawyers focus on the constitutional perspective when determining 
participation in cases.  
 From a comparative perspective, gun control lawyers responded with a mix of responses 
regarding the most important factor determining participation in cases.  Five of the ten gun 
control lawyers responded that changing a unjust law was the most important factor regarding 
participation, other responses included making legal and constitutional history and the potential 
for winning the case.  Most gun control lawyers worried about the potential for increased crime 
with regard to more guns on the streets.  In particular, one national gun control lawyer invoked 
the Heller decision to make his point clearer: 
I am of the opinion that a place like D.C. needs the laws that were in place prior to 
Heller. More guns on the streets mean more violence. It doesn’t seem fair to force 
citizens to live in what could amount to a war zone in several years.  
(Respondent Four) 
 
The differing views regarding the most important factors that determine participation couldn’t be 
more striking.  Gun rights lawyers consider participation from the much larger perspective of 
constitutional standards, while gun control lawyers mostly focus on individual laws and cases. 
Because of these results, two of the three hypotheses associated with Second Amendment 
interest group cause lawyer legal participation are accepted.  Specifically, data shows that there 
are distinct differences between heavily funded and lesser funded Second Amendment interest 
groups with regard to legal participation.  The study found that there were distinct differences 
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between local, state, and national Second Amendment interest groups with regard to legal 
participation.  Based upon the data collected, the legal participation hypothesis regarding 
differences between gun rights and gun control interest groups with regard to legal participation 
could not be accepted.  Thus, the null hypothesis could not be rejected.  The next issue area 
covered in interviews for this study was litigation strategy. 
Interest Group Litigation Strategies 
For this study, Second Amendment interest group litigation strategy questions sought to 
discover what litigation strategies are most productive for gun rights and gun control interest 
groups, what litigation strategies are least productive for gun rights and gun control interest 
groups, if litigation strategies change over time, and what level of influence different factors 
have over litigation strategies and tactics.  Table Four outlines the different litigation strategies 
used by Second Amendment interest groups and their cause lawyers.  
Table Four: Litigation Strategies Used by Second Amendment Interest Group Cause 
Lawyers 
 
Respondents(s) Amicus Curiae Test Cases Financial Support Other 
7, 9     
2, 3, 4, 10, 11, 13, 14, 18, 19, 20 X X X  
1, 6, 15    X 
8, 16, 17 X    
5  X   
12 X X   
21  X  X 
Source: Interview Respondents One through Twenty-One84. 
Note: n=21 interviews. 
Note 1: Respondents 4, 12, 13, 19, 20 national level gun control interests, respondents 8, 9, 17 state level gun control 
interests, and respondents 7, 15 local level gun control interests; Respondents 2, 3, 10, 11, 14, 18 national level gun 
rights interests, respondents 5, 6, 21 state level gun rights interests, and respondents 1, 16 local level gun rights 
interests. 
Note 2: National interests have high funding levels, while state interests have moderate funding levels and local 
interests have low funding levels. 
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In focusing on the litigation strategies of Second Amendment interest groups, it is important to 
note that major differences between local, state, and national level interest groups.  Interview 
responses indicate distinct differences between the litigation strategies of local, state, and 
national level interest groups.  In particular, local and state interests focused on litigation 
strategies that were most economically feasible.  For instance, one state level gun control lawyer 
reported: 
We tend to focus on legal briefs...Why? Well, they are relatively cheap, easy  
to produce, and have little standard format. My lawyer could produce a brief  
in an afternoon if the need arose. We just don’t have substantial resources.  
(Respondent Seventeen) 
 
According to the responses to litigation strategy questions listed in Table Four, the most 
popular strategy was the filing of non-binding amicus curiae, or “friend of the court” briefs, 
which provide judges with information to help decide cases.  In fact, 67 percent of interview 
respondents referred to amicus curiae briefs as primary litigation strategies.  A comparable 
percentage of 62 percent of interview respondents reported the usage of test case litigation 
strategies as challenges to established state and local gun rights and gun control laws, while 48 
percent of respondents reported that their interest group provided financial support to various 
Second Amendment litigants.  Four of the twenty-one interview respondents reported the usage 
of other litigation strategies as part of their Second Amendment efforts.  In particular, the other 
strategies used by these cause lawyers focus upon the lack of resources available to interest 
groups in question: 
I don’t know if you would call it a (litigation) strategy or not, but most  
of the time we try to match lawyers up with cases…if you know what  
I mean. Some lawyers are more likely to take cases on a pro bono basis 
if they agree with our groups standing on the matter. (Respondent One) 
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Focusing on the litigation strategies of the national Second Amendment interests included 
in the study, ten of the eleven national level cause lawyers reported that their interest group legal 
team used all three of the main litigation strategies mentioned previously.  The main reason for 
the usage of all three strategies was financial resources.  The national level interest groups have 
more financial resources.  In turn, these interests put much more money back into their litigation 
efforts.  For instance, two national level Second Amendment interest group cause lawyers, one 
gun rights lawyer and one gun control lawyer, provided similar answers regarding the 
importance of finances in litigation strategies: 
We have used all three strategies you mentioned. We believe that we owe it to  
the millions of members we serve to look into all potential litigation strategies  
to fight harmful laws across the country. We have few limits when it comes  
to spending. (Respondent Eleven) 
 
 Because of the generous support of our donors, we are able to use multiple  
approaches to gain traction in the courts. Briefs, financial support, and case 
testing in different jurisdictions are the main strategies we utilize.  
(Respondent Thirteen)  
 
In regard to litigation strategies, major differences exist between local, state, and national Second 
Amendment interest groups.  The main focus of the usage of differing litigation strategies was 
made apparent through numerous interview responses about the lack of financial resources at 
local and state interest group levels.  National level Second Amendment interest group cause 
lawyers made it clear that because of their higher levels of financial resources they are able to 
use different litigation strategies and to litigate more Second Amendment cases.  Differing 
litigation strategies between gun rights and gun control interest groups were not apparent.  
It is also important to consider the different types of factors that influence litigation 
strategies.  Table Five outlines the different influences regarding litigation strategies reported by 
Second Amendment interest group cause lawyers. 
 79 
 
Table Five: Influences on the Litigation Strategy of Second Amendment Interest Group 
Cause Lawyers 
 
Respondent(s) 
Opposing 
Counsel 
Judicial 
Attitudes
Existing 
Law 
Legis./Exec. 
Policy 
Legal Expert/Soc./ 
Sci. Evidence 
1, 7, 15, 16      
2, 3, 10, 11, 14, 18 X X X X  
4, 8, 9, 12, 13, 17    X X 
5, 6 X  X X  
19 X   X  
20 X X  X X 
21 X  X   
Source: Interview Respondents One through Twenty-One85. 
Note: n=21 interviews. 
Note 1: Respondents 4, 12, 13, 19, 20 national level gun control interests, respondents 8, 9, 17 state level gun control 
interests, and respondents 7, 15 local level gun control interests; Respondents 2, 3, 10, 11, 14, 18 national level gun 
rights interests, respondents 5, 6, 21 state level gun rights interests, and respondents 1, 16 local level gun rights 
interests. 
Note 2: National interests have high funding levels, while state interests have moderate funding levels and local 
interests have low funding levels. 
 
In focusing on the influences on litigation strategies of Second Amendment interest 
groups, it is important to note major differences exist between gun rights and gun control interest 
group cause lawyers.  Gun rights lawyers reported that they were much more likely to be 
influenced by the existing local, state, or federal law governing the case.  In fact, nine of twenty-
one interview respondents reported being influenced by existing law when deciding on Second 
Amendment litigation strategies.  All eight of these respondents represented gun rights interest 
groups, while no gun control cause lawyers were a part of the group influenced by existing law.  
In comparison, a similar data point was established with regard to the influence that legal 
experts, social science evidence, and hard science evidence has upon the litigation strategies of 
Second Amendment interest group cause lawyers.  Specifically, interview responses from gun 
control lawyers representing interest groups of all scopes reported that they were much more 
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likely to be influenced by legal experts, social evidence, and hard science evidence when 
deciding how to litigate Second Amendment cases.  In fact, eight of the twenty-one interview 
respondents reported being influenced by legal, social, and hard science evidence when deciding 
litigation strategies.  All eight of these respondents represented gun control interest groups, while 
no gun rights cause lawyers were a part of this group influenced by legal, social, and hard 
science evidence.  Regarding each of these findings, one gun rights and one gun control cause 
lawyer provided particularly colorful responses regarding both influential perspectives: 
We don’t follow that fluff (social science evidence) stuff. We follow the 
law. What is on the books is what we are fighting for or against. Just  
because a Ph.D. tells me something about guns doesn’t mean it has much 
value in the real world. (Respondent Two) 
 
 Above all it is important for us to follow the published research about  
the importance of gun control. Even though judges might not work with  
these studies, it is important for us that our legal points are backed up by  
evidence. (Respondent Twelve)  
 
Focusing on the particular interview responses regarding influences on litigation strategy, 
the data shows that influences were split relatively evenly between the five influential options 
outlined in the survey questionnaire.  For instance, 62 percent (thirteen of twenty-one) of 
interview survey respondents reported that legislative and executive politics and policies 
influenced their decision regarding litigation strategy regarding Second Amendment cases.  48 
percent (ten of twenty-one) of the cause lawyers surveyed reported that the opposing counsel and 
changing judicial attitudes influenced decisions about strategy for litigation.  From a comparative 
perspective, the two cause lawyer litigation influences that had the lowest level of affirmative 
response were existing laws (43 percent; nine of twenty-one) and legal experts, social evidence, 
and hard science evidence (38 percent; eight of twenty-one).  These results show that political 
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influences, the opposing counsel, and the judge sitting for a case were the most important factors 
when Second Amendment cause lawyers decided what strategies would be used during litigation. 
Analysis of the data collected regarding Second Amendment cause lawyering litigation 
strategies during interviews found acceptance for all three research hypotheses associated with 
this section.  More specifically, distinct differences were found between the litigation strategies 
of gun rights and gun control interest groups, between heavily funded and lesser funded Second 
Amendment interest groups, and differences between local, state, and national Second 
Amendment interest groups.  All three of these hypotheses are accepted and the associated null 
hypotheses are rejected.  The third issue area covered in interviews for this study was judicial 
venue-shopping. 
Interest Group Judicial Venue-Shopping 
For this study, Second Amendment interest group judicial venue-shopping questions 
attempted to discover the level of Second Amendment interest groups venue-shopping during the 
litigation process and whether or not litigation strategy changes depending upon the venue 
selected for litigation.  Table Six outlines the different aspects of venue-shopping regarding 
Second Amendment interest groups and their cause lawyers. 
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Table Six: The Judicial Venue-Shopping of Second Amendment Interest Group Cause 
Lawyers 
 
Respondent(s) Shop for 
Venues 
Favored 
Judicial 
Level 
Shop 
Between 
Urban/Rural 
Venue Shop in 
Diversity Cases 
Venue-Shopping 
Important Lit. 
Process 
1, 5, 7, 8, 9, 15, 16, 17 No -- -- -- -- 
2, 3, 10, 14, 18 Yes Federal Rural Yes Yes 
12, 13, 20 Yes Federal Urban Yes Yes 
4, 19 Yes State Urban Yes Yes 
6, 21 Yes State Rural No No 
11 Yes State Rural Yes Yes 
Source: Interview Respondents One through Twenty-One86. 
Note: n=21 interviews. 
Note 1: Respondents 4, 12, 13, 19, 20 national level gun control interests, respondents 8, 9, 17 state level gun control 
interests, and respondents 7, 15 local level gun control interests; Respondents 2, 3, 10, 11, 14, 18 national level gun 
rights interests, respondents 5, 6, 21 state level gun rights interests, and respondents 1, 16 local level gun rights 
interests. 
Note 2: National interests have high funding levels, while state interests have moderate funding levels and local 
interests have low funding levels. 
 
Do Second Amendment interest groups shop for judicial venues?  The answer is both yes 
and no.  Thirteen of twenty-one interview respondents reported that their interest groups legal 
team does shop for venues.  However, simply looking at that percentage can be misleading.  All 
four (0 percent) of the local level Second Amendment cause lawyers reported that their low 
levels of funding prevented any level of shopping for a judicial venue, while two (33 percent) of 
the six state level Second Amendment cause lawyers reported that they did shop for a judicial 
venue.  All eleven (100 percent) of the national level Second Amendment interest group cause 
lawyers shop for judicial venues. 
 It is also important to determine which levels of the judiciary and what types of judicial 
districts are favored.  Of the thirteen cause lawyers who reported that they do shop for judicial 
venues, five responded that they favored the state courts system, while eight responded that they 
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favored the federal court system.  Second Amendment interest group cause lawyers favored state 
court systems when venue-shopping was fairly evenly distributed between gun rights (three 
respondents) and gun control (two respondents) interest groups.  Lawyers that favored the 
national courts system as five of the eight respondents represented gun rights organizations, 
while the balance (three respondents) represented gun control groups. 
 In regard to the types of judicial venues favored by respondents, cause lawyers 
interviewed created a clear delineation between gun rights and gun control lawyers.  Gun rights 
lawyers favored rural jurisdictions, while gun control lawyers preferred urban jurisdictions.  
With these legal perspectives in mind, one gun rights and one gun control cause lawyer 
explained the reasons behind their preferences: 
Because of the prevalence of gun owners in rural areas, we certainly prefer  
rural jurisdictions. Guns are much more a part of the culture in these areas  
and make it more likely that the outcome will favor us. (Respondent Three) 
 
 I like the stricter gun laws that mostly come in urban areas. We are more likely  
to succeed with cases in these types of situations rather than in rural (locations). 
(Respondent Nineteen)  
 
 Coupled with judicial venue-shopping, favorite judicial levels, and types of venues are 
whether or not an interest group legal team shops for venues in diversity cases and the 
importance of venue-shopping in the litigation process.  Ten of the thirteen cause lawyers who 
did venue-shop did so diversity cases, as well.  The diversity cases litigated by the cause lawyers 
centered upon gun-related corporations.  For instance, one national level gun rights cause lawyer 
reported that by moving a Second Amendment diversity case from one jurisdiction to another 
helped their litigation efforts in a major way because the litigant gun manufacturer had a large 
assembly operation in the jurisdiction the case was moved to and still had plenty of goodwill in 
the judicial district.  
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Ten of the thirteen Second Amendment interest group cause lawyers in the interview pool 
reported that shopping for venues was an important part of their litigation process.  For a number 
of reasons, national and state level Second Amendment interest groups reported that venue-
shopping was or was not an important part of the their litigation process.  In particular, one 
national gun control lawyer supported the notion that venue-shopping was important to litigation, 
while one national level gun rights lawyer noted that his group disagreed: 
For us, a court hearing a case can be the factor between winning and losing.  
We want to win every case we take on, so picking the right court is probably  
the most important factor of the litigation process for us.  
(Respondent Nineteen) 
 
 Like I said, we do consult different judicial venues, but we don’t focus on it  
when we are litigating a case. I am more worried about the law, the  
opposition, resources, the client, potential witnesses…the nuts and bolts  
of a trial. Court selection is important, but I don’t lose sleep over it.  
(Respondent Eighteen)  
 
Results of the data collected that focused on Second Amendment interest group cause 
lawyering judicial venue-shopping led to the acceptance of all three research hypotheses 
associated with this section.  Specifically, clear differences were established between the ways 
gun rights and gun control interest groups, between heavily funded and lesser funded Second 
Amendment interest groups, and differences between local, state, and national Second 
Amendment interest groups shopped between judicial venues.  All three of these hypotheses are 
accepted and the associated null hypotheses are rejected.  The next issue area covered in 
interviews for this study was Second Amendment interest group coordination and networking. 
 Interest Group Coordination and Networking 
For this study, Second Amendment interest group coordination and networking questions 
sought to discover the levels at which Second Amendment interest group cause lawyers 
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coordinate with other interest groups, determine the organizational levels of the surveyed Second 
Amendment interest group cause lawyers, and networking efforts between similar state and 
national organizations.  Table Seven reports the different aspects of coordination between local, 
state, and national Second Amendment interest groups and their cause lawyers. 
Table Seven: Coordination between Second Amendment Interest Groups and Legal Teams 
 
Respondent(s) Have 
Coordinated 
Levels of Groups Types of Groups Level of 
Coordination 
7, 8, 15, 16, 21 No -- -- -- 
3, 18 Yes State/National Gun Rights High 
5, 14 Yes State/National Gun Rights Moderate 
12, 19 Yes State/National Gun Control High 
1 Yes State Gun Rights Low 
2 Yes National Conservative/Gun Rights High 
4 Yes National Progressive/Gun Control High 
6 Yes Local/National Gun Rights Low 
9 Yes Local Liberal/Gun Control Low 
10 Yes State Conservative/Gun Rights Moderate 
11 Yes National Gun Rights High 
13 Yes National Gun Control High 
17 Yes Local/National Gun Control Moderate 
20 Yes State Gun Control High 
Source: Interview Respondents One through Twenty-One87. 
Note: n=21 interviews. 
Note 1: Respondents 4, 12, 13, 19, 20 national level gun control interests, respondents 8, 9, 17 state level gun control 
interests, and respondents 7, 15 local level gun control interests; Respondents 2, 3, 10, 11, 14, 18 national level gun 
rights interests, respondents 5, 6, 21 state level gun rights interests, and respondents 1, 16 local level gun rights 
interests. 
Note 2: National interests have high funding levels, while state interests have moderate funding levels and local 
interests have low funding levels. 
 
Table Seven outlines the basics of legal coordination between Second Amendment 
interest groups. In particular, a large majority of interest group cause lawyers surveyed (76.2 
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percent) reported that they had, in fact, coordinated with other interest groups at some level.  
Results show that the types of groups with which a particular interest group coordinates depends 
upon the level of the interest group in question.  Local level interest groups are more likely to 
coordinate with state interest groups because of the lack of other local groups in a given 
geographical area.  Similarly, state level interest groups are more likely to coordinate with other 
state or national interest groups for litigation purposes, while national level interests are more 
likely to coordinate with other state and national level organizations 
 There are significant differences between gun rights and gun control interest groups when 
it comes to the levels of coordination.  Gun rights interest groups coordinated with other gun 
rights groups, while gun control interest groups coordinated with other gun control interest 
groups.  Both gun rights and gun control groups reported coordination efforts with other 
politically-oriented groups: 
I have worked with other gun rights groups, along with (conservative) groups… 
We do this because they want the same things that we do. All in all, they believe  
in the “right to bear arms” just as much as we do. (Respondent Two) 
 
 I started off working with progressive organizations back in the 1980s, so for  
me, it was second nature to work with the people I have known for more than  
twenty years. Not only do I know those guys, but I know that they are fighting  
hard. (Respondent Four)  
 
Five respondents reported that they had coordinated, in some ways, with conservative, 
liberal, or progressive interest groups in order to move a particular agenda forward.  This finding 
is particularly striking because it shows just how intertwined gun interest groups are inside the 
American political system.  Questions were also posed to interview respondents regarding the 
level of coordination that existed between organizations.  Not surprisingly, all eleven national 
level interest group cause lawyers reported that a moderate to high level of organization existed, 
while local and state level respondents reported moderate to low levels with interest groups.  
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Table Eight outlines the different aspects of interest group networking between local, 
state, and national Second Amendment groups and their cause lawyers. 
Table Eight: Networking between Second Amendment Interest Groups and Legal Teams 
Respondent(s) Have 
Networked 
Types of 
Interdependencies 
Help Litigation 
Efforts? 
Affect Patterns 
of Litigation? 
1, 7, 15, 16, 21 No -- -- -- 
2, 4, 13 Yes Common Interest Sometimes Yes 
10, 12, 19 Yes Common Interest Yes Yes 
3 Yes Similar Beliefs Yes Not Sure 
5 Yes Similar Beliefs Yes No 
6 Yes Common Interest Yes No 
8 Yes Friendship Sometimes No 
9 Yes Financial Exchange Yes Yes 
11 Yes Similar Beliefs Sometimes No 
14 Yes Similar Beliefs Yes No Response 
17 Yes Financial Exchange No No 
18 Yes Similar Beliefs No No 
20 Yes Friendship/Interest Yes Yes 
Source: Interview Respondents One through Twenty-One88. 
Note: n=21 interviews. 
Note 1: Respondents 4, 12, 13, 19, 20 national level gun control interests, respondents 8, 9, 17 state level gun control 
interests, and respondents 7, 15 local level gun control interests; Respondents 2, 3, 10, 11, 14, 18 national level gun 
rights interests, respondents 5, 6, 21 state level gun rights interests, and respondents 1, 16 local level gun rights 
interests. 
Note 2: National interests have high funding levels, while state interests have moderate funding levels and local 
interests have low funding levels. 
 
Interview responses regarding Second Amendment interest group networking provided 
similar results as those given regarding coordination.  A significant majority of interest group 
cause lawyers surveyed (76.2 percent) reported that they networked with other interest groups.  
When asked what types of interdependences propel interest groups towards forming networks of 
cooperation and understanding, 44 percent of respondents (seven of sixteen) reported that 
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common interests inspired networking, 31 percent of respondents mentioned similar beliefs, and 
13 percent of respondents reported that friendship or financial exchange spurred networking to 
occur: 
We do not have the money that other groups have, so we reached out to a group  
from a neighboring state for help. They came through big time. Their (financial)  
support allowed us to change things (legally) throughout Colorado.  
(Respondent Nine) 
 
While our opponents were out raising money, we doubled-down and formed  
relationships with other groups that helped us litigate cases that we truly felt  
needed to be argued. I guess you would call that “common interest.”  
(Respondent Six)  
 
When asked whether or not networks helped litigation strategies or affected patterns of 
litigation, nine (56.25 percent) of the sixteen respondents suggested they did.  Five (31.25 
percent) of the respondents reported that their networking efforts sometimes helped their 
litigation efforts, but only two (12.5 percent) reported that networking did not aide their litigation 
efforts: 
Like I said before, our networking efforts through several financial dealings most 
definitely helped our litigation efforts. Not only were we able to litigate cases  
we wouldn’t have been able to otherwise, but I honestly feel we made a difference  
in the lives of those who would have been harmed with more guns on the streets. 
(Respondent Nine) 
 
My results presented a muddled picture of whether or not networking efforts affected 
patterns of Second Amendment litigation.  Seven (43.75 percent) of the sixteen respondents 
reported networking with other interest groups also reported that their networking efforts did 
affect patterns of gun-related litigation.  The same result, seven (43.75 percent) of the sixteen 
Second Amendment interest group cause lawyers, reported that their networking efforts did not 
affect patterns of litigation, while one interview respondent provided no response and one was 
not completely sure.  This result shows a mixed view on the importance of networking with other 
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groups.  For several respondents, networking directly affected litigation, while others possessed 
the view that there was no affect.   
Results from the interviews illustrate the fact that two of the three hypotheses associated 
with Second Amendment interest group cause lawyer coordination and networking are accepted.  
More specifically, data showed that there were distinct differences between heavily funded and 
lesser funded Second Amendment interest groups with regard to legal coordination and 
networking.  The study found that there were distinct differences between local, state, and 
national Second Amendment interest groups with regard to legal participation.  Based upon the 
data collected, the legal coordination and networking hypothesis regarding differences between 
gun rights and gun control interest groups with regard to legal participation could not be 
accepted.  Thus, the null hypothesis could not be rejected.  The next issue area covered in 
interviews for this study was litigation strategy.  The fifth issue area covered in interviews for 
this study was interest group organization. 
Legal Team Organization 
For this study, Second Amendment interest group organization questions attempted to 
examine the importance of organization in the Second Amendment interest group, the 
organization of the interest group legal team, the level of organization of the interest group legal 
team, the types of organizational strategies employed by the interest group and its legal team, 
and how the legal team is funded.  Table Nine reports the different aspects of organization inside 
local, state, and national Second Amendment interest groups and their legal teams. 
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Table Nine: Second Amendment Interest Group Legal Team Organization 
Respondents(s) Internal 
Legal 
Counsel 
Adjunct Legal 
Organization 
Group  
Devoted to 
Legal Change 
Pro Bono 
Legal 
Counsel 
Outside 
Legal 
Counsel 
1, 5, 7, 8, 15, 16, 21    X X 
2, 4, 10, 14, 20 X  X   
3, 11, 12, 13, 19 X X X   
6, 9 X   X X 
17     X 
18 X X   X 
Source: Interview Respondents One through Twenty-One89. 
Note: n=21 interviews. 
Note 1: Respondents 4, 12, 13, 19, 20 national level gun control interests, respondents 8, 9, 17 state level gun control 
interests, and respondents 7, 15 local level gun control interests; Respondents 2, 3, 10, 11, 14, 18 national level gun 
rights interests, respondents 5, 6, 21 state level gun rights interests, and respondents 1, 16 local level gun rights 
interests. 
Note 2: National interests have high funding levels, while state interests have moderate funding levels and local 
interests have low funding levels. 
 
Table Nine demonstrates that finances are important to the organization of Second 
Amendment interest groups.  National level interest groups are more likely to possess internal 
legal counsel, possess an adjunct legal organization, or lean on a group devoted to legal change 
as their litigation team, while local and state level interest groups are more likely to rely on pro 
bono or outside legal counsel as the organization of their legal team.  Obviously, this speaks 
directly to the funding levels of Second Amendment interest groups.  Second Amendment 
interests that work on the national level have the funding available to keep internal legal counsel, 
have an adjunct legal organization, or a group devoted to legal change, all of which require 
significant monetary resources.  State level Second Amendment interests typically focus on 
obtaining pro bono or outside legal counsel, which can typically be had for free or at a significant 
discount.  One national level gun rights lawyer and one local level gun control lawyer reported: 
Essentially, we have the first three (organizational structures) you mentioned. I  
see our connected legal organization as one that fights for legal change, so in my  
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mind we have all three. For a long time, it has been no secret that that we have  
the money, so we use it. Our organization is second to none. (Respondent Eleven) 
 
Our organization is quite small. In fact, you could say we don’t have one, other  
than me. I am the director and head legal counsel…A number of times I have  
used pro bono representation…or I have received a discounted rate from an  
outside lawyer who believed in what we were doing. This is really how we get  
by. (Respondent Fifteen) 
 
Thirteen (61.9 percent) of the twenty-one respondents reported that their interest group 
employs an internal legal counsel.  Twelve (92.3 percent) of the thirteen respondents also 
represented national level interest groups.  Similar findings were apparent with regard to adjunct 
legal organizations and groups devoted to legal change.  Six (28.6 percent) of the twenty-one 
interview respondents reported that their interest group has used adjunct legal organizations as 
their legal team, while ten (47.6 percent) of the respondents reported that they have employed the 
usage of groups devoted to legal change.  In both respects, each (100 percent) of the affirmative 
interview respondents on these two organizational characteristics represented national level 
Second Amendment interest groups.  
Two other legal organization arrangements, pro bono legal counsel and outside legal 
counsel, are most often used by local and state Second Amendment interest groups.  In 
particular, nine (42.9 percent) of the twenty-one survey respondents reported they had utilized 
pro bono legal counsel as their legal organization in Second Amendment litigation.  All nine 
(100 percent) of these respondents represented local or state level interest groups.  Eleven (52.4 
percent) of the survey respondents reported they use outside legal counsel as their legal 
organization, ten (91.9 percent) of which represent local or state level interest groups.  
One local level gun rights lawyer provided some interesting insight into this 
phenomenon: 
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Over the course of the last twenty-three years, we have received both pro bono  
and outside legal counsel. Our perspective is…‘Why pay for something we can  
have for free?’ In any form, counsel isn’t cheap and we don’t have the money  
to have additional counsel on staff, other than myself. (Respondent Sixteen) 
 
Twenty (95.2 percent) of the twenty-one respondents reported that they used more than one of 
the five organizational features mentioned above, while eight (38.1 percent) of the respondents 
reported that they three of the five organizational structures mentioned above.  
Table Ten provides responses regarding the different ways in which Second Amendment 
interest groups and their legal teams are funded publicly and privately.  
Table Ten: Second Amendment Interest Group Legal Team Organizational Funding 
Respondent(s) Mass Membership 
Drives 
Few Donor 
Contributions 
Corporate Funding 
7, 15    
1, 5, 8, 9, 16, 17, 21  X  
2, 3, 10, 14, 18 X X X 
4, 12, 13, 19 X   
11, 20 X X  
6  X X 
Source: Interview Respondents One through Twenty-One90. 
Note: n=21 interviews. 
Note 1: Respondents 4, 12, 13, 19, 20 national level gun control interests, respondents 8, 9, 17 state level gun control 
interests, and respondents 7, 15 local level gun control interests; Respondents 2, 3, 10, 11, 14, 18 national level gun 
rights interests, respondents 5, 6, 21 state level gun rights interests, and respondents 1, 16 local level gun rights 
interests. 
Note 2: National interests have high funding levels, while state interests have moderate funding levels and local 
interests have low funding levels. 
 
Table Ten illustrates clear differences between the funding of local, state, and national 
level interest groups, and between gun rights and gun control interest groups.  In particular, 
national level interest groups are much more likely to be funded through mass membership 
drives or through corporate donors, while local and state Second Amendment interests are more 
likely to be funded through the contributions of a few donors.  Gun rights groups are much more 
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likely to be funded by corporate contributions then their gun control counterparts.  One national 
level gun rights lawyer and one state level gun control lawyer reported: 
We definitely get contributions from the gun industry. Because we do this, it is  
probably not surprising that we support gun rights. Even though they have a  
financial stake in the game, they are supporters of our (movement) and maintain 
monetary support of our team. (Respondent Ten) 
 
There are definitely strong distinctions between gun groups. One of the biggest is  
how we are funded. Obviously, we don’t have connections to corporations and  
have few people willing to contribute money from out of state. Our lone source of 
funding is a small, committed group of donors who believe in our (gun control)  
agenda. (Respondent Seventeen) 
 
Twelve (57.1 percent) of the twenty-one interview respondents reported that their interest 
group and legal team were funded, in part, through the efforts of small donation mass 
membership drives.  Not surprisingly, the only interest groups with the organizational capacity to 
complete mass membership drives were national level Second Amendment groups.  No local or 
state interest group reported the usage of mass membership drives as being a significant part of 
their organizational funding efforts.  
The most popular form of organizational funding, beyond mass membership drives, 
according to interview respondents was few donor contributions.  Fifteen (71.4 percent) of the 
twenty-one interview respondents reported that a small group of donors provided their interest 
group and legal team with important financial resources.  Of the fifteen affirmative respondents, 
eleven represented gun rights groups and four represented gun control organizations.  This result 
shows that gun rights organizations are almost three more likely than gun control organizations 
to use small group donor contributions to fun their organization.  
The final organizational structure that was considered in the Second Amendment interest 
group cause lawyer study was the importance of corporate funds to the financial support of gun-
related organizations.  In particular, six (28.6 percent) of the twenty-one interview respondents 
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reported that their interest group receives the monetary support of corporate groups and industry. 
All six affirmative respondents represented gun rights organizations.  This finding is not 
particularly striking considering the fact that the gun industry has a financial stake in continuing 
to support gun rights legislation and litigation, and gun control does not have an industry that 
explicitly supports their agenda.  Eight (38.1 percent) of the twenty-one interview respondents 
utilized at least two of these organizational funding mechanisms, while five (23.8 percent) 
respondents reported that their interest group used all three instruments. 
Analysis of the data collected regarding Second Amendment interest group cause 
lawyering legal team organization led to the acceptance of all three research hypotheses 
associated with this section.  Specifically, distinct differences were found between the legal 
organization of gun rights and gun control interest groups, between heavily funded and lesser 
funded Second Amendment interest groups, and differences between local, state, and national 
Second Amendment interest groups.  All three of these hypotheses are accepted and the 
associated null hypotheses are rejected. 
Conclusions 
 This study posed the research question, how have Second Amendment interest group 
cause lawyers dealt with case participation, litigation strategies, judicial venue-shopping, 
coordination and networking between interest groups, and legal team organization, 1960-2009?  
This study theorized that there will be distinct differences between gun rights and gun control 
interest groups, between heavily funded and lesser funded interest groups, and between local, 
state, and national Second Amendment interest groups, with regard to legal participation, 
litigation strategies, venue-shopping, coordination, networking, and organization.  This theory 
was operationalized into five distinct interview independent variable areas, including legal 
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participation, litigation strategies, venue-shopping, coordination, networking, and organization, 
with the actual Second Amendment interest group cause lawyer being the dependent variable. 
 Using telephone interviews, this study found that there were clear differences between 
local, state, and national Second Amendment interest groups with regard to legal participation, 
litigation strategies, judicial venue-shopping, coordination and networking, and organization.  
More specifically, local, state, and national Second Amendment interest groups deal with all five 
of the interview areas differently.  As such, the five research hypotheses associated with these 
variable relationships are accepted and the null hypotheses are rejected.  This study found that 
there were distinct differences between heavily funded and lesser funded interest groups with 
regard to legal participation, litigation strategies, judicial venue-shopping, coordination and 
networking, and organization.  In particular, heavily funded and lesser funded Second 
Amendment interest groups deal with all five of the interview areas differently.  Because of this, 
the five research hypotheses associated with these variable relationships are accepted and the 
null hypotheses are rejected.  
 Along with the first sets of theories, this study found that there were distinct differences 
between gun rights and gun control interest groups with regard to litigation strategies, judicial 
venue-shopping, and organization.  More specifically, gun rights and gun control interest groups 
deal with these three interview areas significantly different ways.  As such, the three research 
hypotheses associated with the variable relationships are accepted and the null hypotheses are 
rejected.  Interview responses regarding legal participation and coordination/networking showed 
that gun rights and gun control lawyers actually participate and coordinate in similar manners, 
and thus, the two research hypotheses associated with these two variable relationships cannot be 
accepted and the null hypotheses cannot be rejected. 
 96 
 
 The most important find of this study is not that there were differences between local, 
state, and national Second Amendment interest groups or that there were differences between 
heavily funded and lesser interest groups, but that there were not differences between gun rights 
and gun control interest groups with regard to legal participation and coordination/networking.  
In focusing on what we know about interest groups, this finding shows that in some ways interest 
groups do not act in the ways we often expect them to.  For instance, because gun rights and gun 
control lawyers both participate in the legal arena for vastly different reasons, we should expect 
them to participate in different ways as well.  However, complied results of the interviews for 
this study show that gun rights and gun control, in fact, act very similarly when deciding whether 
or not to participate in Second Amendment cases.  
 This study found that gun rights and gun control lawyers coordinate network with other 
interest groups in similar ways and for similar reasons.  While both sets of lawyers strive to win 
in the courtroom, they are attempting to attain totally different legal goals.  One set of lawyers 
want fewer gun laws, while the other wants more, and to find that they actually coordinate and 
network in similar fashions is very interesting.  One would think that coordination and 
networking techniques between the two different types of lawyers would be completely different 
because of their competing legal efforts.  The best answer that this study can give as to why they 
have similar process with regard to legal participation and coordination/networking is that they 
are both working the legal system.  Each lawyer knows what they have to do get ahead, and 
regardless of what they are fighting for, they have to follow the legal system that has been laid 
out for so many years. 
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CHAPTER THREE 
 
SECOND AMENDMENT DECISIONS IN STATE SUPREME COURTS 
 
 
(President Clinton) boasts about 186,000 people denied firearms under the Brady 
Law rules. The Brady Law has been in force for three years. In that time, they have 
prosecuted seven people and put three of them in prison. You know, the President 
has entertained more felons than that at fundraising coffees in the White House, for 
Pete’s sake. 
 
--Charlton Heston, former actor and N.R.A. President, 1997 
 
 
 
This (the attempted assassination of U.S. Rep. Gabrielle Giffords) is clearly an  
illustration of why we must all work together to fight gun violence in America  
and keep dangerous weapons out of the hands of the wrong people…I will  
immediately be offering legislation further limiting gun possession laws. 
 
--U.S. Representative Carolyn McCarthy (D-NY), 2011 
  
 
 
In the fall of 1967, Arthur Burton, Louis Benton, Edmond Shuler, Al Toth, Herman 
Treptow, and George Schlelke brought litigation that challenged the constitutionality of the 
New Jersey Gun Control law passed earlier in the year.  This coalition of sportsman club 
members and gun dealers felt that the new restrictive law infringed upon the rights of 
individuals to own and operate legal firearms.  The New Jersey Gun Control law provided new 
guidelines for the ownership and operation of firearms, forced firearms sellers to comply with 
new standards and qualifications for licenses to sell firearms, and gave the New Jersey 
Superintendent of Police broad powers to ensure the safety, health, and welfare of the public 
from the misuse of firearms.  The litigants formally asked the New Jersey Supreme Court to 
declare the new gun law unconstitutional and forbid its enforcement.1 
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Following a hearing before the New Jersey Supreme Court, the Court upheld the 
constitutionality of the newly-passed gun control law.  The written opinion, by a Democratic-
majority, was quite striking as the majority felt that without legal protections, including gun 
law in question, could create scenarios through which political assassinations, the killing of 
law enforcement officers, and increased sniper attacks would occur with a higher frequency.  
With this opinion, membership in New Jersey gun clubs declined and many gun dealers found 
other ways to pedal their firearms.  Burton v. Sills (1968) has become known as one of the first 
legal opinions to be held as evidence in support of the American gun control movement, as 
well as one of the most overt legal attempts to take the gun ownership rights away from 
American by the gun rights movement in America.2 
This study focuses on the decision-making and judicial behavior of judges of state 
supreme courts through the lens of Second Amendment claims and issues, such as those 
outlined in the introductory example that focused on the Burton v. Sills case.  This study 
attempts to do two different things.  First, I will provide readers with a descriptive study of 
state Second Amendment decisions between 1960 and 2009.  Second, I present readers with an 
explanatory analysis that estimates whether electoral accountability, party affiliation of the 
court, institutional factors, public opinion, and specific exogenous factors affect the way 
judges who sit on state supreme courts rule on polarizing political issues, such as the Second 
Amendment between 1960 and 2009. 
Potential Influences on State Supreme Court Judicial Behavior and Decision-Making 
In this study, I am interested in the political aspects that affect Second Amendment 
decisions in state supreme courts from 1960 to 2009.  This study theorizes that electoral 
accountability, party affiliation of the court, institutional factors, public opinion, and specific 
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exogenous factors affect the way state supreme courts judges rule on cases that encompass the 
polarizing political issue of Second Amendment rights.  Rejecting the legal model of decision-
making and building upon recent studies of state supreme courts produced by Melinda Gann 
Hall, Paul Brace, Chris Bonneau, and others, this study attempts to uncover specific institutional 
and state-level political aspects that make it more or less likely for a state supreme court judge to 
rule in favor of gun rights or gun control. 
State supreme courts are an important part of this study because of their position as an 
integral part of the public policy-making process.  The Second Amendment policy area gives this 
study particularly good mileage towards understanding state supreme courts because the right to 
bear arms is integral within the Bill of Rights, and consequently also is a civil liberty that the 
federal government should be unable to take away from American citizens.  Since the 1970s, 
scholarship regarding state supreme courts has focused on judicial decision-making on particular 
cases, the composition of specific state courts, and policy-making.   
One of the barriers to the study of decision-making in state supreme courts has been the 
differing ideological composition of membership on state supreme courts.  According to Donald 
Songer and Susan Tabrizi, the connection between political ideology, religiosity, and judicial 
decision-making has always been difficult to measure empirically.  In an attempt to create a new 
model for the study of state supreme courts decision-making, Songer and Tabrizi found that 
practicing Christian Evangelicals judges were significantly more conservative than regular 
Protestant, Catholic, and Jewish justices regarding death penalty, gender discrimination, and 
obscenity cases.3  
In one of the first attempts to empirically measure the decision-making of state supreme 
courts judges, Stuart Nagel explored the connection between state supreme court judges and 
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political party affiliation regarding decision-making.  Nagel found that Democratic state supreme 
court judges were much more likely to support the liberal argument in a case than their 
Republican counterparts.  Democratic judges were more likely than Republican judges to support 
the defense in criminal cases, the administrative agency in business regulation cases, and 
broadening position in free speech cases.4 
John Patterson and Gregory Rathjen explored the social, political, and legal backgrounds 
of state supreme courts judges and how they affected the judicial decision-making processes 
when the judges rendered decisions.  Patterson and Rathjen found that partisanship, tenure on a 
court, religion, and career patterns were each significant factors that helped determine how state 
supreme court judges decided cases.  In particular, partisanship and religion were the two most 
important variables that helped to determine how state supreme court judges decided cases.5 
Through analysis of the demographic background of state supreme court judges, Robert 
Kagan, Bobby Infelise, and Robert Detlefsen produced a model that outlined the distinctive 
patterns of the decision-making of judges. The study found that the judges who served on state 
supreme courts between 1900 and 1970 were relatively diverse, drawn from a variety of legal 
and political backgrounds with significant or no experience, and attended an assortment of elite 
and non-elite law schools.  Unfortunately, the model used by the authors found no connections 
between selected judge background characteristics and judicial trends in judicial decision-
making.6 
Gerard Gryski and Eleanor Main measured the importance of social demographic 
backgrounds on the judicial decision-making of state supreme court judges in sexual 
discrimination cases.  The authors found that state supreme court judges who decided in favor of 
a sexual discrimination claim were most likely a Democrat who studied law at an out of state or 
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public law school.7  Craig Emmert used a wide-ranging set of three thousand state supreme court 
decisions to create an integrated model of judicial decision-making.  Statistical analysis revealed 
that the case issue raised, the identity of a challenging party, types of constitutional arguments 
advanced, centrality of legal challenge, and the lower court ruling all impact the decision-making 
process used by state supreme court judges.8 
Melinda Gann Hall and Paul Brace explored the political nature of the burden of death 
penalty cases in state supreme courts within the context of judicial decision-making.  The model 
of decision-making created by Hall and Brace found that age and partisanship significantly 
affected how judges ruled on death penalty cases.  In particular, Republican-affiliated judges 
were more likely to approve a death sentence than Democratic judges, while the same 
phenomenon was apparent with older judges.  Older state supreme court judges were much more 
likely than younger judges to support the death penalty.9 
Paul Brace, Laura Langer, and Melinda Gann Hall created a better measure of party 
affiliation to examine the judicial decision-making of state supreme court judges.  The new 
measure, party-adjusted surrogate judge ideology measure (PAJID), was exposed to a number of 
analyses, and was found to be a valid, stable measure of the preferences of state supreme court 
judges that is much better than party affiliation.  Not only did the new PAJID measure improve 
explanations of judicial decision-making across areas of law, but also across 52 different state 
supreme courts.10 
Donald Songer and Kelley Crews-Meyer examined the effects of a judge’s gender on 
decision-making in state supreme courts across the United States.  This decision-making effort 
found that regardless of political ideology, female judges on state supreme courts collectively 
supported greater rights when a case regarding women’s issues was decided.  The study found 
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that there was no connection between gender and judicial decision-making in criminal rights and 
economic liberty cases.11  Sara Benesh and Wendy Martinek found that the decision-making of 
state supreme court judges is influenced by the U.S. Supreme Court and state-level political 
elites.12 
David Caplan provided some analysis regarding the decision-making of the Indiana and 
Oregon state supreme courts as they decided several important Second Amendment decisions.  In 
Oregon v. Kessler (1980), the Oregon Supreme Court handed down a unanimous decision in 
which struck down a state statute banning the private possession of weapons.  A month after the 
Kessler decision, in Schubert v. DeBard (1981), the Indiana Supreme Court declined to review a 
lower state court ruling that the Indiana State Superintendent of Police may provide gun licenses 
to individuals with a reason for carrying a weapon after they passed a background check.  These 
early decisions show how state supreme court decision-making regarding the Second 
Amendment have changed to include the potential for greater gun ownership.13 
David Hardy addressed state supreme court decision-making as it relates to the Second 
Amendment.  In the work, Hardy found that many of the early state supreme court Second 
Amendment cases (1820-1940) were decided in accordance with the prevailing cultural 
conception of the Second Amendment as allowing firearms to owned and operated only in 
circumstances in which a state or local militia was the central focus.14  Michael Quinlan explored 
numerous early state supreme court Second Amendment cases and how judges came to a 
decision.  Through analysis of early state supreme court Second Amendment decisions, the 
author found that the cases surveyed show that almost all early state supreme court judges who 
decided a case regarding the Second Amendment favored the right to bear arms in conjunction 
with a militia.15 
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David Kopel, Clayton Cramer, and Scott Hattrup systematically outlined the Second 
Amendment judicial decision-making process in the Ohio, Oregon, and Colorado supreme 
courts.  First, Oregon’s original intent test states that all Second Amendment cases brought 
before the court must be closely associated to firearms usage by militias to be satisfied when 
judges are deciding a firearms-related case.  Second, Colorado’s fundamental right to bear arms 
test states that firearms cases must be connected with individual ownership in order to be 
satisfied when judges are deciding a Second Amendment case.  Third, the new “reasonableness” 
standard of review created by the Ohio Supreme Court states that a Second Amendment claim 
must be deemed reasonable by the Court before an affirmative ruling can be rendered.  
According to the authors, each of these standards help to explain how state supreme court judges 
decide Second Amendment cases in Oregon, Colorado, and Ohio.16  Using this work as a starting 
point, this study suggests that electoral accountability, party affiliation of the court, institutional 
factors, public opinion, and specific exogenous factors affect the way state supreme court judges 
decide polarizing political issues, including the Second Amendment. 
From this scholarship, it is obvious that there is expansive work regarding the many 
issues that encompass the study of decision-making and judicial behavior in state supreme 
courts, and state appellate decision-making regarding Second Amendment cases. However, 
research for this study suggests that no literature has focused on a statistical analysis of the 
political aspects of Second Amendment decisions in state supreme courts.  This study attempts to 
fill this void in the literature regarding analysis of the political characteristics of state supreme 
court firearms-related decision.  Since this topic has never been the focus of scholarship, it is my 
hope that this chapter will, in its own small way, be successful in encouraging discussion of and 
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improve descriptions of the explanations of the issues that affect decision-making regarding 
Second Amendment decisions in state supreme courts. 
Design of the Research 
In this study, I am interested in the political aspects that explain the judicial decision-
making and behavior of judges on Second Amendment cases in state supreme courts.  
Specifically, this study elaborates on the theory that political context and the political values of 
judges, including electoral accountability, party affiliation of the court, institutional factors, 
public opinion, and specific exogenous factors, affect decision-making on Second Amendment 
decisions.  The dependent variable for the study is the Second Amendment case decision, 
whether a state supreme court ruled in favor of gun control or gun rights.  Although scholars 
have not created a dependent variable in this manner before, there is precedent for the usage of 
case outcomes as the central focus of judicial scholarship.   
John Kilwein and Richard Brisbin examined a sample of more than 1,000 state supreme 
court decisions that focused on intensified scrutiny doctrine.17  In second work, Sidney Ulmer 
created a methodical approach to the study of judicial behavior of U.S. Supreme Court justices 
that focused racial discrimination case outcomes during the Civil Rights Movement.18  In third 
work, Nancy Scherer and Banks Miller created a logistic regression model to determine if 
membership in the Federalist Society affected the political ideology and decision-making of U.S. 
Courts of Appeals judges through usage of the Harold Spaeth database on U.S. Supreme Court 
decisions.  After surveying case law, the authors argued that federal appellate judges who were 
members of the Federalist Society were significantly more conservative than non-members.19 
A model, similar to that of the Schrer and Miller study, was created for this chapter.  This 
new model estimates the effects of electoral accountability, party affiliation of the court, 
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institutional factors, public opinion, and specific exogenous factors on state supreme court 
Second Amendment decisions.  Second Amendment case decisions were gathered from the 
LexisNexis Academic Legal search engine, between 1 January 1960 and 31 December 2009, for 
a total of 269 cases from all state supreme courts.  Search terms for data collection in LexisNexis 
included the following phrases: Second Amendment, concealed weapons, concealed weapons 
permits, automatic weapons, semi-automatic weapons, gun violence, gun show loophole, 
background checks, right to bear arms, sawed-off shot gun, assault weapon, convicts and 
firearms, and gun bans.  The dependent variable was created so that if a case ruled in favor of 
gun control, then the case was labeled “0.” If a case favored gun rights, then the case was labeled 
“1.”  The mid-range theory of this study was disaggregated into seven independent variables, 
each including specific hypotheses, to estimate their effect on the dependent Second Amendment 
decision variable. 
Electoral Accountability 
 Electoral accountability provides reasoning for the way state politicians vote and act, and 
state supreme court judges are similar.  Each of the judges sitting on the fifty state supreme 
courts across the United States were either elected or appointed.  Recent scholarship has 
suggested that the judicial decision-making of state supreme court judges is partly influenced by 
the type of judicial selection method that propelled them into office.  According to Melinda Gann 
Hall, the low rate of dissenting opinions authored by state supreme court judges can be 
accounted for because some judges are forced to face reelection, and constituent values suppress 
the expression of dissent on important policy issues for certain judges.  Hall argued that instead 
of voting in agreement with their personal policy preferences, state supreme court judges want to 
retain their positions do not offer dissenting opinions in order to avoid being singled out in an 
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election.20  Gregory Huber and Sanford Gordon found that judges who stand for election become 
more punitive in sentencing as re-election approaches.21 
 Melinda Gann Hall and Paul Brace argued that the method of judicial selection in a state 
affected how state supreme court judge’s decided cases.  In particular, Hall and Brace argued 
that state supreme courts with appointive selection methods promoted consensus decision-
making, while elective methods promoted disagreement.  The authors found that in states with 
appointive judicial selection methods had 7.5 percent lower dissenting opinion rates than state 
with elective judicial selection.22  Paul Brace and Melinda Gann Hall argued that non-elected or 
appointed judicial selection methods encouraged decision-making by state supreme court judges 
in a consensual fashion, while elected judicial selection methods did not.  In the article, the 
authors found appointive judicial selection methods were associated with fewer dissenting 
opinions regarding important state courts of appeals policy decisions.23 
Melinda Gann Hall argued that state supreme court judges act in a strategic fashion when 
deciding cases in order to minimize opposition when they face an election.  Focusing on death 
penalty decisions between 1983 and 1988 in four southern state supreme courts, Hall found that 
the influence of voters on state supreme court judges was enhanced when an environment of 
competitive elections were present.24  Daniel Pinello came to a similar conclusion when 
exploring business law policy decisions made in state supreme courts.  The author found that 
popularly elected judicial selection methods led to cost-stabilizing business decisions, while 
appointed judicial selection methods led to cost-increasing business decisions.25 
Paul Brace and Melinda Gann Hall explored the connection between institutional rules 
and structures, including state judicial selection method, and judicial behavior and decision-
making.  After estimating several models of judicial voting on the death penalty cases in state 
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supreme courts, Brace and Hall found that state judicial selection method did impact how judges 
voted on death penalty cases.  In particular, the authors found that state supreme courts with an 
elected selection method were more likely to support the death penalty than judges selected 
through appointments or commissions.26 
Paul Brace and Melinda Gann Hall examined the linkage between electoral politics and 
judicial decision-making in state supreme courts.  Using probit estimations of death penalty 
decisions in eight state supreme courts between 1983 and 1988, Brace and Hall found that state 
supreme court judges do have predispositions that are consistent with a state’s electoral and 
ideological situation.  In particular, the authors found that a judge’s support for the death penalty 
in a decision was directly linked to more competitive judicial election situations.27  Elisha 
Savchak and A.J. Barghothi tested the effects of merit plan judicial selection on judicial 
decision-making. Using a larger sample than previous studies, Savchak and Barghothi found that 
judges facing retention elections act in a similar manner to those who face partisan or non-
partisan elections.  In fact, the authors concluded that judicial decisions were influenced more by 
the public voting in retention elections than the commission who original appointed the judge.28 
Roughly half of all state supreme court judges across the country face either partisan or 
non-partisan elections in order to retain their seats on the bench.  According to Adam Long, over 
the past twenty years judicial elections have been transformed into races that are 
indistinguishable from other political campaigns.  Fueled by contributions from industry, 
corporations, companies, businesses, the legal bar, and doctors, candidates running for seats on 
state supreme courts have become pawns in the political game to become the best judge money 
can buy.29 
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Because of these contributions, justices elected, in part, with the money given to their 
campaigns from these interests are seen as being beholden to their contributors when deciding 
tough cases they are litigating or cases that involve policy aspects of their interests.  For instance, 
during the 2000 Ohio Supreme Court race, a pro-business organization accused incumbent 
Justice Alice Robie Resnick “of having an anti-business bias, encouraged by the donations of 
trial lawyers…”30  In West Virginia, incumbent supreme court Justice Warren McGraw (D) lost 
his 2004 re-election race to Charleston private practice lawyer Brent Benjamin, in what the 
Washington Post called “a rancorous contest…one of the nastiest (races) in the nation…”31 
Special interest groups spent more than $3.5 million on the 2004 West Virginia Supreme 
Court of Appeals race, while the candidates raised a total of $2.8 million.  In 2004, the two major 
party candidates for state supreme court in Illinois raised more than $8.9 million in campaign 
contributions, which was the most money ever contributed for a state judicial election, and it was 
not even statewide race, as supreme court justices are elected from districts across the state.  The 
winner, lawyer Lloyd Karmeier (R), raised nearly $4.6 million, while the loser, Gordon Maag 
(D), brought in $4.4 million.32 
Other state supreme court judges who do not face election are either selected through a 
commission process, which is often similar to the Missouri Plan, or through lifetime 
appointments.33  In stark contrast to hyper-political state supreme court elections, judges sitting 
on the bench through Missouri Plan processes or gubernatorial lifetime appointments are 
supposed to be independent of political interests with regard to potential case outcomes.34  
Elected state supreme court judges possess the added weight of being supported by political 
interests through elections, while selected judges are independent of the political fray.35  
Connecting this work together, it should be noted that the method through which state supreme 
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court judges are selected can have a direct impact on how they decide important cases. As such, 
this study hypothesizes that elected state supreme courts increase the probability of a Second 
Amendment decision that will favor gun rights, while selected or appointed state supreme courts 
increase the probability of a Second Amendment decision that will favor gun control.   
The electoral accountability variable, judicial selection method, estimated the effect of 
judicial selection methods on state supreme court Second Amendment decisions.  This 
dichotomous variable was labeled “0” in cases where a state supreme court judicial selection 
method was elected on a partisan or non-partisan basis, the variable was labeled “1” in cases 
where the state supreme court judicial selection method was not elected.  Data regarding state 
supreme court selection method was collected from the American Judicature society, and 
accounted for changes in state judicial selection methods between 1960 and 2009. 
Political Party Affiliation of the Court 
 The political party affiliation of the judges who hear a case might affect the way a state 
supreme court decides Second Amendment cases.  This hypothesis suggests that a judge’s 
political party affiliation can affect how judges’ rule on important cases in state supreme courts.  
In particular, several studies have advanced the argument that party affiliation affects judicial 
decision-making.  In one of the first works that linked judicial party affiliation to the decision-
making of judges, Sidney Ulmer found that U.S. Presidents were interested in appointing U.S. 
Supreme Court justices that possessed a background in public office.  Ulmer found that all of 
President Dwight Eisenhower’s appointees had previous public experience on either the state or 
federal judiciary or as the attorney general of a state.  The author argued, with the exception of 
Earl Warren, that justices with previous experience in an elected office typically mirrored the 
opinion of the president who nominated them when deciding a case.36 
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In an attempt to explore the judicial role of state supreme court judges, John Wold found 
that the political ideology, social background, and political party associations helped to model 
personal and professional views of the judicial role of state supreme court judges.37  Philip 
Dubois found that the political party affiliation of state supreme court judges was at the center of 
judicial decision-making.  Dubois found that one of the key factors that helped to explain how 
state supreme court judges behaved was the political party that they had often been associated 
with.38 
Melinda Gann Hall and Paul Brace surveyed death penalty cases from 1980 to 1988 in 
four states to determine factors that helped explain judicial decision-making in state supreme 
courts.  Specifically, Hall and Brace found that the individual preferences regarding death 
penalty cases mirrored the perceived party affiliation of state supreme court judges in the four 
state sample.39  Paul Brace and Melinda Gann Hall explored the connection between electoral 
politics and judicial decision-making in state supreme courts.  Using statistical analysis of capital 
punishment decisions in eight state supreme courts between 1983 and 1988, Brace and Hall 
found that state supreme court judges did have political predispositions that were consistent with 
association with a political party.40 
Using a meta-analysis of numerous judicial politics studies, Daniel Pinello found that 
political party affiliation of state supreme court judges was a dependable measure of ideology 
and judicial decision-making.  In the study, Pinello found that state supreme court judges who 
were affiliated in some way with the Democratic Party were much more liberal when dispensing 
justice than their Republican Party affiliated counterparts, who were far more conservative in 
their rulings.41 
 116 
 
 Because this literature argues that party affiliation affects judicial decision-making in 
general, and state supreme court judicial decision-making in particular, this study contends that 
party affiliation will affect how state supreme court judges rule on Second Amendment 
decisions.  Consistent with commonly held conceptions about the policy preferences of the two 
parties, this study hypothesizes that the number of state supreme court judges affiliated with the 
Democratic Party increase the probability of a Second Amendment decision that will favor gun 
control, while state supreme court associated with the Republican Party increase the probability 
of a Second Amendment decision that will favor gun rights. 
The party affiliation of the court variable estimated the effect of a state supreme court’s 
majority political party affiliation on Second Amendment decisions.  This dichotomous variable 
was labeled “0” in decisions where the ruling majority of a state supreme court was affiliated 
with the Democratic Party.  The variable was labeled “1” in decisions where the ruling the 
majority of a state supreme court was affiliated with the Republican Party.  Variable data 
regarding state supreme court political party affiliation was collected from the Richard Brisbin 
and John Kilwein state supreme court judicial biography dataset created in the early 1990s, 
updated to 2006, and spanning the years 1970 to 2006.  Data for Second Amendment cases used 
in this study decided before 1970 or after 2006 was taken from the on-line judicial database, 
Judgepedia. 
Institutional Factors 
Specific institutional factors might also affect the way a state supreme court decides 
Second Amendment cases.  In state supreme courts, literature has addressed the importance of 
institutional arrangements and their effect on the decision-making of judges.  Robert Sickels 
argued that the high level of judicial consensus in the decisions of the Maryland Court of 
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Appeals was a product of the institutional process that rotated case assignments randomly 
between the sitting judges of the court.  According to Sickels, this arrangement was reinforced 
by the judicial compliance of the opinions of others.42  Edward Beiser found a similar result 
within the Rhode Island Supreme Court.  Because of a high degree of integration, the judges of 
the court rarely disagreed with one another because of the institutional process of randomly 
assigned case assignments.43 
Bradley Canon and Dean Jaros, like Sickels and Bieser, examined the importance of 
several institutional factors on the rate of dissent in state supreme courts. Institutional factors 
used in the study included: the method of state judicial selection, the method of office retention, 
length of tenure in office, and presence or absence of an intermediate appellate court.  Canon and 
Jaros found that institutional factors, in the form of the presence of absence of intermediate 
appellate courts, did create conditions for an increase in the behavior of dissenting behavior of 
state supreme court judges.44   
Elliot Slotnick found that, according to the personal and professional perceptions of a 
number of state supreme court chief justices, a randomly-selected system of opinion assignments 
maintained social and political cohesion of a state supreme court.  Slotnick also argued that 
methods of discretionary case assignments promoted social and political conflict within a state 
supreme court.45  Roger Handberg argued that there was a direct connection between institutional 
factors and the writing of dissenting opinions in state supreme court decisions.  In particular, 
Handberg found that states with an intermediate appellate court just below the state supreme 
court had significantly higher levels of dissent.46  Henry Glick and George Pruet found a similar 
result.  Glick and Pruet found that the presence of a state intermediate appellate court 
significantly increased the potential for dissenting opinions in state supreme court decisions.47 
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Later work also focused on the institutional arrangement of the presence of state 
intermediate appellate courts, coupled with other institutional factors.  Melinda Gann Hall and 
Paul Brace argued that in addition to state intermediate appellate courts, the method of judicial 
selection in a state affected how state supreme court judge’s decided cases.  In particular, Hall 
and Brace argued that state supreme courts with appointive selection methods promoted 
consensus decision-making, while elective methods encouraged disagreement.  The authors 
found that in states with appointive judicial selection methods had 7.5 percent lower dissenting 
opinion rates than state with elective judicial selection.  Results of the study found that the use of 
random opinion assignments and the presence of a state intermediate appellate court were 
associated with higher levels of dissenting opinions in state supreme courts.48  
Paul Brace and Melinda Gann Hall argued that judicial selection methods influenced the 
judicial decision-making of state supreme court judges.  In particular, Brace and Hall found that 
appointive judicial selection methods and voting rules were associated with fewer dissenting 
opinions and behavior.  In fact, in states with an appointed the governor or the legislature, the 
number of cases that possessed dissenting opinions dropped by 4 percent.  The authors found that 
the presence of an intermediate appellate court produced significant dissent in state supreme 
courts.  In states with intermediate appellate courts, dissenting opinions were expected in 8.5 
percent more cases each year than in states without this institutional arrangement.49 
Much of this scholarship suggests that institutional factors in general, and the presence or 
absence of state intermediate appellate courts in particular, affect state supreme court judicial 
decision-making.  This study contends that the presence or absence of state intermediate 
appellate courts will affect how state supreme courts judges decide Second Amendment 
decisions.  Specifically, this study hypothesizes that the presence of a state intermediate appellate 
 119 
 
court increase the probability that state supreme courts will rule in favor of gun control in Second 
Amendment decisions, while states without an intermediate appellate court increase the 
probability that state supreme courts will rule in favor of gun rights in Second Amendment 
decisions. 
The state intermediate appellate court variable estimated the effect of the presence or 
absence of state intermediate appellate courts on Second Amendment decisions.  This 
dichotomous variable was labeled “0” in decisions that had an operative state intermediate 
appellate court at the time of the ruling.  The variable was labeled “1” in decisions that did not 
have an active state intermediate appellate court at the time of the ruling.  Variable data 
regarding state intermediate appellate courts was collected from the American Judicature 
Society, and accounted for changes in the presence or absence of state intermediate appellate 
courts between 1960 and 2009. 
Public Opinion 
Public opinion might also affect the way judges who sit on state supreme courts rule on 
polarizing political issues.  Because a significant amount of state supreme court judges across the 
country are elected on a partisan and non-partisan basis, they act in a manner similar to regular 
politicians.  As these judicial campaigns are bankrolled by wealthy political interests, there is 
evidence to suggest that the judges have become beholden to these interests.50  Similarly, much 
like politicians who routinely face election and re-election, there is scholarship that proposes that 
one of the main concerns of these judges is to be re-elected like their legislative counterparts.51  
For instance, the intake of campaign contributions into elections for state supreme court has 
drastically increased over the last fifteen years.  Judges who are up for re-election and actively 
seek campaign contributions illustrate their desire to win re-election.52 
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One of the key aspects of winning re-election for any politician, as outlined by David 
Mayhew, is to take credit for particular policies and to take positions on issues.53  For state 
supreme court judges who face elections, this desire is no different.  Even though state supreme 
court judges are politicians, they are governed by very different ethical rules and professional 
norms.  The West Virginia State Code of Judicial Conduct states that candidates for State 
Supreme Court should refrain from making policy statements regarding issues that the court 
might hear and should abstain from endorsing or opposing candidates for other offices.  During 
his 2004 re-election campaign, former West Virginia Supreme Court Justice Warren McGraw 
violated both statutes of the code.  At a time when West Virginia was dealing with numerous 
changes to its criminal law statutes, Justice McGraw made it clear, during a campaign speech in 
Kermit, WV, that he was at least partly responsible for many of the tougher criminal laws 
coming on to the books.  At another campaign speech in Williamson, WV, Justice McGraw 
noted that, “If I were going to do so, I’d be endorsing Joe Manchin for Governor of West 
Virginia.”54  This example shows that not only did McGraw violate the judicial code of conduct 
he was supposed to uphold, but he also took credit for the new, tougher criminal laws created in 
West Virginia directly before his re-election effort. 
This idea of state judicial credit claiming has extended to other states.  Incumbent 
Wisconsin State Supreme Court justice David Prosser (R) was running for re-election against 
challenger JoAnne Kloppenberg (I), a prosecutor in the Wisconsin Department of Justice, during 
the spring 2011 race.  During a campaign forum at the Marquette University Law School 
between the candidates, Prosser made a number of statements where he seemingly claimed credit 
for the outcomes of cases he presided over.  Prosser said: 
In 12 years, I participated in more than 900 published decisions.  I have written 132 
majority opinions, plus many concurrences and dissents.  I have written decisions on 
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virtually every area of Wisconsin law from anti-trust to zoning, including constitutional, 
contempt, criminal, environmental, family, insurance, labor, and tort law.  Many of my 
opinions have significantly influenced Wisconsin law.55 
 
While state supreme court judges have started to make statements regarding policies, it wasn’t 
until 2002 that it was protected speech under the First Amendment.  In Republican Party of 
Minnesota v. White, an ideologically divided U.S. Supreme Court ruled that Minnesota’s 
requirement that judges not discuss political issues was unconstitutional.  The case successfully 
challenged the Minnesota Code of Judicial Ethics that constrained candidates seeking election as 
a judge from discussing issues that could come before them if elected.56 
Taking credit for rendered decisions speaks specifically to the point that judges, while 
they are typically seen as being insulated from the pressures of the public, are affected by what 
the public thinks because of their interest in being re-elected.  Research has shown that 
politicians and elected judges in particular, must focus on changes in public opinion over time.  
In particular, variation and stability patterns in political ideology and public policy change in 
states as national ideological trends manifest themselves in states.57  The system of judicial 
selection at the state supreme court level has created elections that are virtually the same as 
executive and legislative contests where money and public opinion affects the policy positions 
taken by candidates because each are interested in getting re-elected.   
Like Mayhew outlines for members of Congress, elected state supreme court judges are 
able to point to specific decisions in regard to policy decisions and issue positions in their re-
election fights in order to show attentiveness to public opinion and political ideology.  This 
literature shows that public opinion can affect how cases are ruled upon in state supreme courts 
because of changing opinions of the electorate and because of institutional arrangements that 
force judges to stand for election.  In particular, state supreme court judges might be inclined to 
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rule in favor of gun rights or gun control on Second Amendment cases given the timeline and 
their re-election interests.  Depending upon the state, the closer to an election a case is 
determined might mean a gun rights ruling if a state favors firearms rights or a gun control ruling 
if a state does not. 
The public opinion variables estimated the effect of state political ideology and 
population density on Second Amendment state supreme court decisions.  This study 
hypothesizes that state supreme court Second Amendment decisions will be significantly 
affected by state political ideology and population density.  In particular, states with a liberal 
political ideology increase the probability that their state supreme court will rule in favor of gun 
control in Second Amendment decisions, while states with a conservative political ideology 
increase the probability that their state supreme court will rule in favor of gun rights in Second 
Amendment decisions.  States with high population density increase the probability that their 
state supreme court will rule in favor of gun control in Second Amendment decisions, while 
states with low population density increase the probability that their state supreme court will rule 
in favor of gun rights in Second Amendment decisions. 
Accordingly, the state political ideology measure was taken from the Berry, et. al. citizen 
political ideology dataset.  The variable was continuously measured between 1 and 100 with 
lower numbers representing conservative political ideologies and higher numbers representing 
liberal political ideologies.  The appellate circuit population density measure was taken from the 
U.S. Census Bureau dataset.  This continuously measured variable represents the number of 
people per square mile in each state.  Lightly populated states have lower population densities, 
while densely populated states have higher population densities. 
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Specific Exogenous Factors 
 Specific exogenous factors might affect the way state supreme court judges decide 
Second Amendment cases.  This hypothesis suggests that factors from outside the judicial system 
affect state appellate firearms cases.  In particular, several studies have advanced the argument 
that specific exogenous factors have influenced judicial decision-making.  One of the first studies 
that considered this external argument was produced by James Gibson.  In the study, the author 
found that particular exogenous factors did affect the way judges decided cases.  According to 
Gibson, the exogenous factors that had an effect were contact with constituents and the potential 
for electoral defeat.  Focusing on the circuit system used in the Iowa trial courts, Gibson found 
that this involvement from outside factors was essential when judges ruled offered important 
decisions.58 
 Philip Fetzer argued that extralegal factors helped to explain complex American Indian 
legal decisions rendered in tribal jurisdictions.  Through analysis of case law, Fetzer found that 
that the extralegal factor of tribal sovereignty had a particular impact on these Indian legal 
decisions.  Previously, scholars had questioned much of the confusing legal reasoning that was 
established in prior tribal decisions.  According to Fetzer, tribal sovereignty was the outside 
factor that helped explain why judges ruled the way that did in several of these unusual 
decisions.59  James Gibson argued that one of the biggest failings of early judicial behavior 
literature was that few considered multiple exogenous concepts.  In several of these studies, the 
authors employed exogenous measures that considered the personal lives of judges.  Gibson 
argued that personal factors were exogenous in nature.60   
John Ferejohn and Barry Weingast created a spatial model that connected personal and 
professional judicial goals with distinct judicial behavioral and decision-making outcomes.  
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According to the Ferejohn and Weingast model, external factors included those outside the scope 
of a judge’s career.61  Pragati Patrick and Thomas Bak found that a federal law involving 
increased sentences for individuals who were arrested for violent firearms-related drug crimes 
affected the amount of firearms cases decided by the federal court system.  For Patrick and Bak, 
this finding was of specific interest because judges in the sample appeared hesitant to get 
involved with cases that concerned these new sentences.62   
Gretchen Helmke and Mitchell Sanders argued that external factors helped to shape the 
behavior of judges on the Argentine Supreme Court.  The exogenous factors that shaped the 
behavior of Argentine judges included loyalty to the national government and specific policy 
interests.  The model created by Helmke and Sanders linked specific exogenous factors to the 
behaviors of judges in their role on the Argentine Supreme Court.63  In a final work, Matthew 
Henry and John Turner created a patent litigation case dataset from the Federal Circuit Court of 
Appeals from the last fifty years.  In the study, the authors found that exogenous factors have 
affected these decisions.  Decisions made by other judicial levels were the outside factor that had 
a particular impact on patent decisions.64  This literature shows that specific exogenous factors 
have affected judicial rulings made at various levels of the state and federal judiciary. 
Specific exogenous factor variables estimated their effect on state supreme court Second 
Amendment decisions.  Two firearms-related external factor variables, state gun ownership 
percentage and homicide rate, were created.  State gun ownership percentage was continuously 
measured from each state based on the findings from Washington Post gun ownership surveys 
completed in 1970, 1980, 1990, and 2000. Lower gun ownership rates meant that fewer state 
residents own firearms, while higher gun ownership reflected elevated rates of gun ownership.  
State homicide rate was a continuous measure of the total number of homicides committed per 
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100,000 people in a state population per year.  Variable data regarding state homicide rate was 
collected from the U.S. Bureau of Justice Statistics.  Lower homicide rates meant that the state 
had fewer murders, while more murders reflected elevated rates of homicides in an appellate 
circuit.   
This study hypothesized that states with high gun ownership percentages increase the 
probability that their state courts of appeals will rule in favor of gun rights in Second 
Amendment decisions, while states with low gun ownership percentages increase the probability 
that their state supreme court will rule in favor of gun control in Second Amendment decisions.  
This study hypothesized that states with low homicide rates increase the probability that their 
state supreme court will rule in favor of gun rights in Second Amendment decisions, while states 
with high homicide rates increase the probability that their supreme court will rule in favor of 
gun control in Second Amendment decisions. 
Study Methodology and Data Collection Format 
Logistic regression analysis was the method used for the analysis of the political aspects 
of Second Amendment court rulings made in state supreme courts.  The dependent variable for 
this study was the state-level Second Amendment case, where cases that favor gun control will 
be labeled zero and cases that favor gun rights will be labeled one, so it was important to use 
logistic regression because this variable was dichotomous.65  Logistic regression allows 
researchers to predict outcomes from a set of variables that may be continuous, discrete, 
dichotomous, or a mix of the three types.  In particular, the dependent variable was dichotomous, 
such as presence/absence or success/failure.66  Logistic regression analysis is designed to analyze 
the relationship between independent variable data and a dichotomous dependent variable.  A 
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dichotomous variable can assume only two values and are just like the indicator dummy 
variables used throughout the political science literature.67 
Second Amendment case data used for this study spanned the last fifty years, between 1 
January 1960 and 31 December 2009.  The starting point of this study was significant because it 
started several years before Second Amendment issues burst onto the American political 
landscape.  Case coding was noted after reading the case twice to determine if the respective 
state supreme court ruled in favor of gun rights or in favor of gun control cases.  Only cases in 
which a Second Amendment claim was forwarded or where an important Second Amendment 
issue was broached were used in this study.   
Predicted probability estimates were tabulated for average and interesting observations 
within the data in order to interpret the affect of the independent variables on the dependent 
variable and create observations that varied values and showed which variables were significant.  
Inter-coder reliability for this study was established.  Fifty cases of the 269 full case sample were 
randomly selected and coded by another reader.  A Cronbach’s α statistic was tabulated based on 
the random sample case codes and the reader’s code in order to establish a measure of internal 
consistency and reliability between the two codes.  The following section provides the results 
and analysis of this study. 
Political Aspects of Judicial Behavior and Second Amendment Cases: Results and Analysis 
 The previous sections have described important literature, theories, and methods that link 
electoral accountability, institutional factors, public opinion, and specific policy interests to the 
types of Second Amendment decisions rendered by state supreme court judges; however, a direct 
connection between the independent variables and Second Amendment state supreme court 
decisions needs to be established.   
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Table One reports the estimated logistic regression coefficients of the state supreme court 
Second Amendment case model that was clustered for states, along with several logistic 
regression model performance measures presented at the bottom of the table, 1960-2009. 
Table One: Logistic Regression Analysis of State Supreme Court Second Amendment 
Decisions, 1960-2009 
State Supreme Court Independent Variables Estimated Coefficients 
Judicial Selection Method 0.173 (0.396) 
Party Affiliation of the Court 0.017 (0.013)*** 
Presence of Intermediate Appellate Court -0.251 (0.477) 
Political Ideology -0.071 (0.014)*** 
Population Density 0.153 (0.289) 
Gun Ownership Percentage 0.101 (0.021)*** 
Homicide Rate 0.093 (0.059) 
Log-Likelihood Statistic -127.664 
Chi-Squared Statistic 0.021 
% Correctly Predicted 0.887 
Proportional Reduction of Error 0.313 
R2P 0.917 
PCP 0.906 
AIC 212.6614 
BIC 244.6645 
***p<0.05 
Sources: LexisNexis Legal Database, the American Judicature Society, Brisbin & Kilwein dataset; Judgepedia; the 
Federal Judicial Center, Berry, et. al., four Washington Post gun ownership surveys, the U.S. Census Bureau, and 
the U.S. Bureau of Justice Statistics68. 
Note: n=269 cases. 
The first variable, judicial selection method (X1), had an estimated coefficient of 0.173.  
The estimated coefficient of judicial selection method was not statistically significant because 
zero was included in the 95 percent confidence interval.  Because this variable was not 
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statistically significant, the null hypotheses associated with this variable cannot be rejected.  The 
two specific directional hypotheses, elected state courts of last resort increase the probability of a 
Second Amendment decision that will favor gun rights and selected or appointed state courts of 
last resort increase the probability of a Second Amendment decision that will favor gun control, 
cannot be accepted. 
 Second, the state supreme court party affiliation variable (X2) had an estimated 
coefficient of 0.017.  The estimated coefficient of the party affiliation variable was statistically 
significant because zero was not included in the 95 percent confidence interval.  Because this 
variable was significant, the null hypotheses associated with this variable can be rejected.  The 
two specific directional hypotheses, state supreme court judges affiliated with the Democratic 
Party increase the probability of a Second Amendment decision that will favor gun control and 
state judges affiliated with the Republican Party increase the probability of a Second 
Amendment decision that will favor gun rights, are accepted.  Anticipated relationships between 
judicial political party affiliation and state supreme court Second Amendment decisions are 
consistent with my hypotheses.  
 Third, the presence of a state intermediate appellate court variable (X3) had an estimated 
coefficient of -0.251.  The estimated coefficient of the intermediate appellate court variable was 
not statistically significant because zero was included in the 95 percent confidence interval.  
Since the appellate court variable was not statistically significant, the null hypotheses related to 
this variable cannot be rejected.  The two specific directional hypotheses, the presence/absence 
of a state intermediate appellate court increase the probability that state supreme courts will rule 
in favor of gun control/rights in Second Amendment decisions, cannot be accepted. 
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Fourth, the state political ideology variable (X4) had an estimated coefficient of -0.071.  
The estimated coefficient of the state political ideology variable was statistically significant 
because zero was not included in the 95 percent confidence interval.  Because this variable was 
significant, the null hypotheses associated with this variable are rejected.  The two specific 
directional hypotheses, states with a liberal/conservative political ideology increase the 
probability that their state supreme court will rule in favor of gun control/gun rights in Second 
Amendment decisions, are accepted.  Anticipated relationships between state political ideology 
and state supreme court Second Amendment decisions are consistent with my hypotheses.  
Fifth, the state population density variable (X5) had an estimated coefficient of 0.153.  
The estimated coefficient of the variable was not statistically significant because zero was 
included in the 95 percent confidence interval.  Since the homicide rate variable was not 
statistically significant, the null hypotheses related to this variable cannot be rejected.  The two 
specific directional hypotheses, states with high/low population density increase the probability 
that their state supreme court will rule in favor of gun control/gun rights in Second Amendment 
decisions, cannot be accepted. 
Sixth, the state gun ownership percentage variable (X6) had an estimated coefficient of 
0.101.  The estimated coefficient of the variable was statistically significant because zero was not 
included in the 95 percent confidence interval.  Because this variable was significant, the null 
hypotheses associated with this variable are rejected.  The two specific directional hypotheses, 
states with high/low gun ownership percentages increase the probability that their state supreme 
court will rule in favor of gun rights/gun control in Second Amendment decisions, are accepted.  
Anticipated relationships between state gun ownership percentages and state supreme court 
Second Amendment decisions are consistent with my hypotheses.  
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Seventh, the state homicide rate variable (X7) had an estimated coefficient of 0.093.  The 
estimated coefficient of the variable was not statistically significant because zero was included in 
the 95 percent confidence interval.  Since the homicide rate variable was not statistically 
significant, the null hypotheses related to this variable cannot be rejected.  The two specific 
directional hypotheses, states with high/low homicide rates increase the probability that their 
state supreme court will rule in favor of gun control/gun rights in Second Amendment decisions, 
cannot be accepted. 
The chi-squared statistic, 0.021, allows this study to reject the null hypothesis that all 
variables in the model jointly equal zero.  This also refers to the finding that the null hypothesis 
of the model does not improve upon simply picking the model outcome.  The percent correctly 
predicted statistic for this study is 0.887, which means that the model predicts 88.7% of all cases 
in the model.  This high statistical value refers to the fraction of cases where the actual outcome 
corresponds to the predictions described in the model.  The third and final statistic that needs to 
be addressed is the proportional reduction of error statistic, which is 0.313.  This statistic refers 
to the percentage of errors that occur from just picking the modal outcome. The reduction of 
error is the percentage of these errors that your model eliminates. Because of this statistic, the 
model presented in this study reduced chance error by 31.3% 
Regarding the performance by the logistic regression model, the R2P value for the linear 
probability model was .901.  This value reflects that the logistic model makes correct predictions 
90 percent of the time, which is forty percent better than pure chance.  The PCP value for the 
logistic regression model was .897.  This value reflects that the logistic regression model makes 
correct predictions about 90 percent of the time, which means that the model predicts potential 
outcomes much better than chance.  The AIC and BIC values for the logit probability model are 
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low. This means that the logistic regression model has a good fit.  The logistic regression model 
was shown to predict outside the bounds of zero and one because the minimum and maximum 
summation values for the predicted value of dependent variable of the model were -1.271 for the 
minimum value and 1.683 for the maximum value.  These model performance values were 
estimated following the initial execution of the model. 
In order to measure the inter-coder reliability and to measure the soundness of the coding 
schema for this study, fifty cases of the full 269 case sample were randomly selected and coded 
by another reader.  A Cronbach’s α statistic was tabulated based on the random sample case 
codes and the reader’s code in order to establish a measure of internal consistency and reliability 
between the two codes.  The Cronbach’s α statistic for this study was 0.918, which suggests that 
the two case codes have a high level of internal consistency.  Typically, a reliability coefficient 
of 0.70 or higher for two codes is considered to be highly acceptable and possess excellent 
agreement. 
Table Two outlines the predicted probability estimation (PPE) of important data 
observations within the full sample of Second Amendment state supreme court cases.  PPE 
estimates interpret the affect of significant independent variables on the dependent variable.  
Coupled with several averaged PPE observations, Table Two presents sixteen PPE observations 
from eight states that changed the most over the study period, 1960-2009.  For instance, a state 
that changed considerably from conservative to liberal regarding political ideology was 
measured in the year the state was most conservative and the year the state was most liberal in 
order to illustrate the full affect of significant independent variable on the dependent variable. 
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Table Two: Predicted Probability Estimation (PPE) of State Supreme Court Second 
Amendment Decisions, 1960-2009 
  
 
Type of Estimation 
 
Variable 
Var. Score; 
Year 
 
State 
Gun Control 
Ruling PPE 
Gun Rights 
Ruling PPE 
Average Sample Observation -- -- -- 55.3 percent 44.7 percent 
Average State w/ GOP Majority Court Party Aff. -- -- 21.5 78.5 
Average State w/ DEM Majority Court Party Aff. -- -- 76.3 23.7 
Average Conservative Ideology State Pol. Ideo. -- -- 29.7 70.3 
Average Liberal Ideology State Pol. Ideo. -- -- 78.4 21.6 
Average Low Gun Ownership % State Gun Own. -- -- 81.4 18.6 
Average High Gun Ownership % State Gun Own. -- -- 25.9 74.1 
Conservative to Liberal Political Ideology Pol. Ideo 2.27; 1965 NC 6.2 93.8 
Conservative to Liberal Political Ideology Pol. Ideo 53.86; 2006 NC 67.2 32.8 
Conservative to Liberal Political Ideology Pol. Ideo 1.26; 1965 SC 5.8 94.2 
Conservative to Liberal Political Ideology Pol. Ideo 53.50; 1999 SC 66.6 33.4 
Liberal to Conservative Political Ideology Pol. Ideo 73.83; 1972 AK 88.9 11.1 
Liberal to Conservative Political Ideology Pol. Ideo 16.66; 2000 AK 13.9 86.1 
Liberal to Conservative Political Ideology Pol. Ideo 63.11; 1964 KY 79.5 20.5 
Liberal to Conservative Political Ideology Pol. Ideo 8.45; 2002 KY 8.7 91.3 
More Gun Ownership to Less Gun Own. 23.4; 1970 NY 80.1 19.9 
More Gun Ownership to Less Gun Own. 18.0; 2000 NY 87.0 13.0 
More Gun Ownership to Less Gun Own. 15.9; 1970 MA 89.0 11.0 
More Gun Ownership to Less Gun Own. 12.6; 2000 MA 91.7 8.3 
Less Gun Ownership to More Gun Own. 32.4; 1970 LA 62.2 37.8 
Less Gun Ownership to More Gun Own. 44.1; 2000 LA 34.4 65.6 
Less Gun Ownership to More Gun Own. 15.2; 1970 NV 89.7 10.3 
Less Gun Ownership to More Gun Own. 33.8; 2000 NV 59.2 40.8 
Sources: LexisNexis Legal Database, the American Judicature Society, the Federal Judicial Center, Berry, et. al., 
four Washington Post gun ownership surveys, the U.S. Census Bureau, and the U.S. Bureau of Justice Statistics69. 
Note: n=269 cases. 
Table Two illustrates averaged and state-level data regarding the predicted probability estimates 
of the two significant variables from the study.  The first estimation in the table provides an 
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average sample observation in which 55.3 percent of the time a gun control ruling is expected, 
while 44.7 percent of the time a gun rights ruling was expected.  
By setting data values of the variables through usage of the standard deviation scores, I 
can create average PPE values for significant state-level variable data.  In an average state that 
had a state supreme court majority of Republican-affiliated judges, 78.5 percent of the time a gun 
rights ruling was expected 78.5 percent of the time, while a gun control ruling was expected only 
21.5 percent of the time.  In an average state that had a state supreme court majority of 
Democratic-affiliated judges, 76.3 percent of the time a gun control ruling was expected, while 
only 23.7 percent of the time a gun rights ruling was expected. 
Since the Berry, et. al., state political ideology and state gun ownership percentage values 
were continuous, the data set allows for easy analysis by means of PPE.  By setting the state 
political ideology value one standard deviation both above (liberal) and below (conservative) the 
mean, I can create an average liberal and conservative state Second Amendment PPE.  In an 
average liberal state, a gun control ruling is predicted 78.4 percent of the time, while a gun rights 
ruling is predicted only 21.6 percent of the time.  Comparatively, in an average conservative 
state, a gun rights ruling is predicted 70.3 percent of the time, while 29.7 percent of the time a 
gun control decision is predicted.   By setting the state gun ownership percentage value one 
standard deviation both above (more gun ownership) and below (less gun ownership) the mean, I 
can create an average low and high gun ownership percentage state Second Amendment PPE.  In 
an average high gun ownership state, a gun control ruling is predicted 25.9 percent of the time, 
while a gun rights ruling is predicted 74.1 percent of the time.  Conversely, in an average low 
gun ownership state, a gun rights ruling is predicted only 18.6 percent of the time, while 81.4 
percent of the time a gun control decision is predicted. 
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 Predicted probability estimates can also be used to track changes to the probabilities of 
Second Amendment case rulings for state-level variable data that changed the most during the 
fifty year study period by setting the variable values at the opposing scores.  For instance, North 
Carolina and South Carolina state political ideology scores moved from very conservative (2.27; 
1.26 respectively) in 1965 to moderate (53.86; 53.50 respectively) in the 1990s and 2000s.  In 
these states, the PPE of a gun rights ruling in both states was very high (93.8 percent; 94.2 
percent respectively) when the state political ideology values were at their most conservative.  
After the state political ideologies moderated the two state in the 1990s and 2000s (53.86; 53.50 
respectively), the PPE of a gun rights ruling decreased by more than 60 percent.  In fact, by the 
1990s and 2000s, the PPE of a gun control ruling was 67.2 percent in North Carolina and 66.6 
percent in South Carolina that the state supreme court would rule in favor of gun control after 
political ideologies changed from conservative to moderate.  As state political ideologies move 
from conservative to liberal, the probability of a state supreme court gun control ruling increases. 
 Comparatively, Alaska and Kentucky state political ideology scores moved from liberal 
(73.83; 63.11 respectively) in the 1960s and 1970s to very conservative (16.66; 8.45 
respectively) in the 2000s.  In these states, the PPE of a Second Amendment gun control ruling 
in both states was high (88.9 percent; 79.5 percent respectively) when the state political ideology 
values were at their most liberal.  After the state political ideologies became very conservative in 
the two state in the 2000s (16.66; 8.45 respectively), the PPE of a gun rights ruling increased by 
more than 70 percent.  In fact, by the 2000s, the PPE of a gun rights ruling was 86.1 percent in 
Alaska and 91.3 percent in Kentucky that the state supreme court would rule in favor of gun 
rights after political ideologies changed from liberal to conservative. As state political ideologies 
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moved from liberal to conservative, the probability of a state supreme court gun rights ruling 
increased. 
Predicted probability estimates can also be used to track changes to the probabilities of 
Second Amendment case rulings for state gun ownership percentage variable data that changed 
the most during the fifty year study period by setting the variable values at the opposing scores.   
For instance, New York and Massachusetts state gun ownership percentage values were the only 
two states that decreased (New York from 23.4 percent in 1970 to 18 percent in 2000; 
Massachusetts from 15.9 percent in 1970 to 12.6 percent in 2000) during the fifty year study 
period.  For these two states, the affect of decreasing state gun ownership percentage is not as 
great because the earlier values were already very low, as compared to other states.  After the 
state gun ownership percentage decreased, the PPE of a gun control ruling increased by 7 percent 
in New York (80.1 percent in 1970 to 87 percent to 2000), while the PPE of a gun control ruling 
increased by only 3 percent in Massachusetts (89.0 percent in 1970 to 91.7 percent in 2000).  As 
state gun ownership percentages move lower, the probability of a state supreme court gun control 
ruling increases. 
Comparatively, Louisiana and Nevada state gun ownership percentage values increased 
the most (Louisiana from 32.4 percent in 1970 to 44.1 percent in 2000; Nevada from 15.2 
percent in 1970 to 33.8 percent in 2000) during the fifty year study period.  For these two states, 
the affect of increasing state gun ownership percentage is quite significant.  After the state gun 
ownership percentage increased in these two states, the PPE of a gun rights ruling increased by 
nearly 30 percent in Louisiana (37.8 percent in 1970 to 65.6 percent to 2000), while the PPE of a 
gun rights ruling increased by more than 30 percent in Nevada (10.3 percent in 1970 to 40.8 
percent in 2000).  As state gun ownership percentages move higher, the probability of a state 
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supreme court gun rights ruling increases. The following section provides the conclusions of this 
chapter. 
Conclusions 
 This study posed the research question, what is the extent and determinants of Second 
Amendment rulings in state supreme courts, 1960-2009?  This study theorized that electoral 
accountability, institutional factors, public opinion, and specific policy interests affect the way 
judges that sit on state supreme courts rule on polarizing political issues, such as the Second 
Amendment.  This theory was then operationalized into six independent variables, with the 
actual Second Amendment case ruling being the dependent variable.  The operationalizations of 
the study included electoral accountability.  This variable was developed into a dichotomous 
variable, state judicial selection method, which measured whether a state used elections or 
another means of selecting judges to state supreme courts.  Second, institutional factors were 
operationalized into a dichotomous variable, the presence of state intermediate appellate courts, 
which measures whether or not a state had an intermediate appellate court when a Second 
Amendment ruling was handed down.  Third, public opinion aspect of the study was 
operationalized to continuously measure state political ideology and population density.  Forth, 
specific policy interests were operationalized to continuously measure state gun ownership 
percentage and homicide rate. 
 Using logistic regression analysis, this study found that the extent and determinants of 
Second Amendment rulings in state supreme courts, 1960-2009, were limited to select public 
opinion and specific policy interests.  More specifically, state political ideology and state gun 
ownership percentage variables had a direct impact on the outcomes of Second Amendment state 
supreme court rulings during the fifty year study period.  As such, the four hypotheses associated 
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with these two independent variables are accepted and the null hypotheses are rejected.  State 
judicial selection method, the presence of a state intermediate appellate court, state population 
density, and state homicide rate did not have a statistically significant relationship with the 
dependent variable, and thus the eight hypotheses associated with these independent variables 
cannot be accepted and the null hypotheses cannot be rejected.  The logistic regression model 
performance measures illustrated the fact that the model made predictions correctly more than 90 
percent of the time and had a good fit, while the coding schema employed in the study was 
shown to provide high consistency between coders because of the Cronbach’s α statistic. 
 The effect of state political ideology on Second Amendment state supreme court rulings 
is no surprise.  Political institutions and state judicial systems are populated by political 
appointees or judges who have won elective office.  Political actors, even ones who are supposed 
to have some level of political independence, possess a personal political ideology.  This set of 
personal ideas, goals, expectations, and actions, affects the actions of most political actors when 
they carry out their political role, and state supreme court judges are no different.   
Corresponding directly to traditional notions about political ideology and support for or 
opposition to gun rights, this study shows that state supreme court judges in states with 
conservative political ideologies are much more likely to rule in favor of gun rights than gun 
control.  Comparatively, this study also shows that state supreme court judges in states with 
liberal political ideologies are much more likely to rule in favor of gun control than gun rights.  
Traditionally, people with conservative political ideologies support greater gun rights, while 
individuals with liberal political ideologies support greater gun control measures.  The findings 
in this study affirm traditional political ideology considerations, especially regarding the Second 
Amendment at the state supreme court level.    
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 Like the state political ideology variable, the affect of state gun ownership percentage on 
Second Amendment state supreme court decisions is not a surprising revelation.  State gun 
culture across the country varies widely.  States with higher gun ownership rates have 
traditionally been associated with rural and conservative areas, while states with lesser gun 
ownership rates have traditionally been associated with urban and liberal areas.  Since judges are 
political actors and possess an individual political ideology, the connection should be made 
between ideology and specific policy interests.  While judges are not often directly lobbied 
regarding these cases, the make-up of a personal political ideology includes goals and actions.    
These goals and actions frequently include specific policy interests, such as gun 
ownership and the Second Amendment.  Related directly to the creation of individual political 
ideologies and the support for specific policy interests, this study shows that state supreme court 
judges in states with higher gun ownership percentages are more likely to rule in favor of gun 
rights than gun control.  Comparatively, this study also shows that state supreme court judges in 
states with lower gun ownership percentages are much more likely to rule in favor of gun control 
than gun rights.  Traditionally, support for gun rights breeds an atmosphere that respects gun 
ownership, while laws that curtail the ownership or possession of firearms creates a scenario 
through which gun ownership is frowned upon.  The findings in this study affirm traditional 
specific policy interest considerations, especially regarding the Second Amendment. 
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CHAPTER FOUR 
 
SECOND AMENDMENT DECISIONS IN THE U.S. COURTS OF APPEALS 
 
 
For target shooting, that's okay. Get a license and go to the range. For defense of 
the home, that's why we have police departments. 
 
--James Brady, former White House Press Secretary and Gun 
Control Advocate, 1988 
 
 
Just as the First and Fourth Amendment secure individual rights of free speech 
and security respectively, the Second Amendment protects an individual right  
to keep and bear arms. This view of the text comports with the all but unanimous 
understanding of the Founding Fathers. 
 
--John Ashcroft, former U.S. Attorney General and U.S. Senator 
(R-MO), 2002 
 
 
  
By the fall of 2005, Alan Klebig had gained the reputation around his neighborhood as 
being a bit of a pack rat.  The yard and fence in front of his Watertown, Wisconsin, home was 
adorned with dozens of squirrel tails from hunting trips, along with shiny compact disc cases 
collected from the town dump.  Containers filled with acidic chemicals and other substances 
littered the backyard area, while various odds-and-ends were strewn across the garage and 
kitchen.  An extensive assortment of other items were scattered across his bedrooms, while his 
living room was in complete disarray.1 
On 18 October 2005, the Watertown Police Department executed a search warrant on 
Klebig’s home.  Officers on the scene found two unregistered firearms around the house.  One 
of the firearms was a .22-caliber rifle with a sawed-off barrel, a missing stock, and two 
ammunition magazines taped together.  An illegal silencer was found inside the bedroom 
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closet.  Both the .22 caliber rifle and silencer were seized during the search, and Klebig was 
charged under Sections §5861(d) and §5871 of the United States Code “with knowingly 
possessing a firearm and silencer which were not registered to him in the National Firearms 
Registration and Transfer Record.”2 
In the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Wisconsin, Klebig was convicted 
of possessing an unregistered rifle and illegal silencer.  Subsequently, Klebig appealed to the 
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit.  The appeal challenged the district court’s 
decision to admit firearms-related evidence and to permit the completion of gun 
demonstrations during closing arguments.  The appellate decision was authored by Judge Ilana 
Rovner, a George H.W. Bush appointee.  Other case panelists included Judge Richard 
Cudahy, a Jimmy Carter appointee, and Judge Richard Posner, a Ronald Reagan appointee.3   
Judge Rovner’s Republican-majority panel ruled that the government should not have 
allowed firearms articles to be placed into evidence and should not have allowed gun 
demonstrations to occur during closing arguments.  Rovner wrote in the decision that “without 
the improperly admitted evidence (and gun demonstrations), the prosecution’s case here 
would have been considerably weaker.”4  Because of these findings, Rovner’s decision 
reversed Klebig’s firearms convictions and remanded the case for a new trial consistent with 
the decision.5 
Using the firearms issues related to the Klebig case as a starting point, this study 
focuses on the decision-making and judicial behavior of U.S. Courts of Appeals judges 
regarding Second Amendment decisions.  This study attempts to do two different things.  
First, I provide readers with a descriptive study of U.S. Courts of Appeals Second Amendment 
decisions between 1960 and 2009.  Second, I present an explanatory analysis that estimates 
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whether partisan accountability, public opinion, and specific exogenous factors affect the way 
U.S. Courts of Appeals judges rule on polarizing political issues, such as the Second 
Amendment between 1960 and 2009.   
Potential Influences on U.S. Courts of Appeals Judicial Behavior and Decision-Making 
In this study, I am interested in the political aspects that affect Second Amendment 
rulings in the U.S. Courts of Appeals.  This study theorizes that partisan accountability, public 
opinion, and specific exogenous factors affect the way judges who sit on the U.S. Courts of 
Appeals rule on the polarizing political issue of Second Amendment rights.  Rejecting the legal 
model of decision-making and building upon recent U.S. Courts of Appeals work produced by 
Donald Songer, Susan Haire, and others, this study attempts to uncover specific institutional and 
appellate circuit-level political aspects that effect U.S. Courts of Appeals gun rulings. 
Focusing on the judicial behavior of U.S. Courts of Appeals judges, Frank Cross explored 
the nature of federal appellate court decision-making over the last twenty years by focusing on 
political ideology, the law, judicial background, political institutions, litigants, panel effects, 
procedural thresholds, and legal precedent.  Cross argued that a judge’s judicial and personal life, 
personal experience, and background affect how they rule on important cases.  In particular, 
Cross found that judges of the U.S. Courts of Appeals are influenced in their decision-making 
processes by political ideology and by the appointing president.6 
The U.S. Courts of Appeals are the concern of this study because of their position as an 
integral part of the federal public policy-making process.  In fact, Frank Cross argued that the 
U.S. Courts of Appeal have a profound impact on the law because judges issue many more 
decisions in more areas of law than the U.S. Supreme Court.7  The Second Amendment policy 
area also gives particularly good mileage towards understanding the U.S. Courts of Appeals 
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because the right to bear arms is a part of the Bill of Rights in the U.S. Constitution, and 
therefore also is a civil liberty that the federal government should be unable to take away from 
American citizens.  Work regarding the U.S. Courts of Appeals has been concerned with 
judicial decision-making on cases, partisanship, and policy-making.  One of the barriers to the 
study of decision-making in the U.S. Courts of Appeals was the three-judge panel decision 
structure.  According to John McIver, panel decisions on issues from the U.S. Courts of 
Appeals provided information only a subset of the judges of the court on any case, regardless 
of issue.  In an attempt to create a new model for the study of U.S. Courts of Appeals decision-
making, McIver created a general decentralized model that scaled case issues and decisions 
including unanimous and non-unanimous decisions.8 
In one of the first attempts to empirically measure the decision-making of the U.S. 
Courts of Appeals judges, Sheldon Goldman created a model of decision-making for all U.S. 
Courts of Appeals decisions rendered between 1961 and 1964.  Most important for this study, 
Goldman included in his model a measure of case issue and of voting position, and found that 
criminal cases, including several Second Amendment cases, were not evenly distributed across 
the U.S. Courts of Appeals circuits.  Some appellate circuits, such as the Fifth Circuit, dispose 
of a disproportionate number of criminal cases than other appellate circuits.9  Sheldon 
Goldman updated his earlier work to extend to decisions rendered during the late 1960s and 
early 1970s, finding that patterns of judicial decision-making regarding specific case issues, 
such as criminal cases, were effected by interrelated political attitudes and values held by the 
judges who rendered a decision.10 
Later scholarship started to focus specifically on case issues and decision-making 
outcomes in the U.S. Courts of Appeals.  John Gruhl found that libel cases decided before the 
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U.S. Courts of Appeals were not always consistent with decisions rendered by the U.S. 
Supreme Court.  Even though 88 percent of U.S. Courts of Appeals decisions were consistent, 
Gruhl argued that certain political aspects accounted for this inconsistency between the 
decision-making of the U.S. Courts of Appeals and the U.S. Supreme Court regarding libel 
cases.11  In a similar study, Steve Koh found that the decision-making processes of the eleven 
U.S. Courts of Appeals circuits vary widely regarding immigration cases.  Some circuits have 
different standards of review than others.  The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, a sprawling 
appellate circuit covering much of the western U.S. has long had to deal with immigration 
cases because of its proximity to foreign countries, possessed different standards of review of 
than other circuits.12   
Donald R. Songer, alone and with others, has published extensively regarding issues 
relating to the U.S. Courts of Appeals.  Judicial decision-making has been the central focus of 
some of his work.  For instance, Donald Songer and Susan Haire explored integrated 
approaches to the study of judicial decision-making regarding obscenity cases within the halls 
of the U.S. Courts of Appeals.  Creating an integrated multivariate model that combined five 
approaches to judicial voting, the authors found that their new model correctly predicted about 
80 percent of the judges’ votes on obscenity cases with an error reduction of almost 46 
percent.13  Susan Haire, Stefanie Lindquist, and Roger Hartley considered judicial decision-
making through the lens of litigant success, finding that U.S. Courts of Appeals judges were 
less likely to support the position of plaintiffs when represented by an attorney appearing for 
the first time before the appellate circuit.14 
Brandon Denning provided case analysis of several important U.S. Courts of Appeals 
cases the focused on the Second Amendment, including Cases v. United States (1942), United 
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States v. Tot (1942), and United States v. Warin (1976).  Denning argued that the decisions 
made by federal appellate judges in these cases created an exceedingly irregular view of the 
Second Amendment.  In fact, Denning argued that two cases, Cases and Warin, presenting the 
virtually the same facts, but came to two completely different decisions.15  Not only has the 
Second Amendment been politically polarizing in nature, but the U.S. Courts of Appeals have 
offered vastly different decisions based on similar case facts. 
 Donald Kilmer and Gary Harding surveyed the Second Amendment case of Nordyke v. 
King (2004).  In the decision, as of the start of 2010, Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals decided 
to offer no formal decision in the important case because the panel judges decided to wait until 
the Parker and Heller cases were decided by the U.S. Supreme Court.  According to Kilmer 
and Harding, Nordyke was important regarding federal appellate decision-making because the 
plaintiffs, local gun show promoters, challenged an Alameda County, California, ordinance 
that made the possession of firearms on county property illegal.16   
Christopher Keleher examined Parker v. District of Columbia (2006) and how it 
related to the decisions of other federal appellate decisions.  The Parker case was the first time 
a federal appellate court found a law unconstitutional on Second Amendment grounds.  
Keleher concluded that the decision did not forbid all state and local firearms regulations; 
however, the banning of firearms would be outside their range of legality.17  Amanda Dupree 
examined Parker v. District of Columbia (2007), a U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of 
Columbia Circuit case, which was the precursor to the U.S. Supreme Court case, District of 
Columbia v. Heller (2008). Parker, then subsequently Heller, held that the District of 
Columbia’s ban on handguns violated the Second Amendment and was unconstitutional.  
Through examination of Second Amendment judicial decision-making analysis, Dupree 
 149 
 
argued that Parker firmly ushered in an era government sponsorship of an individual right 
theory of the right to keep and bear arms.18   
David Kopel surveyed thirty years (1977-2007) of decisions related to the Second 
Amendment rendered by the plains and Rocky Mountains-based Tenth U.S. Circuit Court of 
Appeals (CO, KS, NM, OK, UT, WY).  The author’s argument, established through intense 
analysis of numerous Second Amendment cases, is that in light of U.S. Supreme Court’s 
District of Columbia v. Heller decision, the case law of the Second Amendment in the Tenth 
Circuit Court of Appeals have largely been wrongly decided.  According to Kopel, the case 
law has been incorrect because the vast majority of cases were decided in opposition to 
Second Amendment precedents established in Heller.  For instance, Bastible v. Weyerhaeuser 
Co. (1985) and U.S. v. Great Guns, Inc. (2001) were two cases in which Tenth Circuit Second 
Amendment decisions were wiped out by Heller.19  Using these analyses as a central 
motivation point, this study suggests that partisan accountability, public opinion, and specific 
exogenous factors affect the way judges that sit on federal appellate courts rule on polarizing 
political issues, including the Second Amendment. 
From this literature, it is apparent that there is wide-ranging literature regarding the 
numerous issues that make-up the study of the decision-making and judicial behavior of U.S. 
Courts of Appeals judges, and federal appellate decision-making regarding Second Amendment 
cases; however, lengthy research suggests that no literature has focused on a statistical analysis 
of the political aspects of Second Amendment case holdings in U.S. Courts of Appeals.  This 
study attempts to fill this void in the literature regarding analysis of the political characteristics 
of U.S. Courts of Appeals Second Amendment decisions.  Since this topic has never served as 
the focus of scholarship, it is my hope that this study will stimulate discussion of and improve 
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explanations of the issues that affect decision-making regarding Second Amendment decisions in 
the U.S. Courts of Appeals. 
Design of the Research 
In this study, I am interested in the political factors that help to explain the judicial 
behavior and decision-making processes of judges on issue-based cases in the U.S. Courts of 
Appeals.  Specifically, this study elaborates on the theory that political context and the political 
values of judges, including judicial partisan accountability, public opinion, and specific 
exogenous factors, affect Second Amendment decisions.  Because of this theory, the dependent 
variable for the study is the Second Amendment case decision whether a U.S. Courts of Appeals 
three-judge panel ruled in favor of gun control or gun rights.  Although scholars have not created 
a dependent variable in this way before, there is precedent for the usage of case outcomes as the 
central focus of scholarly commentary.   
John Kilwein and Richard Brisbin studied a sample of 1,040 state supreme court 
decisions regarding intensified scrutiny doctrine.20  In different work, Sidney Ulmer provided a 
systematic overview of the behavior of U.S. Supreme Court justices with regard to race-based 
case outcomes during the Civil Rights Movement.21  Using the Harold Spaeth database on U.S. 
Supreme Court decisions, Nancy Scherer and Banks Miller created a logistic regression model to 
determine if membership in the Federalist Society affected the political ideology and decision-
making of U.S. Courts of Appeals judges.  Through consideration of case law, the authors found 
that federal appellate judges who held membership in the Federalist Society were significantly 
more conservative than non-members.22   
A new logistic regression model was created for this chapter.  This new model estimates 
the effect of partisan accountability, public opinion, and specific exogenous factors regarding 
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U.S. Courts of Appeals Second Amendment decisions.  The dependent variable for this new 
logistic regression model were the Second Amendment case decisions, in which a U.S. Courts of 
Appeals panel either ruled in favor of gun control or gun rights.  Dependent variable data was 
taken from the LexisNexis Academic Legal search engine.  Second Amendment case data used 
for this study spanned the last fifty years, between 1 January 1960 and 31 December 2009.  A 
total of 219 cases from all state supreme courts were included in the data. The dependent 
variable was created so that if a case ruled in favor of gun control, then the case was labeled “0.” 
If a case favored gun rights, then the case was labeled “1.”  The mid-range theory of this study 
was disaggregated into five independent variables, each including specific hypotheses, to 
estimate their effect on the dependent Second Amendment decision variable. 
Partisan Accountability 
Partisan accountability provides reasoning for the way politicians vote and act, and 
judges sitting on the U.S. Courts of Appeals are no different.  Each of the 156 U.S. Courts of 
Appeals individual judges that sit on the bench of one of the eleven appellate circuits across 
the United States were appointed by a U.S. President.  According to Jeff Gill and Richard 
Waterman, presidential appointments to the federal courts system and the cabinet have 
symbolized the greatest basis of executive influence over both the bureaucracy and the federal 
judiciary.23  
According to Sheldon Goldman federal appellate appointments are dramatically 
important.  This lack of attention can be attributed to the fact that the lower federal judiciary is 
organized on a region and local basis.  Often made behind closed doors, nominations to the 
U.S. Courts of Appeals are often coupled with intense drama and significant public policy 
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decisions.  The decisions of U.S. Courts of Appeals judges in the 1960s and 1970s regarding 
civil liberties and civil rights led the courts to become a political issue in elections.24 
Following Ronald Reagan’s victory in 1980, his administration thought that the U.S. 
Courts of Appeals had become too activist in nature, and thus had established an imbalance of 
power between the federal and state systems that threatened the rights of the states.  Because 
of this perception, the Reagan administration saw judicial appointments to be an important 
link to the potential success of the President’s domestic agenda.  This sharp political turn to 
the right sought to change direction of government through very partisan means. In fact, 
Reagan trumped the traditional senatorial prerogative to help name judges to the federal 
bench, by instead asking Republican Senators to submit three to five names for a federal 
judgeship.  After submission of names, the Reagan Administration would then study the 
potential nominees and select the individual who would most likely favor Reagan’s agenda. 
For one of the first recorded times, partisanship and ideology had changed the way U.S. 
Courts of Appeals judges were selected.25 
According to Sheldon Goldman and Elliot Slotnick, this overt partisanship that took 
hold during the Reagan Administration regarding appointments to the U.S. Courts of Appeals 
continued into the 1990s.  President Clinton, facing a hostile political environment, was forced 
into moderation, compromise, and accommodation when he made appointments to the U.S. 
Courts of Appeals.  Because the U.S. Senate and U.S. House Judiciary Committee was chaired 
by Orrin Hatch (R-UT) and Henry Hyde (R-IL) respectively, the Clinton Administration was 
forced to contend with both during the nomination and confirmation process of judges to the 
U.S. Courts of Appeals.  The success of his efforts in getting many Democratic, left-leaning 
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judges nominated, and ultimately confirmed, depended on funneling judicial nominations at 
the right times.26 
Sheldon Goldman, Elliot Slotnick, Gerard Gryski, Gary Zuk, and Sara Schiavoni 
argued that while George W. Bush’s judicial appointees were made through coordinated effort 
and expended significant resources to place judges who shared the President’s judicial 
philosophy on the U.S. Courts of Appeals.  In fact, a Bush aide was quoted as saying “(Bush) 
is very interested in this (judicial selection) and thinks it is one of his most important 
responsibilities on the domestic side”.27  The authors argued that Bush’s nomination process 
for the U.S. Courts of Appeals became so politically motivated that the administration 
deviated from the normal nomination process by not allowing the American Bar Association 
to rate potential candidates before a nomination was made official.  Because the U.S. Senate 
had a poor record of confirming Bush judicial nominees, the administration attempted to 
regulate the time parameters of the nomination process.  This effort was ultimately 
unsuccessful, but Bush’s partisan legacy of the U.S. Courts of Appeals nominees remains.28 
Sheldon Goldman, Elliot Slotnick, Gerard Gryski, Gary Zuk, and Sara Schiavoni found 
that the key to understanding the rancorous nature of the judicial nomination process under 
George W. Bush was his want to continue to nominate politically partisan judges even though 
his political capital was small after two type presidential elections.  Even though the President 
confronted a nasty environment within the advice and consent process, the Bush 
Administration placed many highly qualified, ethnically diverse individuals on the U.S. Courts 
of Appeals.  Most importantly, the judges of the federal appellate circuits confirmed during 
Bush’s first term shared the President’s judicial philosophy and many shared his partisan 
nature.29 
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Sheldon Goldman, Elliot Slotnick, Gerard Gryski, and Sara Schiavoni explored the 
process through which the George W. Bush Administration picked U.S. Courts of Appeals 
judges between 2005 and 2007, a time of widespread turmoil within his second term in office.  
The authors found that despite the swirling negative atmosphere around Bush’s foreign policy 
goals, the administration was still exceedingly successful in getting their nominees to the U.S. 
Courts of Appeals passed through the U.S. Senate.  During each of his two presidential 
campaigns, Bush made it clear that he was going to nominate judges who agreed with him 
from a policy/partisan standpoint, and this effort continued to be effective during the most 
trying time of his presidency. 30  In a final work regarding Bush judicial appointments, 
Sheldon Goldman, Sara Schiavoni, and Elliot Slotnick surveyed the judicial nomination record 
of the George W. Bush Administration.  In the article, the authors found, through numerous 
interviews with individuals involved the process, that the Bush Administration legacy 
appointments to the U.S. Courts of Appeals was one that included almost complete success in 
selecting judges who espoused the similar political and partisan views.31 
Scholars have also focused on the role of interest groups in the nomination process to 
the U.S. Courts of Appeals.  Nancy Scherer, Brandon Bartels, and Amy Steigerwald argued 
that nominations to the U.S. Courts of Appeals have become lengthy, partisan proceedings not 
because of an intense political environment or ideological extremism of nominees, but because 
of increasing opposition to judicial nominees from concerned interest groups.  In instances 
when interests opposed U.S. Courts of Appeals nominees, the groups sounded a “fire alarm” 
regarding the professional record of a nominee, which forced U.S. Senators politically-aligned 
with the interest group to desert the traditional senatorial position of quickly confirming 
judicial nominees.32  Through considerable analysis of the U.S. Courts of Appeals, Frank 
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Cross found that judges of the U.S. Courts of Appeals are influenced in their decision-making 
processes by political ideology and by the appointing president.33 
 According to scholarship, presidential appointments to the federal bench have become 
exceedingly political in nature.  Scholars have also shown that judicial appointees by 
Democratic and Republican Presidents traditionally espouse the liberal and conservative 
values often associated with the political parties of President who nominated the judge.   
Presidential staffs assure policy agreement between the President and judicial nominees 
through considerable assessment of candidates.  Moreover, the Republican Party was often 
associated with clear support for Second Amendment rights.34  To compare, the Democratic 
Party was frequently connected with gun control efforts.35 
Connecting this work together, it can be noted that the federal judicial appointment 
process has become politicized as the executive branch of government has scrambled to make 
appointments to the federal judiciary who are consistent with presidential ideological and 
partisan boundaries.36  As such, this study hypothesizes that U.S. Courts of Appeals Second 
Amendment decisions will be significantly affected by the partisan presidential nomination 
make-up of appellate circuit panels because federal appellate judges often mirror the policy 
preferences of the executives who they were nominated by because of an intense vetting 
process.  In particular, U.S. Courts of Appeals panels that have a majority of judges appointed 
by Democratic presidents increase the probability that the panel will rule in favor of gun 
control in Second Amendment decisions, while federal appellate circuit panels that have a 
majority of judges appointed by Republican presidents increase the probability that the panel 
will rule in favor of gun rights in Second Amendment decisions. 
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The partisan accountability aspect of the theory was created to estimate the effect of 
presidential party nomination majority appellate panels on Second Amendment U.S. Courts of 
Appeals decisions.  This variable indicates that if a Second Amendment federal appellate panel 
had two Clinton appointments and one Reagan appointment, then the case variable would labeled 
as a majority Democratic panel.  This dichotomous variable was labeled “0” for panels with a 
majority of judges appointed by Democratic Presidents, or labeled “1” for panels with a majority 
of judges appointed by Republican Presidents.  Variable data regarding U.S. Courts of Appeals 
panel partisanship was collected from the judge biography section of the Federal Judicial Center 
website. 
Public Opinion 
 Even though the judges of the federal judiciary possess lifetime appointments, the 
varying opinions of members of professional circles and the public affect the way that U.S. 
Courts of Appeals judges rule on issues like the Second Amendment.  This notion is backed-
up by a law review work that preceded a foundational effort by Frank Cross.  In the piece, 
Cross found that legal and political factors were statistically significant with regard to what 
issues determined the way federal appellate judges decide cases.  One of the political factors 
measured in the article was an affirmance rate of lower court rulings by the U.S. Courts of 
Appeals.  The affirmance ruling rate was virtually the same regardless of the partisan make-up 
on the appellate panel.  Statistical analysis showed that political ideology was a significant 
factor of judicial decision-making.37  Lawrence Baum argued that judicial colleagues, the 
public, the executive and legislative branches of government, social and professional groups, 
interested policy groups, and the media are all groups which judges are conscious of and seek 
consent from when they are making decisions.38   
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 Not only does political ideology and public opinion affect judicial decision-making, 
but evidence also suggests that there is a geographical factor involved when it comes to issues 
that affect decisions.  Steve Koh found that immigration decisions in the U.S. Courts of 
Appeals differ significantly among the eleven federal appellate circuits.  The Ninth Appellate 
Circuit Court of Appeals, an appellate circuit that has long grappled with issues relating to 
immigration because of its proximity to both the Mexican and Canadian borders, possess 
different standards regarding review of immigration cases than the Eleventh Circuit, created in 
1981, covering states along the Gulf of Mexico.39  In another important work, John Gruhl 
found a similar result regarding the difference in adherence to U.S. Supreme Court libel cases 
between the different circuits of the U.S. Courts of Appeals.40  This geographical factor is 
important because it shows that different circuits and geographic regions affect how federal 
appellate judges decide cases.  This finding shows that the judiciary is aware of and seeks out 
judicial positions that the general public agrees with. 
 Coupled together for this study, political ideology and geographical factors establish an 
estimation of public opinion.  J. Woodford Howard, Jr.’s analysis of his work on the role 
perceptions and behavior of judges in two U.S. Courts of Appeals circuits suggests that there 
is a common link.  While many of the federal appellate judges saw their role and behavior on 
the bench in a similar light, it was clear that judges coming from different political and 
demographic background across the two appellate circuits acted differently regarding the law 
then other judges.  Based upon his experience as an elected local and state judge, a southern 
newcomer to the U.S. Courts of Appeals argued that federal judges should merely interpret the 
law, while a new northern judge felt that his job included more than simple legal 
interpretation.41  Why did the two U.S. Courts of Appeals judges make these arguments?  The 
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first judge clearly understood that a judicial policy overreach was never seen as a positive by 
the public, while the second judge believed that exact opposite.  Even though U.S. Courts of 
Appeals judges possess lifetime appointments, they still show attentiveness to public opinion 
and political ideology.   
The way U.S. Courts of Appeals judges decide cases has become an important issue 
within this theory and the literature.  The study of judicial behavior has focused on the types of 
issues that affect the decisions rendered by judges.  According to this assertion, judicial 
behavior refers the types of activities and behaviors judges become involved with in their 
capacity on the bench, and has an intense and enduring impact on the types of decisions 
rendered by judges across all courts that comprise the American judiciary.42  There is also a 
growing consciousness by scholars that judicial behavior includes more than just ruling on the 
constitutionality of laws and public policy decisions.43 
Lee Epstein and Jack Knight argued that the achievement of personal and professional 
goals, calculated behaviors, and communication between justices effect the behavior of judges.  
First, an essential assumption of strategic judicial behavior is that justices make decisions on 
cases that are consistent with their personal goals and interests.  Second, because judges want to 
make the most of their goals and interests, they have to make decisions in a calculated fashion 
that encompasses the opinions of others.  Third, a complete account of strategic judicial behavior 
is difficult to establish without an understanding of the institutions in which judges work.44 
Lawrence Baum added to the study of judicial behavior in two recent works.  In the 
earlier effort, Baum addressed the sometimes perplexing issue of judicial behavior.45  Baum 
analyzed the significance of striking a balance between a judge’s personal interests in a decision 
and other professional goals, including personal, professional, and judicial popularity, in addition 
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to the size of the docket.  Baum also considered the extent to which judges think, act, and decide 
cases in a strategic fashion.  Strategic judicial behavior refers to the notion that judges develop 
and select their own judicial policy positions following early assessments of the position of 
colleagues and other decision-makers might assume.46 
Building on his earlier scholarship, Lawrence Baum developed his investigation of 
judicial behavior further by examining judges’ work and the environments in which it takes 
place.  Baum argued that judges are aware of, and look for, support from the people that occupy 
their social and professional environment.  Judicial colleagues, the public, other branches of 
government, social and professional groups, policy groups, and the news media are all entities 
judges are aware of, and seek approval from, as they do their job.  Judges and their audiences, 
people whose esteem they regard as important, provide a key viewpoint regarding overall 
judicial behavior.47  Baum argued “that a judge’s motivation to win the approval of their 
audiences can explain a good deal about their choices as decision-makers…”48  Epstein, Knight, 
and Baum agree that judges care about the opinions of others when they decide particular cases.  
This literature shows that public opinion and public political ideology affects how cases are ruled 
upon in the U.S. Courts of Appeals.   
The public opinion variables estimated the effect of appellate circuit political ideology 
and population density on Second Amendment U.S. Courts of Appeals cases.  This study 
hypothesizes that U.S. Courts of Appeals Second Amendment decisions will be significantly 
affected by appellate circuit political ideology and population density.  In particular, U.S. Courts 
of Appeals circuits with a liberal political ideology increase the probability that their appellate 
panels will rule in favor of gun control in Second Amendment decisions, while federal appellate 
circuits with a conservative political ideology increase the probability that their appellate panels 
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will rule in favor of gun rights in Second Amendment decisions.  U.S. Courts of Appeals circuits 
with high population density increase the probability that their appellate panels will rule in favor 
of gun control in Second Amendment decisions, while federal appellate circuits with low 
population density increase the probability that their appellate panels will rule in favor of gun 
rights in Second Amendment decisions. 
The appellate circuit political ideology measure was taken from the Berry, et. al. citizen 
political ideology dataset.  The variable was continuously measured between 1 and 100 with 
lower numbers representing conservative political ideologies and higher numbers representing 
liberal political ideologies.  The appellate circuit population density measure was taken from the 
U.S. Census Bureau dataset.  This continuously measured variable represents the number of 
people per square mile in each appellate circuit.  Lightly populated appellate circuits have lower 
population densities, while densely populated appellate circuits have higher population densities.  
The data collected for both of these variables was aggregated from state-level data to account for 
the eleven circuits that comprise the U.S. Courts of Appeals. 
Specific Exogenous Factors 
 Specific exogenous factors might affect the way U.S. Courts of Appeals judges decide 
Second Amendment cases.  A variety of studies suggest that factors outside the judicial system 
affect federal appellate cases.  James Gibson found that specific external factors, including 
contact with constituents and electoral defeat, affected the way judges made important decisions.  
Through data analysis of a quasi-experimental design focusing on the circuit system used by the 
Iowa trial courts, the author argued that this outside involvement was integral when judges made 
case decisions.49 
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 Philip Fetzer argued that extralegal factors, such as tribal sovereignty, helped to explain 
multifaceted American Indian legal rulings made in tribal courts.  In several previous tribal 
decisions, scholars questioned the confusing legal reasoning brought up in particular cases.  
Exogenous factors, such as the way tribes ruled themselves, helped to explain why judges ruled 
the way that did in several of these rulings inconsistent with other legal reasoning.50  James 
Gibson argued that early studies of judicial behavior and decision-making rarely considered 
multiple exogenous concepts, and that this was a failing in the literature.  Gibson argued that far 
too many studies that have included exogenous measures were created by considering the 
personal life of judges, which Gibson believed were not exogenous in nature.51   
John Ferejohn and Barry Weingast used a model of spatial theory to connect judicial 
goals with distinct judicial behavioral and decision-making outcomes.  According to the 
Ferejohn and Weingast model, exogenous factors included those outside the scope of a judge’s 
career.52  Pragati Patrick and Thomas Bak found that a powerful federal law that involved 
increased penalties for individuals who were arrested for violent firearms-related drug crimes 
affected the amount of firearms cases decided by the federal court system.  This finding was 
particularly interesting because judges seemed hesitant to become involved with these types of 
cases.53   
Gretchen Helmke and Mitchell Sanders argued that external factors, such as loyalty to a 
national government and specific policy interests, helped to shape the behavior of judges on the 
Argentine Supreme Court.  The dominant framework created by the authors linked specific 
external factors to the types of ideal-type behaviors carried out by judges in their national level 
judicial careers, including: loyalists, policy seekers, institutionalists, and careerists.54  Matthew 
Henry and John Turner analyzed a dataset of patent litigation case decisions from the Court of 
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Appeals for the Federal Circuit occurring over the last fifty years.  Henry and Turner found that 
outside factors, including decisions made by other judicial levels, have dramatically affected 
patent decisions made by judges of the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit.55  This literature 
shows that specific exogenous factors have affected judicial rulings made at various levels of the 
state and federal judiciary. 
Specific exogenous factor variables estimated their effect on U.S. Courts of Appeals 
Second Amendment decisions.  Two firearms-related external factor variables, appellate circuit 
gun ownership percentage and homicide rate, might be expected to influence case decisions.  
U.S. Courts of Appeals gun ownership percentage was continuously measured from each 
appellate circuit based on the findings from Washington Post gun ownership surveys completed 
in 1970, 1980, 1990, and 2000. Lower gun ownership rates meant that fewer appellate circuit 
residents own firearms, while higher gun ownership reflected elevated rates of gun ownership.   
Appellate circuit homicide rate was a continuous measure of the total number of 
homicides committed per 100,000 people in an appellate circuit population.  Variable data 
regarding appellate circuit homicide rate was collected from the U.S. Bureau of Justice Statistics.  
Lower homicide rates meant that the appellate circuit has fewer murders, while more murders 
reflected elevated rates of homicides in an appellate circuit.  All appellate circuit-level data used 
for this study was aggregated from state-level measures.  The data collected for both of these 
variables was aggregated from state-level data to account for the eleven circuits that comprise the 
U.S. Courts of Appeals. 
This study hypothesized that U.S. Courts of Appeals circuits with high gun ownership 
percentages increase the probability that their appellate panels will rule in favor of gun rights in 
Second Amendment decisions, while federal appellate circuits with low gun ownership 
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percentages increase the probability that their appellate panels will rule in favor of gun control in 
Second Amendment decisions.  This study hypothesized that U.S. Courts of Appeals circuits 
with low homicide rates increase the probability that their appellate panels will rule in favor of 
gun rights in Second Amendment decisions, while federal appellate circuits with high homicide 
rates increase the probability that their appellate panels will rule in favor of gun control in 
Second Amendment decisions. 
Study Methodology and Data Collection Format 
Since my dependent variable is dichotomous I use logistic regression analysis.56  Logistic 
regression allows researchers to predict a discrete outcome a set of variables that may be 
continuous, discrete, dichotomous, or a mix of the three types.57  Logistic regression analysis was 
designed to analyze the relationship between independent variable data and a dichotomous 
dependent variable.  A dichotomous variable can assume only two values and are just like the 
indicator dummy variables used throughout the political science literature.58 
 U.S. Courts of Appeals Second Amendment case data was collected separately from the 
legal search engine within the LexisNexis Academic database.  Search terms for data collection 
in LexisNexis included the following phrases: Second Amendment, concealed weapons, 
concealed weapons permits, automatic weapons, semi-automatic weapons, gun violence, gun 
show loophole, background checks, right to bear arms, sawed-off shot gun, assault weapon, 
convicts and firearms, and gun bans. 
Second Amendment case data used for this study spanned the last fifty years, between 1 
January 1960 and 31 December 2009.  The starting point of this study was important because it 
encompassed several years before firearms-related issues became important in the American 
political lexicon, along with the inclusion of the era of peaked interest in gun ownership, gun 
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control, important political assassinations, and Second Amendment issues that occurred between 
1963 and 2009.  Case coding was noted after reading the case twice to determine if the respective 
U.S. Court of Appeals ruled in favor of gun rights or in favor of gun control cases.  Only cases in 
which a Second Amendment claim was forwarded or where an important Second Amendment 
issue was broached were used in this study.  In total, 219 cases from the U.S. Courts of Appeals 
were found to be appropriate for coding in this project. 
Predicted probability estimates were tabulated for average and interesting observations 
within the data in order to interpret the affect of the independent variables on the dependent 
variable and create observations that varied values and showed which variables were significant.  
Inter-coder reliability for this study was established.  Fifty-one cases of the 219 full case sample 
were randomly selected and coded by another reader.  A Cronbach’s α statistic was tabulated 
based on the random sample case codes and the reader’s code in order to establish a estimate of 
internal consistency and reliability between the two codes.  The following section provides the 
results and analysis of this study. 
Political Aspects of Judicial Behavior and Second Amendment Cases: Results and Analysis 
While the previous sections of this study has outlined important scholarly works, 
theories, and methods that link partisan accountability, public opinion, and specific exogenous 
factors to the types of Second Amendment decisions rendered by U.S. Courts of Appeals 
judges, a direct connection between the suggested independent variables and Second 
Amendment U.S. Courts of Appeals decisions also needs to be established. 
Table One reports the estimated logistic regression coefficients of the U.S. Courts of 
Appeals Second Amendment case model that was clustered for appellate circuits, along with 
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several logistic regression model performance estimates presented at the bottom of the table, 
1960-2009. 
Table One: Logistic Regression Analysis of the U.S. Courts of Appeals Second Amendment 
Decisions, 1960-2009 
 
U.S. Courts of Appeals Independent Variables Estimated Coefficients 
Panel Partisanship 0.203 (0.317) 
Political Ideology -0.033 (0.016)*** 
Population Density -0.003 (0.002) 
Gun Ownership Percentage -0.025 (0.036) 
Homicide Rate 0.044 (0.034) 
Log-Likelihood Statistic -122.578                
Chi-Squared Statistic 0.083 
% Correctly Predicted 0.867 
Proportional Reduction of Error 0.039 
R2P 0.864 
PCP 0.823 
AIC 303.8711 
BIC 346.2649 
***p<0.05 
Sources: LexisNexis Legal Database, the American Judicature Society, the Federal Judicial Center, Berry, 
et. al., four Washington Post gun ownership surveys, the U.S. Census Bureau, and the U.S. Bureau of 
Justice Statistics59. 
Note: n=219 cases. 
The first variable, panel partisanship (X1), had an estimated coefficient of 0.203.  The 
estimated coefficient of panel partisanship was not statistically significant because zero was 
included in the 95 percent confidence interval.  Since this variable was not statistically 
significant, the null hypotheses related to this variable cannot be rejected.  The two specific 
directional hypotheses, appellate circuits with a Republican majority panel increase the 
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probability of a gun rights rulings and appellate circuits with a Democratic majority panel 
increase the probability of a gun control ruling, are rejected. 
 Second, the federal appellate circuit political ideology variable (X2) had an estimated 
coefficient of -0.033.  The estimated coefficient of the political ideology variable was 
statistically significant because zero was not included in the 95 percent confidence interval.  
Because this variable was statistically significant, the null hypotheses associated with this 
variable can be rejected.  The two specific directional hypotheses, appellate circuits with a liberal 
political ideology increase the probability of a gun control ruling and appellate circuits with a 
conservative political ideology increase the probability of a gun rights ruling, are accepted.  
Anticipated relationships between political ideology and U.S. Courts of Appeals Second 
Amendment decisions are consistent with my hypotheses.  
 Third, the federal appellate population density variable (X3) had an estimated coefficient 
of -0.003.  The estimated coefficient of the population density variable was not statistically 
significant because zero was included in the 95 percent confidence interval.  Since the population 
density variable was not statistically significant, the null hypotheses related to this variable 
cannot be rejected.  The two specific directional hypotheses, U.S. Courts of Appeals circuits with 
a high population density increase the probability of a gun control ruling and federal appellate 
circuits with a low population density increase the probability of a gun rights ruling, cannot be 
accepted. 
Fourth, the federal appellate gun ownership percentage variable (X4) had an estimated 
coefficient of -0.025.  The estimated coefficient of the gun ownership percentage variable was 
not statistically significant because zero was included in the 95 percent confidence interval.  
Since the gun ownership percentage variable was not statistically significant, the null hypotheses 
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related to this variable cannot be rejected.  The two specific directional hypotheses, U.S. Courts 
of Appeals circuits with a high gun ownership percentage increase the probability of a gun rights 
ruling and federal appellate circuits with a low gun ownership percentage increase the 
probability of a gun rights ruling, cannot be accepted. 
Fifth, the federal appellate homicide rate variable (X5) had an estimated coefficient of -
0.044.  The estimated coefficient of the homicide rate variable was not statistically significant 
because zero was included in the 95 percent confidence interval.  Since the homicide rate 
variable was not statistically significant, the null hypotheses related to this variable cannot be 
rejected.  The two specific directional hypotheses, U.S. Courts of Appeals circuits with a low 
homicide rate increase the probability of a gun rights ruling and federal appellate circuits with a 
high homicide rate increase the probability of a gun control ruling, cannot be accepted. 
The chi-squared statistic, 0.083, allows this study to reject the null hypothesis that all 
variables in the model jointly equal zero.  This also refers to the finding that the null hypothesis 
of the model does not improve upon simply picking the model outcome.  The percent correctly 
predicted statistic for this study is 0.867, which means that the model predicts 86.7% of all cases 
in the model.  This high statistical value refers to the fraction of cases where the actual outcome 
corresponds to the predictions described in the model.  The third and final statistic that needs to 
be addressed is the proportional reduction of error statistic, which is 0.289.  This statistic refers 
to the percentage of errors that occur from just picking the modal outcome. The reduction of 
error is the percentage of these errors that your model eliminates. Because of this statistic, the 
model presented in this study reduced chance error by 28.9% 
Regarding the performance by the logistic regression model, the R2P value for the linear 
probability model was 0.864.  This value reflects that the logistic model makes correct 
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predictions 86.4 percent of the time, which is almost forty percent better than pure chance.  The 
PCP value for the logistic regression model was 0.823.  This value reflects that the logistic 
regression model makes correct predictions 82.3 percent of the time, which means that the model 
predicts potential outcomes much better than chance.  The AIC and BIC values for the logistic 
probability model are relatively low. This means that the logistic regression model has a good fit.  
The logistic regression model was shown to predict outside the bounds of zero and one because 
the minimum and maximum summation values for the predicted value of the dependent variable 
of the model were -1.189 for the minimum value and 1.789 for the maximum value.  These 
model performance values were estimated following the initial execution of the model. 
In order to estimate the inter-coder reliability and to measure the soundness of the coding 
schema for this study, fifty-one cases of the full 219 case sample were randomly selected and 
coded by another reader.  A Cronbach’s α statistic was tabulated based on the random sample 
case codes and the reader’s code in order to establish an estimate of internal consistency and 
reliability between the two codes.  The Cronbach’s α statistic for this study was 0.907, which 
suggests that the two case codes have a high level of internal consistency.  Typically, a reliability 
coefficient of 0.70 or higher for two codes is considered to be highly acceptable and possess 
excellent agreement. 
Table Two outlines the predicted probability estimation (PPE) of important data 
observations within the full sample of Second Amendment U.S. Courts of Appeals cases.  PPE 
estimates interpret the effect of significant or interesting independent variables on the dependent 
variable.  Coupled with several averaged PPE estimates, Table Two presents sixteen PPE 
observations from eight appellate circuits changed the most over the study period, 1960-2009.  
An appellate circuit that changed considerably from conservative to liberal regarding political 
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ideology was measured in the year the circuit was most conservative and the year the circuit was 
most liberal in order to illustrate the full affect of significant independent variable on the 
dependent variable. 
Table Nine: Predicted Probability Estimation (PPE) of the U.S. Courts of Appeals Second 
Amendment Decisions, 1960-2009 
  
 
Type of Estimation 
 
Variable 
Var. Score; 
Year 
App. 
Circ. 
Gun Control 
Ruling PPE 
Gun Rights 
Ruling PPE 
Average Sample Observation -- -- -- 76.2 percent 23.8 percent 
Average Conservative Appellate Circuit Pol. Ideo. -- -- 69.2 30.8 
Average Liberal Appellate Circuit Pol. Ideo. -- -- 82.5 17.5 
Average Low Pop. Den. App. Circuit Pop. Den. -- -- 67.4 32.6 
Average High Pop. Den. App. Circuit Pop. Den. -- -- 83.6 16.4 
Conservative to Liberal Political Ideology Pol. Ideo. 33.55; 1966 4 66.8 33.2 
Conservative to Liberal Political Ideology Pol. Ideo. 55.99; 1999 4 80.8 19.2 
Conservative to Liberal Political Ideology Pol. Ideo. 15.42; 1971 5 52.7 47.3 
Conservative to Liberal Political Ideology Pol. Ideo. 43.21; 1994 5 73.5 26.5 
Liberal to Conservative Political Ideology Pol. Ideo. 53.92; 1960 6 79.7 20.3 
Liberal to Conservative Political Ideology Pol. Ideo. 36.53; 2000 6 68.9 31.1 
Liberal to Conservative Political Ideology Pol. Ideo. 58.99; 1960 9 82.2 17.8 
Liberal to Conservative Political Ideology Pol. Ideo. 41.46; 2000 9 72.3 27.7 
Least Population Growth Pop. Den. 32.37; 1960 8 67.1 32.9 
Least Population Growth Pop. Den. 43.06; 2007 8 67.9 32.1 
Least Population Growth Pop. Den. 16.57; 1960 10 65.9 34.1 
Least Population Growth Pop. Den. 31.22; 2007 10 67.0 33.0 
Most Population Growth Pop. Den. 394.6; 1960 1 86.9 13.1 
Most Population Growth Pop. Den. 506.1; 2007 1 89.9 10.1 
Most Population Growth Pop. Den. 432.9; 1960 3 88.1 11.9 
Most Population Growth Pop. Den. 630.4; 2007 3 92.3 7.7 
Sources: LexisNexis Legal Database, the American Judicature Society, the Federal Judicial Center, Berry, et. al., 
four Washington Post gun ownership surveys, the U.S. Census Bureau, and the U.S. Bureau of Justice Statistics60. 
Note: n=219 cases. 
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Table Two illustrates averaged and appellate circuit-level data regarding the predicted 
probability estimates of the significant variable from the study.  The first estimation in the 
table provides an average sample observation in which 76.2 percent of the time a gun control 
ruling is expected, while 23.8 percent of the time a gun rights ruling was expected.  
By setting data values of the variables through usage of the standard deviation scores, I 
can create average PPE values for significant appellate circuit-level variable data.  Since the 
Berry, et. al., state political ideology and state gun ownership percentage values are continuous, 
and I combined state-level data to establish appellate circuit level measures, the data set created 
for this study allows for easy analysis by means of PPE.  By setting the appellate circuit political 
ideology value one standard deviation both above (liberal) and below (conservative) the mean, I 
can create an average liberal and conservative appellate circuit Second Amendment PPE.  In an 
average liberal appellate circuit, a gun control ruling is predicted 82.5 percent of the time, while 
a gun rights ruling is predicted only 17.5 percent of the time.  Comparatively, in an average 
conservative appellate circuit, a gun rights ruling is predicted 30.8 percent of the time, while 39.2 
percent of the time a gun control decision is predicted.    
By setting the appellate circuit population density values one standard deviation both 
above (high population density) and below (low population density) the mean, I can create an 
average high and low population density for appellate circuit Second Amendment PPE.  In an 
average high population density appellate circuit, a gun control ruling is predicted 83.6 percent 
of the time, while a gun rights ruling is predicted 16.4 percent of the time.  Conversely, in an 
average low population density appellate circuit, a gun control ruling is predicted 67.4 percent of 
the time, while 32.6 percent of the time a gun rights decision is predicted. 
 171 
 
 Predicted probability estimates can also be used to track changes to the probabilities of 
Second Amendment case rulings for appellate circuit-level variable data that changed the most 
during the fifty year study period by setting the variable values at the opposing scores.  For 
instance, the Fourth and Fifth Circuit Courts of Appeals appellate circuit political ideology 
moved from conservative to (33.55; 15.42 respectively) in 1960s and early 1970s to moderate 
(55.99; 43.21 respectively) in the 1990s.  In these appellate circuits, the PPE of gun rights rulings 
were at their highest point (33.2 percent; 47.3 percent respectively) when the appellate circuit 
political ideology values were at their most conservative.  After the appellate circuit political 
ideologies moderated in the 1990s (55.99; 43.21 respectively), the PPE of a gun rights ruling 
decreased by about 15 percent.  In fact, by the 1990s, the PPE of a gun control ruling was 80.8 
percent in the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals and 73.5 percent in the Fifth Circuit Court of 
Appeals that the federal appellate court would rule in favor of gun control after political 
ideologies moved from conservative to moderate.  As the political ideology of an appellate 
circuit moves from conservative to liberal, the probability of a gun control ruling increases.  
 In comparison, the Sixth and Ninth Circuit Courts of Appeals appellate circuit political 
ideology scores moved the most from liberal (53.92; 58.99 respectively) in 1960 to conservative 
(36.53; 41.46 respectively) in 2000.  In these appellate circuits, the PPE of a Second Amendment 
gun control in both appellate circuits was high (79.7 percent; 82.2 percent respectively) when the 
appellate circuit political ideology values were at their most liberal in 1960.  After the appellate 
circuit political ideologies became more moderate/conservative in the two circuits in 2000 
(36.53; 41.46 respectively), the PPE of a gun rights ruling increased by more than 10 percent.  In 
fact, by 2000, the PPE of a gun rights ruling was 31.1 percent in the Sixth Circuit Court of 
Appeals and 27.7 percent in the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals that the federal appellate court 
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would rule in favor of gun rights after political ideologies moved from moderate/liberal 
moderate/conservative.  As the political ideology of an appellate circuit moved from liberal to 
conservative, the probability of a gun rights ruling increased.  
Predicted probability estimates can also be used to track changes to the probabilities of 
Second Amendment case rulings for appellate circuit population density variable data that 
changed the most during the fifty year study period by setting the variable values at the opposing 
scores.  For instance, the Eighth and Tenth Circuit Courts of Appeals appellate circuit population 
density measures grew the least (Eighth from 32.37 in 1960 to 43.06 in 2007; Tenth from 16.57 
in 1960 to 31.22 in 2007) during the fifty year study period.  For these two appellate circuits, the 
affect of low population growth had little impact on the PPE of gun control and gun rights 
rulings because of the already significant gun control ruling skew in the full sample.  In fact, the 
PPE changed by only 0.8 percent (67.1 percent in 1960 to 67.9 percent in 2007) in the Eighth 
Circuit Courts of Appeals from 1960 to 2007, while the PPE changed by only 1.1 percent (65.9 
percent in 1960 to 67.0 percent in 2007) in the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals during the same 
period.  As population growth increases, the probability of a federal appellate circuit ruling in 
favor of gun control increases.  
 In comparison, the First and Third Circuit Courts of Appeals appellate circuit population 
density values grew the most (First from 394.6 in 1960 to 506.1 in 2007; Third from 432.9 in 
1960 to 630.4 in 2007) during the fifty year study period.  For these appellate circuits, the affect 
of significant population growth had little impact on the PPE of gun control and gun rights 
rulings because of the already significant gun control ruling skew in the full sample.  The PPE 
changed by only 3.0 percent (86.9 percent in 1960 to 89.9 percent in 2007) in the First Circuit 
Court of Appeals from 1960 to 2007, while the PPE changed by 4.2 percent (88.1 percent in 
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1960 to 92.3 percent in 2007) in the Third Circuit Court of Appeals during the same period.  
Again, as population grows the probability of a federal appellate circuit ruling in favor of gun 
control increases; however, the affect is not significant. 
Conclusions 
This study posed the research question, what is the extent and determinants of Second 
Amendment rulings in the U.S. Courts of Appeals, 1960-2009?  This study theorized that 
partisan accountability, public opinion, and specific policy interests affect the way judges that sit 
on the circuits of the U.S. Courts of Appeals rule on polarizing political issues, such as the 
Second Amendment.  This theory was then operationalized into five independent variables and 
hypotheses, with the actual Second Amendment case ruling being the dependent variable.  The 
operationalizations of the study included partisan accountability.  This variable was developed 
into a dichotomous variable, panel partisanship, which measured the partisan make-up of federal 
appellate panels.  Second, the public opinion aspect of the study was operationalized to 
continuously measure appellate circuit political ideology and population density.  Third, specific 
policy interests were operationalized to continuously measure appellate circuit gun ownership 
percentage and homicide rate. 
 Using logistic regression analysis, this study found that the extent and determinants of 
Second Amendment rulings in the U.S. Courts of Appeals between 1960 and 2009 were limited 
to a single public opinion variable.  More specifically, appellate circuit political ideology had a 
direct impact on the outcomes of Second Amendment U.S. Courts of Appeals rulings during the 
fifty year study period.  As such, the two hypotheses associated with these two independent 
variables are accepted and the null hypotheses are rejected.  In particular, this study can conclude 
that U.S. Courts of Appeals circuits with a liberal political ideology increase the probability that 
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their appellate panels will rule in favor of gun control in Second Amendment decisions. U.S. 
Courts of Appeals circuits with a conservative political ideology increase the probability that 
their appellate panels will rule in favor of gun rights in Second Amendment decisions. 
The four other variables in the study, panel partisanship, appellate circuit gun ownership, 
and appellate circuit homicide rate did not have a statistically significant relationship with the 
dependent variable, and thus the eight hypotheses associated with these independent variables 
cannot be accepted and the null hypotheses cannot be rejected.   The logistic regression model 
performance measures illustrated the fact that the model made predictions correctly almost 90.7 
percent of the time and had a good fit, while the coding schema employed in the study was 
shown to provide high consistency between coders because of the Cronbach’s α statistic. 
 The affect of appellate circuit political ideology on Second Amendment U.S. Courts of 
Appeals decisions provides no significant shock.  Political institutions and federal judicial 
circuits are filled with political appointees who have been given their position because of their 
own personal political feelings or have feelings that closely mirror those of the individual doing 
the appointing.  Judicial actors, even ones that are supposed to possess political independence, do 
have their own personal political ideology.  This set of personal ideas, goals, expectations, and 
actions, affects the actions of judicial actors when they carry out their role on the bench.   
Corresponding directly to traditional notions about political ideology and support for or 
opposition to gun rights, this study shows that U.S. Courts of Appeals judges with conservative 
political ideologies are more likely to rule in favor of gun rights than gun control.  This study 
also shows that federal appellate judges with liberal political ideologies are more likely to rule in 
favor of gun control than gun rights.  Historical trends have shown that individuals with 
conservative political ideologies support greater gun rights, while individuals with liberal 
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political ideologies support greater gun control measures.  The findings in this study affirm 
traditional political ideology considerations, especially regarding the Second Amendment at the 
federal appellate level.    
Like the appellate circuit political ideology variable, the affect of appellate circuit of 
other study variables on Second Amendment U.S. Courts of Appeals rulings provides an 
interesting look into the uncertain nature of urban politics.  Urban areas have traditionally been 
much more likely to curtail the usage and possession of firearms in order to maintain stability 
and decrease violence in cities that have seen their fair share of it in the past.  Appellate circuits, 
such as the Third Circuit Court of Appeals, and the states associated with the circuit (Delaware, 
New Jersey, and Pennsylvania) often choose to deter gun violence through ownership because of 
the density of their population.   
For instance, New Jersey is the most densely populated state with 1171.1 people per 
square mile (2007), while the state also has one the lowest gun ownership percentages in the 
entire country with only 12.3 percent (2000) of people owning firearms.  In comparison, Alaska 
only has 1.2 people per square mile (2007) with 57.8 percent gun ownership (2000).  Some states 
and appellate circuits, especially those with densely populated areas, are more likely to restrict 
gun ownership.  Gun culture across the country varies widely.  States and appellate circuits with 
higher gun ownership rates have traditionally been associated with rural and conservative areas, 
while states and appellate circuits with lesser gun ownership rates have traditionally been 
associated with urban and liberal areas.  The findings in this study affirm traditional population 
density considerations, especially regarding the Second Amendment at the federal appellate 
level. 
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CODA 
State Supreme Court and U.S. Courts of Appeals Second Amendment Data Comparison  
 Because of the similar design of the studies completed in Chapter Three and Chapter 
Four, the important findings in each study are easily comparable.  For instance, Second 
Amendment rulings by decade, gun rights/gun control ruling types, gun-related issues, tracking 
Second Amendment cases, Second Amendment estimated logistic regression coefficients, and 
Second Amendment predicted probability estimates (PPE) in state supreme courts and the U.S. 
Courts of Appeals can be comparable in table format.   
Table One outlines comparable Second Amendment ruling decade data, 1960-2009, for 
state and federal appellate court 
Table One: State and Federal Appellate Second Amendment Rulings by Decade, 1960-2009 
 
Decade State Supreme Courts U.S. Courts of Appeals All-Decade Totals 
1960s 29 (10.8 percent) 4 (1.8 percent) 33 (6.8 percent) 
1970s 89 (33.1) 31 (14.2) 120 (24.6) 
1980s 59 (21.9) 24 (10.9) 83 (17.0) 
1990s 57 (21.2) 88 (40.2) 145 (29.7) 
2000s 35 (13.0) 72 (32.9) 107 (21.9) 
Judicial Level Totals 269 (100 percent) 219 (100 percent) 488 (100 percent) 
Source: LexisNexis Academic Legal Database61. 
Note: n=488 cases. 
Comparing state and federal appellate rulings by decade, the most active decade for 
Second Amendment cases in state supreme courts was the 1970s (33.1 percent; 89 cases), while 
the most active decade for similar cases in the U.S. Courts of Appeals was the 1990s (40.2 
percent; 88 cases).  A majority of Second Amendment state supreme court cases were decided in 
the 1970s and 1980s (55 percent; 148 cases), while a super majority of similar cases in the U.S. 
Courts of Appeals were decided in the 1990s and 2000s (73.1 percent; 160 cases).  All-decade 
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Second Amendment case totals (both state supreme courts and U.S. Courts of Appeals) found 
that the 1970s (24.6 percent; 120 cases) and 1990s (29.7 percent; 145 cases) were the two most 
active decades in terms of total decisions rendered at both levels of the state and federal 
judiciary. 
Table One illustrates the rising importance of the Second Amendment in the American 
political system.  In both the state supreme courts and the U.S. Courts of Appeals, the 1960s (6.8 
percent; 33 cases) were the least active in terms of Second Amendment decisions.  All other 
decade totals from both judicial levels reported Second Amendment decision totals of more than 
14 percent, except for the 1980s in the U.S. Courts of Appeals.  The all-decade case total 
percentages at both studied levels of the judiciary were fairly evenly distributed between 
decades.  Other than the 1960s (6.8 percent), all-decade decision percentages were not lower 
than 17 percent in the 1980s and not higher than 29.7 percent in the 1990s. 
Table Two illustrates comparable Second Amendment ruling type data, 1960-2009, from 
the state supreme courts and the U.S. Courts of Appeals. 
Table Two: State and Federal Appellate Second Amendment Cases by Ruling Type, 1960-
2009 
 
Type of Ruling State Supreme Courts U.S. Courts of Appeals Number of Cases 
Gun Control Rulings 143 (53.2 percent) 160 (73.1 percent) 303 (62.1 percent) 
Gun Rights Rulings 126 (46.8) 59 (26.9) 185 (37.9) 
Total Rulings 269 (100 percent) 219 (100 percent) 488 (100 percent) 
Source: LexisNexis Academic Legal Database62. 
Note: n=488 cases. 
Second Amendment case ruling types at both the state supreme courts and the U.S. Courts of 
Appeals provided interesting comparable data.  The spread between state supreme courts and 
U.S. Courts of Appeals Second Amendment decisions that favored gun control and rights was 
significant.  According to the data, a Second Amendment case was 19.9 percent more likely to 
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favor gun rights in state supreme courts than in the U.S. Courts of Appeals, while the same 
spread favored gun control in the U.S. Courts of Appeals over state supreme courts.   
In state supreme courts, Second Amendment cases were 6.4 percent more likely to be 
decided in favor of gun control then gun rights.  In the U.S. Courts of Appeals, Second 
Amendment cases were 46.2 percent more likely to be decided in favor of gun control.  This 
finding represents a 39.8 percent difference between the likelihood of a particular ruling in the 
two levels of the state and federal judiciary.  Regarding the full state and federal appellate 
Second Amendment case sample, 303 (62.1 percent) of the 488 cases were decided in favor of 
gun control. The balance of the case sample, 185 (37.9 percent), were decided in favor of gun 
rights.  This represents a 24.2 percent spread between the likelihood of a gun control ruling (62.1 
percent) and a gun rights ruling (37.9 percent) in the full state and federal case sample.  
Table Three illustrates comparable Second Amendment case issue data, 1960-2009, from 
the state supreme courts and the U.S. Courts of Appeals. 
Table Three: State and Federal Appellate Second Amendment Cases by Issue, 1960-2009 
 
Litigated Second Amendment Issues State Supreme 
Courts 
U.S. Courts of 
Appeals 
Number of Cases 
Felon in Possession of a Firearm 51 (19.0 percent) 38 (17.4 percent) 89 (18.2 percent) 
Concealed Weapons Violation 31 (11.5) 17 (7.8) 48 (9.8) 
Denial of Personal Firearms License 24 (8.9) 28 (12.8) 52 (10.7) 
Possession of Automatic/Assault Weapon 23 (8.5) 24 (11.0) 47 (9.6) 
Unregistered Firearms Violation 20 (7.4) 16 (7.3) 36 (7.4) 
Local Ban on Gun Show Sales/Exhibition 9 (3.3) 14 (6.4) 23 (4.7) 
Gun Club Related Issues 8 (3.0) 13 (5.9) 21 (4.3) 
Total Cases 269 (100 percent) 219 (100 percent) 488 (100 percent) 
Source: LexisNexis Academic Legal Database63. 
Note: n=488 cases in the full sample. 
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The types of Second Amendment issues decided in both state supreme courts and U.S. 
Courts of Appeals can be compared much like the chronological and rulings data. Table Three 
outlines the Second Amendment case issue data, 1960-2009, from both levels of the judiciary in 
the study.  In particular, the Second Amendment that was litigated the most during the fifty year 
study period in the state and federal appellate levels was possession of a firearm by a convicted 
felon.  In fact, almost 20 percent (89 cases; 18.2 percent) of the full 488 case sample dealt with 
the felon possession issues.  Given the numerous issues associated with the Second Amendment, 
it is a significant to show that one particular issue, such as felony possession, made up nearly 
one-fifth of the full case issue sample.  
Three other issues made up more than 30 percent of the full case issue sample.  Denial of 
personal firearms license, concealed weapons violations, and possession of automatic/assault 
weapon accounted for 30.1 percent of the issues decided in the 488 full state and federal Second 
Amendment case sample.  In particular, all three firearms-related issue-based case types 
accounted for about 10 percent of the full case sample.  The final issues listed in the table, 
unregistered firearms violations, local ban on gun show sales/exhibitions, and gun club-related 
issues accounted for 16.4 percent of the full case sample, or about 5.4 percent each.  The balance 
of the Second Amendment case issues decided in state supreme courts and the U.S. Courts of 
Appeals, 35.3 percent of all cases, varied between the levels of the judiciary and between 
different types of issues consistent with state and federal systems. 
Table Four illustrates comparable Second Amendment case tracking data, 1960-2009, 
from the state supreme courts and the U.S. Courts of Appeals. 
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Table Four: Tracking State and Federal Appellate Second Amendment Cases, 1960-2009 
 
Type of Action State Courts  
of Last Resort 
U.S. Courts  
of Appeals 
Number  
of Cases 
None 219 (81.4 percent) 183 (83.6 percent) 402 (82.4 percent)
Case Reheard (State)/Reviewed En Banc (Fed.) 5 (1.9) 3 (1.4) 8 (1.6) 
Original Ruling Overturned (Same Level) 2 (0.7) 1 (0.4) 3 (0.06) 
Case Appealed 45 (16.7) 33 (15.1) 78 (16.0) 
Case in which Certiorari was Denied 40 (14.9) 24 (11.0) 64 (13.1) 
Case Reviewed 5 (1.9) 9 (4.1) 14 (2.9) 
Case Overturned 3 (1.1) 5 (2.3) 8 (1.6) 
Total Cases 269 (100 percent) 219 (100 percent) 488 (100 percent) 
Source: LexisNexis Academic Legal Database64. 
Note: n=488 cases. 
 
Table Four shows that 402 (82.4 percent) Second Amendment cases ended with a 
decision rendered in the state supreme courts of the U.S. Courts of Appeals.  In all 402 of these 
cases, no further action by either side was formally attempted.  Several litigants in the sample 
looked into possibly appealing their decision to the U.S. Supreme Court; however, ultimately 
there was no appeal made.  Only 8 cases of the full case sample were either re-heard (5; state 
supreme courts) or reviewed en banc (3; U.S. Courts of Appeals).  Of these 8 cases, 3 of the 
original rulings were overturned at the same of the judiciary.  
 78 total Second Amendment cases in the full sample (16.0 percent) were appealed to the 
U.S. Supreme Court.  In 64 of these cases (13.1 percent), certiorari, an official writ for review by 
a judicial body, was denied by the U.S. Supreme Court.  This finding means that 14 cases (2.9 
percent; 5 from state supreme courts; 9 from the U.S. Courts of Appeals) were accepted for 
review by the U.S. Supreme Court.  After review, 8 original Second Amendment case outcomes 
(1.6 percent; 3 from state supreme courts; 5 from U.S. Courts of Appeals) were overturned by 
the U.S. Supreme Court.  Taken as a whole, only 11 original Second Amendment case decisions 
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(3 decisions overturned at original judicial level; 8 decisions overturned on appeal in the U.S. 
Supreme Court) were eventually overturned through re-hearings or on appeal.  This rate of 
success was only 2.3 percent. 
Table Five illustrates comparable estimated logistic regression coefficients for Second 
Amendment case data, 1960-2009, from the state supreme courts and the U.S. Courts of Appeals. 
Table Five: Comparable Estimated Logistic Regression Coefficients of State and Federal 
Appellate Second Amendment Decisions, 1960-2009 
 
Independent Variables State Supreme Courts U.S. Courts of Appeals 
Political Ideology 0.000 (0.014)*** 0.036 (0.015)*** 
Population Density 0.345 (0.211) 0.039 (0.001) 
Gun Ownership Percentage 0.000 (0.020)*** 0.487 (0.395) 
Homicide Rate 0.117 (0.059) 0.192 (0.033) 
R2P 0.901 0.864 
PCP 0.897 0.823 
AIC 235.2367 303.8711 
BIC 265.5498 346.2649 
Cronbach’s α Statistic 0.918 0.907 
***p<0.05 
Sources: LexisNexis Legal Database, the American Judicature Society, the Federal Judicial Center, Brisbin & 
Kilwein, Judgepedia, Berry, et al., four Washington Post gun ownership surveys, the U.S. Census Bureau, and the 
U.S. Bureau of Justice Statistics65. 
Note: n=269 cases in the state supreme courts; n=219 in the U.S. Courts of Appeals; 488 total cases. 
 
Considering the logistic regression coefficients for similar measurable variables at both 
the state and federal appellate levels, Table Five illustrates the differences between continuously 
measured variables in the full Second Amendment case sample.  In particular, two variables in 
the state supreme courts and one in the U.S. Courts of Appeals proved to be significant.  In the 
state supreme courts, state political ideology and gun ownership percentage were significant.  In 
the U.S. Courts of Appeals, appellate circuit political ideology was significant.   
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 In terms of the two statistical models, the state supreme court regression model makes 
correct predictions regarding Second Amendment decisions better based upon the R2P values.  
However, according the outlined PCP values, the U.S. Courts of Appeals regression model 
makes correct predictions better than the state supreme court model.  The AIC and BIC values 
were all low and have a good fit for each model.  Finally, the Cronbach’s α statistic for 
intercoder reliability for both models was high and acceptable.  In particular, the state supreme 
court statistic had a slightly higher rate of internal consistency than the U.S. Courts of Appeals 
model. 
Table Six illustrates comparable predicted probability estimates (PPE) for Second 
Amendment case data, 1960-2009, from the state supreme courts and the U.S. Courts of Appeals. 
Table Six: Comparable Predicted Probably Estimates (PPE) of State and Federal Appellate 
Second Amendment Decisions, 1960-2009 
Type of Estimation Variable State Supreme 
Courts Gun 
Control 
Ruling PPE 
State Supreme 
Courts Gun 
Rights Ruling 
PPE 
U.S. Courts  
of Appeals  
Gun Control 
Ruling PPE 
U.S. Courts 
of Appeals  
Gun Rights 
Ruling PPE 
Average Sample Observation -- 55.3 percent 44.7 percent 76.2 percent 23.8 percent 
Average State Conservative Ideology Pol. Ideo. 29.7 70.3 -- -- 
Average State Liberal Ideology Pol. Ideo. 78.4 21.6 -- -- 
Average Conservative App. Circuit Pol. Ideo. -- -- 69.2 30.8 
Average Liberal App. Circuit Pol. Ideo. -- -- 82.5 17.5 
Sources: LexisNexis Legal Database, the American Judicature Society, the Federal Judicial Center, Brisbin & 
Kilwein, Judgepedia, Berry, et al., four Washington Post gun ownership surveys, the U.S. Census Bureau, and the 
U.S. Bureau of Justice Statistics66. 
Note: n=269 cases in the state supreme courts; n=219 in the U.S. Courts of Appeals; 488 total cases. 
 
The predicted probability estimates (PPE) outlined above show the differences in the 
predicted outcomes of Second Amendment case outcomes in the state supreme courts and the 
U.S. Courts of Appeals.  The most striking difference between the two judicial levels was the 
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average sample observation.  In the U.S. Courts of Appeals sample a gun control ruling was 
expected 21.9 percent more than in the state supreme courts sample.  These estimates show a 
much greater percentage of gun control rulings were decided in the U.S. Courts of Appeals level 
than in state supreme courts.   
Comparable PPE estimates were tabulated for political ideology, which was the lone 
variable significant in both the state supreme courts and the U.S. Courts of Appeals Second 
Amendment case samples.  PPE estimates show how much of an affect the independent variable 
has on dependent variable.  In this scenario, even though political ideology was shown to be 
significant in both state supreme courts and U.S. Courts of Appeals regarding Second 
Amendment decisions, the effect of this significant variable was greater in the state supreme 
courts.  The likelihood of a gun control decision in the state court of last resort in a conservative 
was 29.7 percent, while the likelihood of a gun control ruling in the state court of last resort in a 
liberal state was 78.4 percent.  This statistic represents a difference of 48.7 percent between the 
likelihood of a gun control decision in two different states from a political ideology perspective.  
In comparison, the same statistic tabulated in for conservative and liberal appellate circuits 
shows a difference of only 13.3 percent between the likelihood of a gun control decision.  This 
represents a difference of 35.4 percent between the state supreme courts and the U.S. Courts of 
Appeals with regard to political ideology. 
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CHAPTER FIVE 
 
SUMMARY OF FINDINGS AND RESEARCH IMPLICATIONS 
 
 
The ruling class doesn't care about public safety. Having made it very difficult  
for states and localities to police themselves, having left ordinary citizens with  
no choice but to protect themselves as best they can, they now try to take our  
guns away. In fact they blame us and our guns for crime. This is so wrong that  
it cannot be an honest mistake. 
 
--Malcolm Wallop, former U.S. Senator (R-WY), 1992 
 
 
 
I think there should be a law—and I know this is extreme—that no one can  
have a gun in the United States. If you have a gun, you go to jail. Only the  
police should have guns. 
 
--Rosie O’Donnell, American Television Personality, 1999 
 
 
 
 This study surveyed important literature regarding the Second Amendment, provided 
interview analysis about the operations of Second Amendment legal operations and cause 
lawyers, and outlined the nature of Second Amendment litigation and judicial decision-making 
in state supreme courts and the U.S. Courts of Appeals between 1960 and 2009.  This chapter 
will provide some analysis about potential implications of the research provided in the 
preceding pages and chapters.  Finally, this final chapter will outline the most important 
concluding thoughts complied as the various studies were completed.  The next section 
provides a summary of the findings of this dissertation. 
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Summary of Findings 
Three separate studies were completed in the course of this dissertation.  By using data 
collected from telephone interviews with twenty-one Second Amendment gun rights and gun 
control cause lawyers, Chapter Two found that there were distinct differences between local, 
state, and national Second Amendment interest groups with regard to legal participation, 
litigation strategies, judicial venue-shopping, coordination and networking, and organization.  
More specifically, local, state, and national Second Amendment interest groups deal with all five 
of the interview issues differently.  Because of this finding, the five research hypotheses 
associated with these variable relationships were accepted and the null hypotheses were rejected.  
This study found that there were distinct differences between heavily funded and lesser funded 
interest groups with regard to legal participation, litigation strategies, judicial venue-shopping, 
coordination and networking, and organization.  Heavily funded and lesser funded Second 
Amendment interest groups deal with the five interview areas very differently.  Because of this 
finding, the five research hypotheses associated with these variable relationships were accepted 
and the null hypotheses were rejected. 
Along with the first two sets of theories, this study found that there were clear differences 
between gun rights and gun control interest groups with regard to litigation strategies, judicial 
venue-shopping, and organization.  More specifically, gun rights and gun control interest groups 
deal with these three interview areas in significantly different ways.  As such, the three research 
hypotheses associated with the variable relationships are accepted and the null hypotheses are 
rejected.  Interview responses from the cause lawyers regarding legal participation and 
coordination/networking showed that gun rights and gun control lawyers actually participate and 
coordinate in Second Amendment cases in similar manners, and thus, the two research 
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hypotheses associated with these two variable relationships cannot be accepted and the null 
hypotheses cannot be rejected. 
 Using logistic regression analysis, Chapter Three found that the nature and determinants 
of Second Amendment rulings in state supreme courts, 1960-2009, were limited to select public 
opinion and specific policy interests.  More specifically, state political ideology and state gun 
ownership percentage variables had a direct impact on the outcomes of Second Amendment state 
supreme courts rulings during the fifty year study period.  As such, the four hypotheses 
associated with these two independent variables were accepted and the null hypotheses were 
rejected.   
State judicial selection method, the presence of a state intermediate appellate court, state 
population density, and state homicide rate variables did not have a statistically significant 
relationship with the dependent variable, and thus the eight hypotheses associated with these 
independent variables cannot be accepted and the null hypotheses cannot be rejected.   
Furthermore, the logistic regression model performance measures illustrated the fact that the 
model made predictions correctly more than 90 percent of the time and had a good fit, while the 
coding schema employed in the study was shown to provide high consistency between coders 
because of the kappa statistic. 
 Similar to the study completed in Chapter Three, Chapter Four found that the effect of 
political aspects on Second Amendment rulings in the U.S. Courts of Appeals, 1960-2009, were 
limited to public opinion variables.  More specifically, appellate circuit political ideology and 
population density variables had a direct impact on the outcomes of Second Amendment U.S. 
Courts of Appeals rulings during the fifty year study period.  Because of these relationships, the 
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four hypotheses associated with these two independent variables are accepted and the null 
hypotheses are rejected.   
Panel partisanship, appellate circuit gun ownership, and appellate circuit homicide rate 
did not have a statistically significant relationship with the dependent variable, and thus, the six 
hypotheses associated with these independent variables cannot be accepted and the null 
hypotheses cannot be rejected.   The logistic regression model performance measures illustrated 
the fact that the model made predictions correctly more than 83 percent of the time and had a 
good fit, while the coding schema employed in the study was shown to provide high consistency 
between coders because of the tabulated kappa statistic. 
Research Implications 
 This work has outlined a number of findings regarding Second Amendment cause 
lawyering and cases in state supreme courts and the U.S. Courts of Appeals.  Given the 
findings previously outlined, several important research implications become apparent.  First, 
it is important to discuss the “so what” question regarding power and empowerment in 
American politics.  In the data collected, cause lawyers who represented national level interest 
groups wielded significant monetary power to participate in more Second Amendment cases, 
utilize more litigation strategies, shop between potential judicial venues, coordinate and 
network with other interest groups, and possess a larger legal team and organization for 
litigation purposes.  The local, state, and federal court system empowers local cause lawyers to 
bring Second Amendment litigation as an outlaw to obtain a remedy from an unjust law.  
Although many local gun rights and gun control lawyers do not possess the same resources as 
their national level colleagues, the court system in itself sanctions litigation for laws thought to 
be unfair. 
 192 
 
 In state supreme court and the U.S. Courts of Appeals Second Amendment rulings, the 
issues of power and empowerment were fairly divided.  Because state supreme court judges 
were much more likely to rule in favor of gun rights, and thus more gun rights, than their 
federal appellate court colleagues, the public were empowered with more rights in these states.  
Once state residents attained greater rights in these Second Amendment cases, they were 
empowered through the authority of the state.  In this respect, state supreme court judges 
possessed significant power to determine what rights should be given to the public and the 
rights that should not be given.  The wielding of power in the federal court was much 
different.  In the U.S. Courts of Appeals, almost three-quarters of the time a gun control ruling 
was expected.  In significantly more rulings, federal appellate judges ruled in favor of gun 
control, and thus did not allow citizens to gain more rights and liberties associated with 
firearms.  In this respect, U.S. Courts of Appeals judges and the federal government retained 
significant power concerning firearms and federal law. 
Second, the three  studies that comprise my dissertation establish a clear argument with 
regard to the American federal system because of distinct and lasting differences between the 
ways Second Amendment cases are decided in both state supreme courts and the U.S. Courts 
of Appeals.  It was clear from the data that state supreme courts judges were much more likely 
to rule in favor of gun rights than their federal appellate counterparts.  
 There were distinct differences in the political aspects that affected the ways Second 
Amendment cases were decided.  In reading and taking notes on the cases in the full sample, 
state supreme courts judges often focused on the civil liberties aspect of the Second 
Amendment, even if they ultimately choose to rule in favor of gun control.  In comparison, in 
only 16 cases did U.S. Courts of Appeals three-judge panels even mention the importance of 
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the Second Amendment in the same analysis as civil liberties.  This analysis was included in 
more than 50 decisions from the state supreme courts and shows the differences regarding how 
both sets of judges saw Second Amendment cases.  State supreme courts judges often saw 
Second Amendment cases through the lens of the Bill of Rights and civil liberties, while U.S. 
Courts of Appeals judges focused on firearms cases through the applicability of the federal 
statute being questioned in a particular case. 
Even though the logistic regression model showed that the electoral component of 
judicial selection did not have an effect on state supreme court Second Amendment decision-
making, it seems to me that the closeness engendered by their position on the supreme court of 
a state, rather than on the federal appellate bench was important regarding this federalism 
argument.  Because federal appellate court judges possess lifetime appointments and rarely 
have to comply with the feelings of the public they serve, U.S. Courts of Appeals judges were 
able to simply interpret federal law without having to discuss rights and liberties issues.  
Because federal appellate courts only have appellate jurisdiction they only review decisions 
from lower trial courts for errors of law.  The U.S. Courts of Appeals only considers the record 
from the trial court, and the legal arguments of the parties involved.  Different from federal 
appellate judges, state supreme court judges are often forced to comply with public pressure.  
In this way, state supreme court judges discussed these rights and liberties issues in decisions 
frequently neglected by federal appellate judges because of this intimacy with the public. 
A surrogate measure of political party identification was used in each decision-making 
study.  For the state supreme court chapter, party affiliation of the court was used, while 
partisan panel appointment was used for the U.S. Courts of Appeals study.  Estimation of both 
models revealed that only the party identification from the state supreme court chapter was 
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significant.  This estimation reports that political party affiliation is still an important part of 
the daily activities of state supreme court judges when they render decisions.  However, party 
identification did not affect judicial decision-making in the federal appellate circuit decisions.  
This provides us with a key difference between the two judicial levels.  Why does party 
affiliation matter at the state level, but not the federal appellate level?  First, state supreme 
court judges are more intimate with their constituents and show some level of connection to a 
political party, while federal judges want to be seen as being above the political fray.  Second, 
federal appellate judges have lifetime appointments and are not beholden to electorate for their 
position, while a large amount of state supreme court judges are elected on a partisan level, 
non-partisan level, or face retention elections, and must comply with public sentiments in 
order to remain in office.  
A third research implication is the notion that this type of logistic regression model 
could potentially be used to predict case outcomes and outline judicial decision-making 
regarding previously decided and future Second Amendment cases in state supreme courts and 
the U.S. Courts of Appeals, along with other important political issues when litigated in 
judicial levels below the U.S. Supreme Court.  Although this is not a new idea, a new model, 
such as the two used in this dissertation, could be updated to account for the political aspects 
that affect many issues.  In this scenario, variables, such as state/appellate circuit political 
ideology, population density, gun ownership percentage, homicide rate, and judicial-level 
specific measures could be estimated to determine a possible case outcome before a decision is 
rendered.  This model could then be revised to utilize only the significant variables to 
determine the type of decision that is expected.   
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Similar predictive models could be created to consider the judicial decision-making 
impact of state supreme courts and U.S. Courts of Appeals judges regarding Second 
Amendment, other Bill of Rights issues, and other important political issues.  Immigration 
reforms issues, including deportation and differences between state and federal immigration 
law, could be used to determine potential political aspects that determine case outcomes 
regarding this issue.  Using estimated models such as this, would give judicial scholars a better 
understanding of the types of political aspects and variables that affect the outcome of 
important political or Bill of Rights related cases decided by state supreme courts and U.S. 
Courts of Appeals judges.  Moreover, mainstream judicial politics studies, such as the three 
completed in this work and proposed in the previous paragraphs, would certainly be a positive 
addition to the literature regarding the two judicial levels and literature focusing on judicial 
decision-making. 
A fourth research implication is that the findings in Chapter Two affirmed what E.E. 
Schattschneider argued more than fifty years ago.  According to Schattschneider, the 
American democratic system was comprised of many competing interest groups, and that the 
pressure system where these interest groups compete was biased toward the wealthiest groups.  
The range of the pressure group system was amazingly narrow, and the system spoke with an 
“upper-class bias.”1  In Chapter Two, Second Amendment cause lawyers and interest groups 
that had more resources were able to employ more people to search of cases, utilize more 
litigation strategies, have larger legal teams, and possess more avenues for organizational 
funding.  According to those respondents who did not have significant resources, often times 
they were forced to complete many of these litigation tasks by themselves or with only limited 
help.  This is at least some clear proof of Marc Galanter’s the “haves come out ahead” thesis.  
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In the piece, Galanter argued that “repeat players”, known as the “haves”, anticipate having 
repeated litigation, and thus have more resources than the “one shotter”, known as the “have-
nots”.2 
Second Amendment cause lawyers who worked as gun rights and gun control lawyers 
were found that they actual participate and coordinate/networking in similar manners.  This 
finding was particularly interesting in that both groups are fighting for very different issues, 
yet they decide to take cases, coordinate with other groups, and network with other groups in a 
comparable fashion.  In particular, several gun rights lawyers and gun control lawyers reported 
that they had local chapter case referrals, had central search team referrals, and intervened on 
appeal.  Both gun rights and gun control lawyers reported that they coordinated with both state 
and national groups.   
The issue of litigation success was a bit different.  From the study, cause lawyers 
affiliated with national level interest groups obviously had more success than local or state 
interests simply because of the level of resources they had at their disposal.  However, local 
and state groups still were able to prevail under several circumstances.  For instance, local gun 
control interests in the state of Colorado were very successful in getting the state gun-show 
loophole overturned because of the public will following the Columbine High School 
shootings of the late 1990s.  SAFE Colorado had limited funds, yet they were able to 
sufficiently buoy public support in favor of their litigation.  In other instances, local cause 
lawyers were able to help individuals who were less fortunate beat firearms related charges.  
In several of cases, the local group had more resources than groups from other states.  The 
cause lawyers who brought and argued these cases seemed to be meticulous in preparation, 
paid close attention to detail, and possessed impressive persuasive skills. 
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Another implication would be that the findings in Chapter Two could potentially be 
used to explain the behavior of interest group cause lawyers working on behalf of other 
politically-important issues being litigated in judicial levels below the U.S. Supreme Court.  A 
large amount of research has been focused on the cause lawyering of the African-American 
civil rights movement, the gay rights movement, and other disparate groups.  However, little 
work has been published regarding civil liberties related groups, such as those associated with 
the Second Amendment. Not only does the study completed in Chapter Two outline the legal 
participation, litigation strategies, court venue-shopping, coordination/networking, and 
organizational structure of gun rights and gun control Second Amendment interest groups, but 
also at local, state, and national levels.   
Although much work has been published regarding civil rights related organization, 
less has been completed civil liberties groups, such as Second Amendment groups, freedom of 
speech groups, and other liberties groups.  Given the structure of the study completed in 
Chapter Two, other civil liberties related groups could be interviewed for a similar study. An 
adaptation of the questionnaire would be easy to complete and applicable to similar interest 
group cause lawyering literature.  Groups supporting free speech have been active litigants in 
the courts regarding First Amendment issues.  The study framework established in Chapter 
Two would be easily manipulated so as to consider the structure, performance, and output of 
other civil liberties related interest groups. 
                                                 
1Schattschneider, E.E. (1960). The Semi-Sovereign People; A Realist’s View of Democracy in America. Stamford, 
CT: Wadsworth Publishing, p. 38-112. 
 
2Galanter, M. (1974). Why the “Haves” Come Out Ahead; Speculations on the Limits of Legal Change. Law & 
Society Review 9, 1: p. 95-160. 
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Appendix A 
Interview Participants and Relevant Demographic Information from Chapter Two 
 
Respondent Cause Lawyer Type Funding Level Interest Group Scope 
One Gun Rights Low Local 
Two Gun Rights High National 
Three Gun Rights High National 
Four Gun Control High National 
Five Gun Rights Moderate State 
Six Gun Rights Moderate State 
Seven Gun Control Low Local 
Eight Gun Control Moderate State 
Nine Gun Control Moderate State 
Ten Gun Rights High National 
Eleven Gun Rights High National 
Twelve Gun Control High National 
Thirteen Gun Control High National 
Fourteen Gun Rights High National 
Fifteen Gun Control Low Local 
Sixteen Gun Rights Low Local 
Seventeen Gun Control Moderate State 
Eighteen Gun Rights High National 
Nineteen Gun Control High National 
Twenty Gun Control High National 
Twenty-One Gun Rights Moderate State 
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Appendix B 
Interest Group Cause Lawyer Interview Questions Used in Chapter Two 
A. Introduction 
 
a. Do you mind if I use your name in my report? 
b. Do you mind if I tape this telephone interview? 
c. Do you agree with what the interest group you work for/worked for stands for 
from a philosophical standpoint? 
i. If so, have you always supported the interest group philosophically? 
ii. Does your level of support for your interest group change based on 
positions that they take on certain issues? 
iii. If so, what types of issues make you re-think your levels of support? 
 
B. Participation 
 
a. How do Second Amendment cases get to you and your legal team? 
i. Are cases referred to you from local interest group chapters, as the 
NAACP does? 
ii. Does your legal team employ a central team that searches for cases to be 
litigated? 
iii. Does your litigation team intervene in cases on appeal? 
1. If so, how do trial court actions affect the appeal? 
2. How are further legal actions pursued? 
3. What is the trigger for legal intervention? 
b. How does your legal team decide to participate/litigate in certain Second 
Amendment cases? 
c. Are there any Second Amendment issue-based cases that you would refuse to 
participate in? 
i. If so, what types of issue-based cases would you always refuse to 
participate in? 
ii. Are there specific issue-based cases that you would always accept 
participation in, if asked? 
d. What is the single most important factor, such as changing an unjust law, making 
legal and constitutional history, taking a legal stand, ensuring constitutional 
standards, or others, that determines your participation in certain cases? 
i. What others factors are foremost in your mind when deciding to 
participate in certain cases? 
ii. Do you and your legal team have full say over the types of cases that you 
participate in?  
iii. If not, then who else has a say in the types of cases that you participate in?  
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C. Litigation Strategies 
 
a. What litigation strategies, such as amicus curiae, test cases, financial support of 
litigants, and other strategies, have you found to be most productive during 
litigation of Second Amendment cases? 
i. How important are amicus curiae briefs for your legal team’s litigation 
strategy? 
ii. How important is the litigation of test cases for your legal team’s litigation 
strategy? 
iii. How important is the financial support of litigants for your legal team’s 
litigation strategy? 
b. What litigation strategies have you found to be least productive during litigation 
of Second Amendment cases? 
i. Have these unproductive litigation strategies forced you change the way 
you were going to litigate before, during, or after a Second Amendment 
case? 
ii. Why do you think this litigation strategy that was least productive for your 
interest group was unsuccessful? 
c. Has your legal team’s litigation strategy changed over time? 
i. What types of legal situations have caused your legal team to change 
litigation strategies? 
ii. Please explain how your legal team’s litigation strategy choice has 
evolved in your time working for your interest group. 
d. What level of influence does the opposing legal counsel have over your legal 
team’s choice of litigation strategies and tactics? 
i. What level of influence do judicial attitudes have over your legal team’s 
choice of litigation strategies and tactics? 
ii. How has the text of existing law shaped your choice of litigation strategy 
and tactics? 
iii. Have aspects of legislative or executive politics and policy preferences 
influenced your choice of litigation strategy and tactics? 
iv. Have legal experts or any form of social or scientific evidence affected 
your choice of litigation strategy or tactics? 
 
D. Venue-Shopping 
 
a. When litigating Second Amendment cases, does your legal team shop for court 
venues? 
i. If so, does your legal team you favor a certain level of the state or federal 
judiciary? 
1. In the state court system, does your legal team shop for venues 
between urban or rural jurisdictions? 
2. In the federal court system, does your legal team shop for court 
venues between urban or rural jurisdictions? 
3. In diversity cases, does your legal team decide to favor a certain 
party’s state court or federal district? 
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a. If so, how/why? 
b. If not, why? 
ii. How much of a factor is venue choice when deciding where to bring 
Second Amendment litigation? 
iii. What are the chief reasons behind shopping for a potential court venue? 
b. Does your litigation strategy change depending on the venue selected in which 
your litigation is brought? 
i. If so, how? 
ii. If not, why? 
 
E. Coordination/Networking 
 
a. In your capacity as an interest group lawyer, did you coordinate with other 
interest groups when trying a case? 
i. If so, what types of groups? 
ii. If so, what groups did you coordinate with? 
iii. If so, what level of coordination existed between interest groups, group 
legal counsels, or legal teams? 
b. Does your interest group have both state and national organizations? 
i. If so, what level of coordination existed between the levels of your 
organization? 
ii. Who normally takes the lead when your interest group is trying a case in 
state courts? 
iii. Who normally takes the lead when your interest group is trying a case in 
federal courts? 
c. Does your organization network with similar state and national organizations? 
i. What types of interdependencies (friendship, kinship, common interest, 
financial exchange, dislike, or relationships of beliefs, knowledge or 
prestige) connects your interest group to other similar interest groups? 
ii. To what degree does interest group networking help to litigate cases? 
iii. Does networking effect the patterns of litigation that can be seen in 
Second Amendment cases (i.e.: topical cases, such as federal or state gun 
bans)? 
 
F. Organization 
 
a. Is organization an important part of your day-to-day activities? 
i. How integral is your legal team to the day-to-day activities of the interest 
group? 
ii. Is litigation a focal point of your interest groups mission? 
b. How is your legal team organized? 
i. Does your interest group employ its own internal legal counsel (unions do 
this)? 
ii. Does your interest group have an adjunct legal organization, such as 
NAACP Legal Defense Fund and other models? 
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iii. Does your interest group rely on a group devoted to legal change for its 
counsel, such as the Pacific Legal Defense Fund’s support of pro-business 
causes and pursuing anti-affirmative action policies? 
iv. Does your interest group ever use pro bono legal counsel? 
v. Does your interest group ever hire outside legal counsel? 
vi. Is there any other information that your would like to share with me 
regarding the organization of your interest group’s legal team? 
c. How organized is your interest group’s legal team? 
i. What types of people make up your legal team? 
ii. What types of personal and professional backgrounds does your legal team 
possess? 
iii. How many Second Amendment cases has your legal team litigated 
together? 
iv. How many Second Amendment cases has your legal team litigated all 
together? 
v. What types of topical cases has your legal team litigated? 
d. What types of organizational strategies does your legal team employ? 
i. Does your legal team have a vision for litigation on future cases and 
issues? 
ii. If so, what types of issues would you be most likely to focus on? 
e. How is your interest group’s legal team funded? 
i. Does your legal team receive funding from mass membership drives? 
ii. Does your legal team receive funding from a few contributors? 
iii. Does your legal team receive funding from corporations? 
f. Why do you think gun groups are more likely to use the court system rather than 
to seek legislation that advances their policy aims? 
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Appendix C 
Second Amendment State Supreme Court Cases Surveyed for Chapter Three 
Case Name Year State 
Anderson v. Maryland 1992 Maryland 
A.P.E. v. Colorado 2001 Colorado 
Arizona v. Belcher 1975 Arizona 
Arizona v. Doyle, Jr. 1977 Arizona 
Arizona v. Rascon 1974 Arizona 
Arnold v. City of Cleveland 1993 Ohio 
Artis v. Virginia 1972 Virginia 
Bailleaux v. Gladden 1962 Oregon 
Balentine v. Arkansas 1976 Arkansas 
Baron v. New Jersey 1971 New Jersey 
Bearden v. City of Boulder 1973 Nevada 
Beason v. Kentucky 1977 Kentucky 
Benjamin v. Bailey 1995 Connecticut 
Bergeson v. Georgia 2000 Georgia 
Bernstein v. New Jersey 1971 New Jersey 
Bilinski v. Delaware 1990 Delaware 
Blore v. Mossey 1976 Minnesota 
Blumenauer v. Keisling 1992 Oregon 
Blumenfeld v. Codd 1977 New York 
Boston Housing Authority v. Guirola 1991 Massachusetts 
Brewer v. Georgia 2006 Georgia 
Bristow v. Alabama 1982 Alabama 
Brown v. Wyoming 1979 Wyoming 
Burton v. Sills 1968 New Jersey 
Busch v. Maryland 1981 Maryland 
CA Rifle and Pistol Association, Inc. v. City of West Hollywood 1998 California 
California v. Bland 1995 California 
California v. King 1978 California 
Carfield v. Wyoming 1982 Wyoming 
Carson v. Georgia 1978 Georgia 
Castillo v. Texas 1967 Texas 
CBS, Inc. v. Block 1986 California 
Chenault v. Georgia 1975 Georgia 
Chimel v. California 1969 California 
City of Chicago v. Beretta U.S.A. Corporation 2002 Illinois 
City of Chicago v. Taylor 2002 Illinois 
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City of Junction City v. Lee 1975 Kansas 
City of Lakewood v. Pillow 1972 Colorado 
City of Las Vegas v. Moberg 1971 New Mexico 
City of Portland v. Lodi 1989 Oregon 
City of Princeton v. Buckner 1988 West Virginia 
City of St. Paul v. Azzone 1970 Minnesota 
Coalition of New Jersey Sportsmen, Inc. v. Whitman 1999 New Jersey 
Cobb v. Georgia 2008 Georgia 
Colorado v. Blue 1975 Colorado 
Colorado v. Brown 1975 Colorado 
Colorado v. Ford 1977 Colorado 
Colorado v. Garcia 1979 Colorado 
Colorado v. Taylor 1975 Colorado 
Colorado v. Ulibarri 1975 Colorado 
Davis v. Florida 1962 Florida 
Des Moines Register & Tribune Co. v. Hildreth 1970 Iowa 
Disciplinary Counsel v. LoDico 2008 Ohio 
Doe v. Portland Housing Authority 1995 Maine 
Dolph v. Oklahoma 1974 Oklahoma 
Douglass v. Kelton 1980 Colorado 
Eary v. Kentucky 1983 Kentucky 
Estate of Heck v. Stoffer 2003 Indiana 
Ex parte Lancaster 1973 Texas 
Ex parte Portis 1982 Alabama 
Farrakhan v. Virginia 2007 Virginia 
Foote v. Mississippi State Bar Association 1987 Mississippi 
Ford v. Texas 1993 Texas 
Fryar v. Oklahoma County 1969 Oklahoma 
Fuller v. Wyoming 1977 Wyoming 
Gaber v. Florida 1996 Florida 
Gabrielle v. Alaska 2007 Alaska 
Galvan v. Superior Court of San Francisco 1969 California 
Garcia v. Indiana 1973 Indiana 
Gardner v. Jenkins 1988 Pennsylvania 
Gilio v. Oklahoma 2001 Oklahoma 
Gooden v. Board of Appeals of the WV Dept. of Public Safety 1977 West Virginia 
Green v. Green 1997 Delaware 
Grimm v. New York City 1968 New York 
Hampton v. Thurmand 1981 Missouri 
Hand v. Nevada 1991 Nevada 
Harris v. Nevada 1967 Nevada 
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Harris v. Virginia 2001 Virginia 
Hasan v. Virginia 2008 Virginia 
Hawaii v. Goudy 1971 Hawaii 
Hawaii v. Mendoza 1996 Hawaii 
Hawaii v. Ogata & Sullivan 1977 Hawaii 
Hawaii v. Onishi 1972 Hawaii 
Hazel v. Texas 1976 Texas 
Hilly v. City of Portland 1990 Maine 
Hollander v. Warden Nevada State Prison 1970 Nevada 
Hunt v. Daley 1997 Illinois 
Hyde v. City of Birmingham 1980 Alabama 
Idaho v. McNary 1979 Idaho 
Iley v. Harris 1977 Florida 
In Interest of J.V.R. (J.V.R. v. Wisconsin) 1985 Wisconsin 
In re 1969 Plymouth Roadrunner, etc. 1970 Missouri 
In re Atkinson 1980 Minnesota 
In re Brickley 1982 Idaho 
In re Cueto 1990 West Virginia 
In re DuBois 1968 Nevada 
In re Goots 1990 West Virginia 
In re Metheny 1990 West Virginia 
In re Ramadass 1971 Pennsylvania 
In re Rinker 1990 West Virginia 
In re Robb 1998 Mississippi 
In re Standard Jury Instructions in Criminal Cases--No. 2005-1 2007 Florida 
In re Thomas 1981 Maine 
In re Ware 1984 Delaware 
Iowa v. Rupp 1979 Iowa 
Iowa v. Werner 1970 Iowa 
J.L. v. Florida 1998 Florida 
James v. Mississippi 1999 Mississippi 
Johnson v. Arkansas 1998 Arkansas 
Jones v. Arkansas 1993 Arkansas 
K.W. v. Florida 1996 Florida 
Kalodimos v. Village of Morton Grove 1984 Illinois 
Kansas v. Davis 1985 Kansas 
Kansas v. Porter, Green, and Smith 1980 Kansas 
Kasler v. Lockyer 2000 California 
Kellogg v. City of Gary 1990 Indiana 
King v. Wyoming Division of Criminal Investigation 2004 Wyoming 
Klein v. Leis 2003 Ohio 
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Knowles v. Langlois 1960 Rhode Island 
Kolokouris v. Georgia 1999 Georgia 
LaBate v. New Jersey 1971 New Jersey 
Landers v. Georgia 1983 Georgia 
Lansdown v. Virginia 1983 Virginia 
Lehman v. Pennsylvania State Police 2003 Pennsylvania 
Lightfoot v. Maryland 1976 Maryland 
Louisiana v. Amos 1977 Louisiana 
Louisiana v. Blanchard 2001 Louisiana 
Louisiana v. Hamlin 1986 Louisiana 
Louisiana v. Landry 1977 Louisiana 
Louisiana v. Reddix 1986 Louisiana 
Louisiana v. Robinson 1977 Louisiana 
Louisiana v. Sanders 1978 Louisiana 
Louisiana v. Sandifer 1996 Louisiana 
Louisiana v. Wiggins 1983 Louisiana 
Louisiana v. Williams 1999 Louisiana 
M.P. v. Florida 1996 Florida 
Mackall v. Maryland 1978 Maryland 
Maine v. Brown 1990 Maine 
Maine v. Friel 1986 Maine 
Maine v. Goodno 1986 Maine 
Maryland v. Crawford 1987 Maryland 
Massachusetts v. Alvarado 1996 Massachusetts 
Massachusetts v. Davis 1976 Massachusetts 
Massachusetts v. Johnson 1992 Massachusetts 
Massachusetts v. Wilson 2004 Massachusetts 
Masters v. Texas 1985 Texas 
Matthews v. Indiana 1960 Indiana 
McGuire v. Texas 1976 Texas 
McKenna v. Nevada 1982 Nevada 
Mecikalski v. Office of the Attorney General 2000 Wyoming 
Metzger v. Metzger 1987 Pennsylvania 
Michigan United Conservation Clubs v. Lansing 1985 Michigan 
Michigan v. Alexander 1979 Michigan 
Michigan v. Beauregard 1970 Michigan 
Michigan v. Brintley 1979 Michigan 
Michigan v. Henderson 1974 Michigan 
Michigan v. Johnson 1981 Michigan 
Michigan v. McDonald 1968 Michigan 
Michigan v. McFadden 1971 Michigan 
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Michigan v. Nix 1987 Michigan 
Michigan v. Panknin 1966 Michigan 
Michigan v. Robinson 1978 Michigan 
Michigan v. Smelter 1989 Michigan 
Michigan v. Tavolacci 1981 Michigan 
Milligan v. Texas 1977 Texas 
Minnesota v. Paige 1977 Minnesota 
Missouri v. Booker 1982 Missouri 
Missouri v. Bordeaux 1960 Missouri 
Missouri v. Whitworth 1986 Missouri 
Mohammad v. Kentucky 2006 Kentucky 
Montana v. Bar-Jonah 2004 Montana 
Montana v. Broken Rope 1996 Montana 
Montana v. Guillaume 1999 Montana 
Montana v. Krantz 1990 Montana 
Montana v. Smith 2000 Montana 
Moosani v. Texas 1995 Texas 
Morgan v. Town of Heidelberg 1963 Mississippi 
Mosely v. Kentucky 1964 Kentucky 
Mosher v. City of Dayton 1976 Ohio 
Nebraska v. Comeau 1989 Nebraska 
Nebraska v. LaChapelle 1990 Nebraska 
Nebraska v. Rush 1989 Nebraska 
New Hampshire v. Beckert 1999 New Hampshire
New Hampshire v. Fox 2004 New Hampshire
New Hampshire v. Sanne 1976 New Hampshire
New Hampshire v. Smith 1990 New Hampshire
New Hampshire v. Taylor 1976 New Hampshire
New Jersey v. Nelson 1998 New Jersey 
New Mexico v. Dees 1983 New Mexico 
New York v. King 1985 New York 
New York v. Moore 1973 New York 
New York v. Pugach 1964 New York 
Nicholas v. Wisconsin 1971 Wisconsin 
Nichols v. Keisling 1992 Oregon 
North Carolina v. Dawson 1968 North Carolina 
North Carolina v. Fennell 1989 North Carolina 
North Dakota v. Chaussee 1965 North Dakota 
North Dakota v. Ricehill 1987 North Dakota 
O'Brien v. Keegan 1996 New York 
O'Connor v. Scarpino 1994 New York 
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Office Disciplinary Counsel v. Cushion 2001 Ohio 
Ohio v. Waldbillig 1964 Ohio 
Oklahoma v. Warren 1998 Oklahoma 
Oregon v. Blocker 1981 Oregon 
Oregon v. Cartwright 1966 Oregon 
Oregon v. Delgado 1984 Oregon 
Oregon v. Hash 1978 Oregon 
Oregon v. Kessler 1980 Oregon 
Oregon v. Krogness 1963 Oregon 
Oregon v. Smoot 1989 Oregon 
Ozenna v. Alaska 1980 Alaska 
Pagel v. Franscell 2002 Wyoming 
Pennsylvania v. Cartagena 1978 Pennsylvania 
Pennsylvania v. Hawkins 1997 Pennsylvania 
Pennsylvania v. Ray 1970 Pennsylvania 
Perez v. Virginia 2007 Virginia 
Posey v. Kentucky 2006 Kentucky 
Pruitt v. Virginia 2007 Virginia 
Rainey & Harton v. Hartness 1999 Arkansas 
Reilly v. New Jersey 1971 New Jersey 
Rhode Island v. Storms 1973 Rhode Island 
Rinzler v. Carson 1972 Florida 
Robertson v. City & County of Denver 1994 Colorado 
Robinson v. Howard Bros. of Jackson, Inc. 1979 Mississippi 
Runo v. Texas 1977 Texas 
Sardis v. Second Judicial District Court 1969 Nevada 
Savior v. Georgia 2008 Georgia 
Schaaf v. Virginia 1979 Virginia 
Sheppard v. Texas 1979 Texas 
Short v. Delaware 1991 Delaware 
Siccardi v. New Jersey 1971 New Jersey 
Simmons v. Virginia 1977 Virginia 
Simonton v. Huiskamp 1964 Iowa 
Smith v. County of Missoula 1999 Montana 
Smith v. Delaware 2005 Delaware 
South Carolina v. Mitchum 1972 South Carolina 
South Carolina v. Muller 1984 South Carolina 
South Carolina v. Spinks 1973 South Carolina 
South Dakota v. Coe 1979 South Dakota 
Spurrier v. Maryland 1962 Maryland 
St. John v. Tennessee 1972 Tennessee 
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Superintendent of Police v. Freedom of Information Comm. 1992 Connecticut 
Suter v. City of LaFayette 1997 California 
Tennessee v. McDowell 1978 Tennessee 
Texas v. Trujillo 1972 Texas 
US v. Brooks 1995 Montana 
Utah v. Beorchia 1974 Utah 
Utah v. Garfield 1976 Utah 
Utah v. Hansen 1968 Utah 
Van Der Hule v. Mukasey 2009 Montana 
Vermont v. Duranleau 1969 Vermont 
Washington v. Eker 1985 Washington 
Washington v. Mak 1986 Washington 
Washington v. Sabala 1986 Washington 
Washington v. Schelin 2002 Washington 
Washington v. Tongate 1980 Washington 
Wayne County Prosecutor v. Recorder's Court Judge 1979 Michigan 
Webb v. Texas 1969 Texas 
Williams v. Oklahoma 1977 Oklahoma 
Wilson v. Cook County 2009 Illinois 
Wisconsin v. Chambers 1972 Wisconsin 
Wisconsin v. Fry 1986 Wisconsin 
Wisconsin v. Kerr 1994 Wisconsin 
Wisconsin v. Medrano 1978 Wisconsin 
Wisconsin v. Williamson 1983 Wisconsin 
Wisconsin v. Wisumierski 1982 Wisconsin 
Wright v. City of Anchorage 1979 Alaska 
Wyoming v. McAdams 1986 Wyoming 
Zanders v. Anderson 1996 Ohio 
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Appendix D 
Second Amendment United States Court of Appeals Cases Surveyed for Chapter Four 
Case Name Year
Appellate 
Circuit 
Akins v. US 2009 11th 
American Arms International v. Herbert 2009 4th 
Article II Gun Shop, Inc. v. Gonzales 2006 7th 
Bach v. Pataki 2005 2nd 
Baranski v. Fifteen Unknown Agents of the Federal Bureau of 
A.T.F. 2006 6th 
Bastible v. Weyerhaeuser Co. 2006 10th 
Blaustein & Reich, Inc. v. Buckles 2004 4th 
Camden County Bd. Of Chosen Freeholders v. Beretta 2001 3rd 
Casanova Guns, Inc. v. Connally 1972 7th 
City of Chicago v. United States Dept. of Treasury 2005 7th 
City of New York v. Beretta U.S.A. Corp. 2008 2nd 
Cody v. US 1972 8th 
CT Coastal Fishermen's Assoc. v. Remington Arms Co., Inc. 1993 2nd 
Dick's Sporting Center, Inc. v. Alexander 2007 6th 
Eckert v. City of Philadelphia, PA 1973 3rd 
Edwards v. City of Goldsboro, NC 1999 4th 
Egan v. City of Aurora, IL 1960 7th 
Farmer v. Higgins 1990 11th 
Forrest v. Florida Department of Corrections 2009 11th 
Fresno Rifle and Pistol Club v. Van De Kamp 1992 9th 
Gardner v. Vespia 2001 1st 
Georgiacarry.org, Inc. v. City of Atlanta, GA 2009 11th 
Gillespie v. City of Indianapolis 1999 7th 
Gun Owners' Action League v. Swift 2002 1st 
Gun South, Inc. v. Brady 1989 11th 
Hamblen v. US 2009 6th 
Haymond v. Hall 2009 11th 
HC Gun & Knife Shows, Inc. v. City of Houston 2000 5th 
Hickman v. Block 1996 9th 
Hinkle v. City of Clarksburg, WV 1996 4th 
Hunter v. US 1996 9th 
Ileto v. Glock, Inc. 2009 9th 
In re Shaffaat 1998 4th 
In re Weitzman 1970 8th 
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Jackson v. County of Marlboro Board Of Commissioners 1997 4th 
Jennings v. Mukasey 2007 9th 
Johnson v. Acevedo 2009 7th 
Justice v. Elrod 1987 7th 
Justice v. Town of Cicero, IL 2009 7th 
Kwan v. Federal Bureau of A.T.F. 2007 9th 
Love v. Pepersack 1995 4th 
Maloney v. Cuomo 2009 2nd 
McCoy v. Newsome 1992 11th 
McGrath v. US 1995 2nd 
Michigan United Conservation Clubs v. Lujan 1991 6th 
Milwaukee Gun Club v. Schulz 1992 7th 
Morgan v. Federal Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, & Firearms 2007 6th 
National Rifle Association of America v. Brady 1990 4th 
National Rifle Association of America v. Magaw 1997 6th 
New Banner Institute, Inc. v. Dickerson 1980 4th 
Nordyke v. King 2009 9th 
Northern Indiana Gun & Outdoor Shows v. City of South Bend, 
IN 1998 7th 
NRA of America v. City of Chicago and Village of Oak Park, IL 2009 7th 
NRA of America v. Handgun Control Federation of OH 1994 6th 
Ohntrup v. Firearms Center, Inc. 1985 3rd 
Olympic Arms v. Buckles 2002 6th 
On Target Sporting Goods, Inc. v. Attorney General of the US 2007 8th 
People's Rights Organization, Inc. v. City of Columbus, OH 1998 6th 
Perkins v. F.I.E. Corporation 1984 5th 
Plona v. UPS, Inc. 2009 6th 
Presley v. US 1988 8th 
Procaccio v. Lambert 2007 6th 
Quilici v. Village of Morton Grove 1982 7th 
Rafferty v. US 1973 5th 
Ramsey Winch, Inc. v. Henry 2009 2nd 
Richmond Boro Gun Club, Inc. v. City of New York 1996 2nd 
Rowlands v. Pointe Mouille Shooting Club 1999 6th 
RSM, Inc. v. Buckles 2001 4th 
San Diego County Gun Rights Committee v. Reno 1996 9th 
Silveira v. Lockyear 2002 9th 
Sipes v. US 1963 8th 
Sklar v. Byrne 1984 7th 
Springfield Armory, Inc. v. City of Columbus 1994 6th 
Stevens v. US 1971 6th 
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The General Store, Inc. v. Van Loan 2009 9th 
Thomas v. City Council of Portland, ME 1984 1st 
Thomas v. New England Firearms Co. 1994 10th 
Thompson v. Immigration & Naturalization Service 1964 7th 
Tomas v. Holder 2009 7th 
US v. 16,179 Molso Italian .22 Caliber Winlee Derringer 
Convertible Starter Guns 1971 2nd 
US v. Ardoin 1994 5th 
US v. Arrington 1980 5th 
US v. Barry 1996 8th 
US v. Bass 1970 2nd 
US v. Battle 2009 11th 
US v. Beavers 2000 6th 
US v. Bergeman 1979 9th 
US v. Berry 1992 5th 
US v. Beuckelaere 1996 6th 
US v. Billue 1993 11th 
US v. Bostic 1998 4th 
US v. Bournes 2003 6th 
US v. Cabbler 1970 4th 
US v. Cardoza 1997 1st 
US v. Cassidy 1990 6th 
US v. Chesney 1996 6th 
US v. Clarke 2000 7th 
US v. Coleman 1983 9th 
US v. Cooper 2009 4th 
US v. Corliss 1960 2nd 
US v. Currier 1980 1st 
US v. Dahms 1991 9th 
US v. Dalton 1992 10th 
US v. Daniels 1970 9th 
US v. DeBerry 1996 7th 
US v. Driscoll 1992 6th 
US v. Elliott 1997 8th 
US v. Emerson 2001 5th 
US v. Engesser 1986 9th 
US v. Essick 1991 4th 
US v. Evans 1991 9th 
US v. Farmer 1993 4th 
US v. Farrell 1995 8th 
US v. Frechette 2006 1st 
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US v. Friel 1993 1st 
US v. Fryer 1976 6th 
US v. Glover 2005 11th 
US v. Gomez 1990 9th 
US v. Gooden 2009 7th 
US v. Gravenmeir 1997 9th 
US v. Graves 1977 3rd 
US v. Gray 1982 5th 
US v. Great Guns, Inc. 2001 9th 
US v. Griley 1987 4th 
US v. Grinkiewicz 1989 11th 
US v. Hager 2001 4th 
US v. Hale 1992 8th 
US v. Hale 1992 8th 
US v. Hall 1996 11th 
US v. Hamm 2005 11th 
US v. Haney 2001 10th 
US v. Hanna 1995 9th 
US v. Harkrider 1996 5th 
US v. Hemmings 2001 7th 
US v. Herrell 1978 9th 
US v. Hinostroza 2002 9th 
US v. Jackson 2007 11th 
US v. Jackubowski 2003 7th 
US v. Johnson 1974 4th 
US v. Johnson 1971 5th 
US v. Jones 1992 4th 
US v. Kafka 2000 9th 
US v. Kenney 1996 7th 
US v. Kirk 1995 5th 
US v. Klebig 2009 7th 
US v. Knutson 1997 5th 
US v. Kolter 1988 11th 
US v. Lawton 2004 7th 
US v. Luna 1999 5th 
US v. Mack 1999 9th 
US v. Mastrangelo 1984 11th 
US v. Matassini 1978 5th 
US v. McLean 1990 4th 
US v. Meade 1999 1st 
US v. Meza-Corrales 1999 9th 
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US v. Michael R. 1996 9th 
US v. Minnick 1991 1st 
US v. Miscellaneous Firearms, Explosives, Destructive 
Devices, & Ammunition 2009 7th 
US v. Mitchell 2000 4th 
US v. Napier 2000 6th 
US v. Nelson 1983 9th 
US v. Nelson 1993 8th 
US v. Ninety-Three Firearms & Assorted Firearm Parts and 
Ammunition 2003 6th 
US v. Nix 2006 11th 
US v. Oakes 1977 10th 
US v. Oliver 1994 11th 
US v. Paz 1991 4th 
US v. Pearson 1993 8th 
US v. Pelusio 1983 2nd 
US v. Peters 2005 11th 
US v. Potts 1975 9th 
US v. Price 2003 7th 
US v. Purgason 1977 4th 
US v. Rambo 1996 9th 
US v. Ramos 1992 1st 
US v. Reavis 1995 4th 
US v. Reddick 2000 10th 
US v. Rene E. 2009 1st 
US v. Rivera 1995 11th 
US v. Rose 1982 10th 
US v. Ross 1993 7th 
US v. Rybar 1996 3rd 
US v. Salamone 1986 3rd 
US v. Scanio 1998 2nd 
US v. Seven Firearms and Ammunition 2004 8th 
US v. Seventeen Firearms and 3,005 Rounds of Ammunition 2006 6th 
US v. Skoien 2009 7th 
US v. Smith 1991 1st 
US v. Smith 1999 8th 
US v. Sorrentino 1995 2nd 
US v. Sweeting 1991 11th 
US v. Synnes 1971 8th 
US v. Taylor 1971 8th 
US v. Thirty-Five Firearms 2005 6th 
 216 
 
US v. Thomas 1993 5th 
US v. Thomas 1978 5th 
US v. Three Winchester 30-30 Caliber Lever Action Carbines 1974 7th 
US v. Throneburg 1990 6th 
US v. Tinker 1992 6th 
US v. Tous 1972 9th 
US v. Turner 1996 6th 
US v. Waller 2000 8th 
US v. Warin 1976 6th 
US v. Wesela 2000 7th 
US v. Whitfield 1990 8th 
US v. Whitman 1996 1st 
US v. Wihbey 1996 1st 
US v. Wiley 1971 8th 
US v. Wilks 1995 10th 
US v. Williams 1971 5th 
US v. Wilson 1971 6th 
US v. Wilson 1998 7th 
US v. Winchester 1990 11th 
US v. Wright 1997 11th 
US v. Wright 1981 8th 
US v. Ziskowski 1972 3rd 
Williams v. Beemiller, Inc. 2008 2nd 
Wyoming ex. Rel. Crank v. US 2008 10th 
York v. Secretary of the Treasury 1985 10th 
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Appendix E 
Randomly Selected Second Amendment State Supreme Court Cases;  
Used to Establish Inter-coder Reliability for Chapter Three 
Case Title Year State 
Anderson v. Maryland 1992 Maryland 
Arizona v. Rascon 1974 Arizona 
Bilinski v. Delaware 1990 Delaware 
Burton v. Sills 1968 New Jersey 
Busch v. Maryland 1981 Maryland 
City of Chicago v. Beretta U.S.A. Corporation 2002 Illinois 
City of St. Paul v. Azzone 1970 Minnesota 
Colorado v. Blue 1975 Colorado 
Colorado v. Brown 1975 Colorado 
Colorado v. Ford 1977 Colorado 
Colorado v. Garcia 1979 Colorado 
Colorado v. Taylor 1975 Colorado 
Colorado v. Ulibarri 1975 Colorado 
Davis v. Florida 1962 Florida 
Douglass v. Kelton 1980 Colorado 
Foote v. Mississippi State Bar Association 1987 Mississippi 
Green v. Green 1997 Delaware 
Grimm v. New York City 1968 New York 
Hawaii v. Mendoza 1996 Hawaii 
Hunt v. Daley 1997 Illinois 
Iley v. Harris 1977 Florida 
In re Robb 1998 Mississippi 
In re Thomas 1981 Maine 
Jones v. Arkansas 1993 Arkansas 
Knowles v. Langlois 1960 Rhode Island 
Landers v. Georgia 1983 Georgia 
Lehman v. Pennsylvania State Police 2003 Pennsylvania 
Lightfoot v. Maryland 1976 Maryland 
Louisiana v. Amos 1977 Louisiana 
Louisiana v. Blanchard 2001 Louisiana 
Louisiana v. Hamlin 1986 Louisiana 
Louisiana v. Reddix 1986 Louisiana 
Mackall v. Maryland 1978 Maryland 
Maryland v. Crawford 1987 Maryland 
Massachusetts v. Alvarado 1996 Massachusetts 
 218 
 
Massachusetts v. Johnson 1992 Massachusetts 
Massachusetts v. Wilson 2004 Massachusetts 
Masters v. Texas 1985 Texas 
Missouri v. Whitworth 1986 Missouri 
Morgan v. Town of Heidelberg 1963 Mississippi 
Mosher v. City of Dayton 1976 Ohio 
Pennsylvania v. Cartagena 1978 Pennsylvania 
Posey v. Kentucky 2006 Kentucky 
Rainey & Harton v. Hartness 1999 Arkansas 
Rinzler v. Carson 1972 Florida 
Robertson v. City & County of Denver 1994 Colorado 
Short v. Delaware 1991 Delaware 
Smith v. Delaware 2005 Delaware 
Spurrier v. Maryland 1962 Maryland 
Superintendent of Police v. Freedom of Information 
Comm. 1992 Connecticut 
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Appendix F 
Randomly Selected Second Amendment United States Courts of Appeals Cases;  
Used to Establish Inter-coder Reliability for Chapter Four 
Case Title Year 
Appellate 
Circuit 
American Arms International v. Herbert 2009 4th 
Article II Gun Shop, Inc. v. Gonzales 2006 7th 
Baranski v. Fifteen Unknown Agents of the Federal Bureau 
of Alcohol, Tobacco, & Firearms 2006 6th 
Blaustein & Reich, Inc. v. Buckles 2004 4th 
Camden County Bd. Of Chosen Freeholders v. Beretta 2001 3rd 
Casanova Guns, Inc. v. Connally 1972 7th 
City of Chicago v. United States Dept. of Treasury 2005 7th 
CT Coastal Fishermen's Assoc. v. Remington Arms Co., Inc. 1993 2nd 
Dick's Sporting Center, Inc. v. Alexander 2007 6th 
Edwards v. City of Goldsboro, NC 1999 4th 
Egan v. City of Aurora, IL 1960 7th 
Fresno Rifle and Pistol Club v. Van De Kamp 1992 9th 
Georgiacarry.org, Inc. v. City of Atlanta, GA 2009 11th 
Gillespie v. City of Indianapolis 1999 7th 
Gun Owners' Action League v. Swift 2002 1st 
HC Gun & Knife Shows, Inc. v. City of Houston 2000 5th 
Hinkle v. City of Clarksburg, WV 1996 4th 
In re Shaffaat 1998 4th 
Jackson v. County of Marlboro Board Of Commissioners 1997 4th 
Jennings v. Mukasey 2007 9th 
Justice v. Town of Cicero, IL 2009 7th 
Kwan v. Federal Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, & Firearms 2007 9th 
Maloney v. Cuomo 2009 2nd 
Michigan United Conservation Clubs v. Lujan 1991 6th 
Milwaukee Gun Club v. Schulz 1992 7th 
Morgan v. Federal Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, & Firearms 2007 6th 
National Rifle Association of America v. Brady 1990 4th 
New Banner Institute, Inc. v. Dickerson 1980 4th 
Nordyke v. King 2009 9th 
Northern Indiana Gun & Outdoor Shows v. City of South 
Bend, IN 1998 7th 
NRA of America v. City of Chicago and Village of Oak Park, 
IL 2009 7th 
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NRA of America v. Handgun Control Federation of OH 1994 6th 
Ohntrup v. Firearms Center, Inc. 1985 3rd 
Olympic Arms v. Buckles 2002 6th 
On Target Sporting Goods, Inc. v. Attorney General of the 
US 2007 8th 
Perkins v. F.I.E. Corporation 1984 5th 
Procaccio v. Lambert 2007 6th 
Ramsey Winch, Inc. v. Henry 2009 2nd 
Rowlands v. Pointe Mouille Shooting Club 1999 6th 
RSM, Inc. v. Buckles 2001 4th 
The General Store, Inc. v. Van Loan 2009 9th 
Thomas v. New England Firearms Co. 1994 10th 
Thompson v. Immigration & Naturalization Service 1964 7th 
Tomas v. Holder 2009 7th 
US v. 16,179 Molso Italian .22 Caliber Winlee Derringer 
Convertible Starter Guns 1971 2nd 
US v. Great Guns, Inc. 2001 9th 
US v. Miscellaneous Firearms, Explosives, Destructive 
Devices, & Ammunition 2009 7th 
US v. Ninety-Three Firearms & Assorted Firearm Parts and 
Ammunition 2003 6th 
US v. Seven Firearms and Ammunition 2004 8th 
US v. Seventeen Firearms and 3,005 Rounds of Ammunition 2006 6th 
US v. Thirty-Five Firearms 2005 6th 
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Appendix G 
Research Hypotheses 
Chapter Two; Second Amendment Interest Group Leaders and Lawyers 
H1: There will be clear differences between gun rights and gun control interest groups with 
regard to legal participation. 
 
H2: There will be clear differences between gun rights and gun control interest groups with 
regard to litigation strategies. 
 
H3: There will be clear differences between gun rights and gun control interest groups with 
regard to judicial venue-shopping. 
 
H4: There will be clear differences between gun rights and gun control interest groups with 
regard to legal coordination and networking. 
 
H5: There will be clear differences between gun rights and gun control interest groups with 
regard to interest group organization. 
 
H6: There will be clear differences between heavily funded and lesser funded Second 
Amendment interest groups with regard to legal participation. 
 
H7: There will be clear differences between heavily funded and lesser funded Second 
Amendment interest groups with regard to litigation strategies. 
 
H8: There will be clear differences between heavily funded and lesser funded Second 
Amendment interest groups with regard to judicial venue-shopping. 
 
H9: There will be clear differences between heavily funded and lesser funded Second 
Amendment interest groups with regard to legal coordination and networking. 
 
H10: There will be clear differences between heavily funded and lesser funded Second 
Amendment interest groups with regard to interest group organization. 
 
H11: There will be clear differences between local, state, and national Second Amendment 
interest groups with regard to legal participation. 
 
H12: There will be clear differences between local, state, and national Second Amendment 
interest groups with regard to litigation strategies. 
 
H13: There will be clear differences between local, state, and national Second Amendment 
interest groups with regard to judicial venue-shopping. 
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H14: There will be clear differences between local, state, and national Second Amendment 
interest groups with regard to interest group coordination and networking. 
 
H15: There will be clear differences between local, state, and national Second Amendment 
interest groups with regard to interest group organization. 
 
 
Chapter Three; Second Amendment Cases in State Courts of Last Resort 
 
H1: Elected state courts of last resort increase the probability of a Second Amendment decision 
that will favor gun rights. 
 
H2: Selected or appointed state courts of last resort increase the probability of a Second 
Amendment decision that will favor gun control. 
 
H3: State courts of last resort judges affiliated with the Democratic Party increase the probability 
of a Second Amendment decision that will favor gun control. 
 
H4: State courts of last resort judges affiliated with the Republican Party increase the probability 
of a Second Amendment decision that will favor gun rights. 
 
H5: The presence of a state intermediate appellate court increase the probability that state courts 
of last resort will rule in favor of gun control in Second Amendment decisions. 
 
H6: States without an intermediate appellate court increase the probability that state courts of last 
resort will rule in favor of gun rights in Second Amendment decisions. 
 
H7: States with a liberal political ideology increase the probability that their state courts of last 
resort will rule in favor of gun control in Second Amendment decisions. 
 
H8: States with a conservative political ideology increase the probability that their state courts of 
last resort will rule in favor of gun rights in Second Amendment decisions. 
 
H9: States with high population density increase the probability that their state courts of last 
resort will rule in favor of gun control in Second Amendment decisions. 
 
H10: States with low population density increase the probability that their state courts of last 
resort will rule in favor of gun rights in Second Amendment decisions. 
 
H11: States with high gun ownership percentages increase the probability that their state courts of 
last resort will rule in favor of gun rights in Second Amendment decisions. 
 
H12: States with low gun ownership percentages increase the probability that their state courts of 
last resort will rule in favor of gun control in Second Amendment decisions. 
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H13: States with high homicide rates increase the probability that their state courts of last resort 
will rule in favor of gun rights in Second Amendment decisions. 
 
H14: States with low homicide increase the probability that their state courts of last resort will 
rule in favor of gun control in Second Amendment decisions. 
 
 
Chapter Four; Second Amendment Cases in U.S. Courts of Appeals 
 
H1: U.S. Courts of Appeals panels that have a majority of judges appointed by Democratic 
presidents increase the probability that the panel will rule in favor of gun control in Second 
Amendment decisions. 
 
H2: U.S. Courts of Appeals panels that have a majority of judges appointed by Republican 
presidents increase the probability that the panel will rule in favor of gun rights in Second 
Amendment decisions. 
 
H3: Appellate circuits with a liberal political ideology increase the probability that their appellate 
panels will rule in favor of gun control in Second Amendment decisions. 
 
H4: Appellate circuits with a conservative political ideology increase the probability that their 
appellate panels will rule in favor of gun rights in Second Amendment decisions. 
 
H5: Appellate circuits with high population density increase the probability that their appellate 
panels will rule in favor of gun control in Second Amendment decisions. 
 
H6: Appellate circuits with low population density increase the probability that their appellate 
panels will rule in favor of gun rights in Second Amendment decisions. 
 
H7: Appellate circuits with high gun ownership percentages increase the probability that their 
appellate panels will rule in favor of gun rights in Second Amendment decisions. 
 
H8: Appellate circuits with low gun ownership percentages increase the probability that their 
appellate panels will rule in favor of gun control in Second Amendment decisions. 
 
H9: Appellate circuits with low homicide rates increase the probability that their appellate panels 
will rule in favor of gun rights in Second Amendment decisions. 
 
H10: Appellate circuits with high homicide rates increase the probability that their appellate 
panels will rule in favor of gun control in Second Amendment decisions. 
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APPENDIX H 
Relevant State-Level Data Set Tables 
State Courts of Last Resort Judicial Selection Method Changes, 1960-2009 
State Old Selection Method New Selection Method Year 
Arkansas Partisan Elections Non-Partisan Elections 2000 
Arizona Partisan Elections Merit Plan Selection 1974 
California Non-Partisan Elections Merit Plan Selection 1979 
Colorado Partisan Elections Merit Plan Selection 1966 
Florida Partisan Elections Non-Partisan Elections 1971 
Florida Non-Partisan Elections Merit Plan Selection 1976 
Georgia Partisan Elections Non-Partisan Elections 1983 
Iowa Partisan Elections Merit Plan Selection 1962 
Indiana Partisan Elections Merit Plan Selection 1970 
Kentucky Partisan Elections Non-Partisan Elections 1975 
Maryland Partisan Elections Merit Plan Selection 1970 
Mississippi Partisan Elections Non-Partisan Elections 1994 
Nebraska Partisan Elections Merit Plan Selection 1962 
New Mexico Partisan Elections Merit Plan Selection 1988 
Oklahoma Partisan Elections Merit Plan Selection 1967 
South Dakota Non-Partisan Elections Merit Plan Selection 1980 
Tennessee Partisan Elections Merit Plan Selection 1971 
Tennessee Merit Plan Selection Partisan Elections 1974 
Tennessee Partisan Elections Merit Plan Selection 1994 
Utah Non-Partisan Elections Merit Plan Selection 1967 
Source: the American Judicature Society. 
Note: n=21 total changes. 
 
 
State Courts of Last Resort Cases by Review/Ruling Type, 1960-2009 
 
Type of Review/Ruling # of Cases 
En Banc Review 20 
Per Curiam Ruling 24 
Source: LexisNexis Academic Legal Database. 
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State Courts of Last Resort Judges by Majority Rulings Authored, 1960-2009 
 
Judge Name State Opinions Authored Office Tenure Position 
Walter F. Marcus, Jr. LA 7 1973-2000 Associate Justice 
William T. Brotherton, Jr. WV 4 1984-1995 Associate/Chief Justice 
Robert B. Lee CO 4 1969-1983 Associate Justice 
Donald W. Lemons VA 3 2000-Present Associate Justice 
Thomas G. Kavanagh MI 3 1969-1984 Associate Justice 
William E. Hunt, Sr. MT 2 1985-2000 Associate Justice 
William G. Callow WI 2 1977-1992 Associate Justice 
Lawrence L. Koontz, Jr. VA 2 1995-Present Associate Justice 
Jean A. Turnage MT 2 1985-2000 Associate/Chief Justice 
David Zenoff NV 2 1966-1976 Associate Justice 
Nathan L. Jacobs NJ 2 1952-1975 Associate Justice 
John C. Mowbray NV 2 1967-1992 Associate Justice 
Masaji Marumoto HI 2 1959-1995 Associate Justice 
Berkeley B. Lent OR 2 1977-1988 Associate/Chief Justice 
Vincent L. McKusick ME 2 1977-1992 Associate/Chief Justice 
William A. Grimes NH 2 1966-1981 Associate/Chief Justice 
Leslie Boslaugh NE 2 1961-1994 Associate Justice 
Andrew D. Christie DE 2 1983-1992 Associate/Chief Justice 
John R. Dethmers MI 2 1946-1970 Associate/Chief Justice 
Source: LexisNexis Academic Legal Database and state judicial websites of the state in the table. 
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State Supreme Court Second Amendment Rulings by Year, 1960-2009 
Year Number of Rulings Year Number of Rulings 
1960 3 1986 10 
1961 0 1987 5 
1962 3 1988 2 
1963 2 1989 6 
1964 4 1980s Total 59 (21.9 percent) 
1965 1 1990 11 
1966 2 1991 3 
1967 2 1992 5 
1968 6 1993 3 
1969 6 1994 3 
1960s Total 29 (10.8 percent) 1995 5 
1970 7 1996 9 
1971 10 1997 4 
1972 8 1998 6 
1973 6 1999 8 
1974 4 1990s Total 57 (21.2 percent) 
1975 7 2000 4 
1976 10 2001 5 
1977 16 2002 4 
1978 9 2003 3 
1979 12 2004 4 
1970s Total 89 (33.1 percent) 2005 1 
1980 7 2006 3 
1981 6 2007 5 
1982 7 2008 4 
1983 6 2009 2 
1984 4 2000s Total 35 (13.0 percent) 
1985 6 Total Cases 269 (100 percent) 
Source: LexisNexis Academic Legal Database. 
This table demonstrates that more than thirty percent (33.1 percent) of all cases in the full 
sample of cases were decided during the 1970s, while less than eleven percent (10.8 percent) of 
the full case sample were decided during the 1960s.  This finding shows that the three political 
assassinations and other causation from the 1960s did bring the Second Amendment to the 
forefront of American political thought as people fought for their perceived to right to bear arms 
in a society that continued to see the Second Amendment as a collective, instead of an individual 
right. 
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State Supreme Court 2nd Amendment Rulings by State, 1960-2009 
 
 
State 
Gun 
Rights 
Rulings 
Gun 
Control 
Rulings 
 
Total 
Rulings 
 
State 
Gun 
Rights 
Rulings 
Gun 
Control 
Rulings 
 
Total 
Rulings 
Alabama 3 0 3 Montana 5 3 8 
Alaska 3 0 3 Nebraska 3 0 3 
Arizona 0 3 3 Nevada 3 4 7 
Arkansas 3 1 4 New Hampshire 2 3 5 
California 1 7 8 New Jersey 0 8 8 
Colorado 3 7 10 New Mexico 1 1 2 
Connecticut 0 2 2 New York 1 6 7 
Delaware 0 5 5 North Carolina 2 0 2 
Florida 4 4 8 North Dakota 2 0 2 
Georgia 5 3 8 Ohio 4 3 7 
Hawaii 0 4 4 Oklahoma 5 0 5 
Idaho 2 0 2 Oregon 3 7 10 
Illinois 0 5 5 Pennsylvania 2 5 7 
Indiana 3 1 4 Rhode Island 0 2 2 
Iowa 0 3 3 South Carolina 3 0 3 
Kansas 3 0 3 South Dakota 1 0 1 
Kentucky 2 3 5 Tennessee 2 0 2 
Louisiana 10 0 10 Texas 9 3 12 
Maine 1 5 6 Utah 2 1 3 
Maryland 0 6 6 Vermont 0 2 2 
Massachusetts 0 5 5 Virginia 5 4 9 
Michigan 4 10 14 Washington 0 5 5 
Minnesota 1 3 4 West Virginia 6 0 6 
Mississippi 5 0 5 Wisconsin 1 8 9 
Missouri 4 1 5 Wyoming 7 0 7 
Source: LexisNexis Academic Legal Database. 
This table shows that the five states with the most total Second Amendment rulings were 
divided between gun rights and gun control in nature.  Texas and Louisiana had the most gun 
rights rulings, with nine and ten respectively, and two of the highest amounts of total full sample 
rulings.  Michigan, Colorado, and Oregon had three of the highest numbers of gun control 
rulings and three of the highest amounts of total full sample rulings.  This table also illustrates 
the differences between states when it comes to Second Amendment court rulings.  Few of the 
state supreme courts split rulings between gun rights and gun control.  In fact, only Florida, 
Kentucky, Nevada, New Hampshire, New Mexico, Ohio, Utah, and Virginia, had at least one of 
 228 
 
each type of gun ruling and the amounts of each type of gun ruling were within one of the other 
ruling.  For instance, Virginia has five gun rights rulings and four gun control rulings. 
 
State Supreme Court Second Amendment Cases by Ruling Types, 1960-2009 
 
Majority Ruling Type Number of Rulings 
Gun Control 143 (53.2 percent) 
Gun Rights 126 (46.8) 
TOTAL 269 (100 percent) 
Source: LexisNexis Academic Legal Database. 
 
 
State Supreme Court Second Amendment Rulings by Selection Method, 1960-2009 
 
State Supreme Court Selection Method Number of Rulings 
Life-Time Appointments 57 (21.2 percent) 
Merit Plan Selection 66 (24.5)  
Non-Partisan Elections 84 (31.2) 
Partisan Elections 62 (23.0) 
TOTAL 269 (100 percent) 
Source: LexisNexis Academic Legal Database and the American Judicature Society. 
This table demonstrates that a plurality of all cases in the sample were litigated in state 
supreme courts where the judges were elected on a non-partisan basis, while more than fifty 
percent of all cases in the sample (54.3 percent) were litigated in state supreme courts where 
judges were either elected on a partisan or a non-partisan basis.  The balance of cases in the 
sample (45.7 percent) was heard in state supreme courts where judges are appointed for lifetime 
or selected through a commission. 
 229 
 
State Supreme Court Second Amendment Rulings by Judicial Selection Method, 1960-2009 
 
Judicial Selection Method Number of Rulings 
Gun Rights Rulings by Selection Method --- 
Lifetime Appointments 13 (4.8 percent) 
Merit Plan Selection 36 (13.4) 
Non-Partisan Elections 36 (13.4) 
Partisan Elections 41 (15.2) 
Total Gun Rights 126 (46.8 percent) 
Gun Control Rulings by Selection Method --- 
Lifetime Appointments 44 (16.4 percent) 
Merit Plan Selection 30 (11.2) 
Non-Partisan Elections 48 (17.8) 
Partisan Elections 21 (7.8) 
Total Gun Control 143 (53.2 percent) 
TOTAL 269 (100 percent) 
Source: LexisNexis Academic Legal Database and the American Judicature Society. 
This table provides some interesting data regarding Second Amendment case rulings over 
the last fifty years.  Partisan elections and merit plan selection judicial selection methods each 
had a majority of cases in which the state supreme court ruled in favor of gun rights, while 
lifetime appointments and non-partisan election judicial selection methods had a majority of 
cases that ruled in favor of gun control.  However, only in life-time appointments and partisan 
elections the percentage of gun rulings types were heavily weighted in one way or the other.   
States that use partisan elections to select their state supreme court judges had only 33.9 percent 
of cases rule in favor of gun control, while 66.1 percent of cases ruled in favor of gun rights.  
Lifetime appointment judicial selection method states had only 22.8 percent of Second 
Amendment cases rule in favor of gun rights, while 77.2 percent of lifetime appointment states 
ruled in favor of gun control.   Nine of the eleven states that had life-appointments processes for 
state supreme court judges during the sample period were located in the northeast United States.  
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State Supreme Court Second Amendment Rulings by Intermediate Appellate Court, 1960-
2009 
 
Intermediate Appellate Court at Time of Ruling? Number of Rulings 
Yes 186 (69.1 percent) 
No 83 (30.9) 
TOTAL 269 (100 percent) 
Source: LexisNexis Academic Legal Database and the American Judicature Society. 
According to this table, almost seventy percent (69.1 percent) of all supreme court 
sample cases were litigated in a situation where an intermediate appellate court was present at 
the time when a decision was handed down.  30.9 percent of cases in the sample did not have a 
state intermediate appellate court during litigation and final ruling.  During the fifty year period 
of the study, thirteen states added intermediate appellate courts, and this is reflected in the data 
sample findings.  For instance, Arkansas added an intermediate appellate court in 1978.  Cases 
prior to 1978 were coded as not having an intermediate appellate court, while cases after 1978 
were coded as having an intermediate appellate court.  According to the American Judicature 
Society, ten states (DE, ME, MT, NV, NH, RI, SD, VT, WV, WY) continue to have state judicial 
systems that do not include intermediate appellate courts. 
State Supreme Court Second Amendment Cases by Issue, 1960-2009 
 
Ten Most Litigated Second Amendment Case Issues # of Cases 
Felon in Possession of a Firearm 51 (19.0 percent) 
Concealed Weapons Violation 31 (11.5) 
Denial of Personal Firearms License 24 (8.9) 
Possession of Semi-Automatic/Automatic/Assault Weapon 23 (8.5) 
Unregistered Firearms Violation 20 (7.4) 
Required Background Check Information Violation 13 (4.8) 
Local/State Gun Registration Violation 12 (4.5) 
Local Firearms Ban 11 (4.1) 
Local Ban on Gun Show Sales/Exhibition 9 (3.3) 
Gun Club Related Issues 8 (3.0) 
Various Other Issues 67 (24.9) 
TOTAL 269 (100 percent) 
    Source: LexisNexis Academic Legal Database. 
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This table presents some interesting findings regarding the issues associated with Second 
Amendment state supreme court cases.  This study originally supposed that the sample would be 
smaller than the final number of 269 cases.  Finding that fifty-one cases in which a felon arrested 
for possession of a firearm increased the number of sample cases significantly.  In each of these 
felony firearms possession cases, the felon that was arrested made the claim that state laws 
banning the possession of firearms by formerly incarcerated individuals violated their right to 
bear arms under the Second Amendment.  Only two of the fifty-one cases regarding felons in 
possession of a firearm were successful in regaining the right to bear arms for the defendant.  An 
issue area where Second Amendment defendants were exceedingly successful was in local gun 
registration violation cases.  In these cases, state supreme courts uniformly allowed defendants to 
correct their gun registration information, and then re-register their firearms on the local/state 
level.  
Tracking Second Amendment Cases in State Supreme Courts, 1960-2009 
 
Type of Judicial Action Judicial Level Number of Rulings 
None --- 219 (81.4 percent) 
Case Reheard State Supreme Court 5 (1.9) 
Original Ruling Overturned State Supreme Court 2 (0.7) 
Case Appealed U.S. Supreme Court 45 (16.7) 
Case in which Certiorari was Denied U.S. Supreme Court 40 (14.9) 
Case Reviewed U.S. Supreme Court 5 (1.9) 
Case Overturned U.S. Supreme Court 3 (1.1) 
TOTAL --- 269 (100 percent) 
Source: LexisNexis Academic Legal Database. 
The vast majority (81.4 percent) of all sample Second Amendment cases ended when the 
respective state supreme court handed down a ruling, while five (1.9 percent) of the 269 cases 
were reheard in the same state court of resort. Of the five cases reheard in state supreme courts, 
only two (0.7 percent) of the original case rulings were eventually overturned.  In both of these 
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cases, the original state supreme court ruling was overturned several years later with different 
judges rehearing the case.  
All cases appealed beyond the state supreme courts went directly to the U.S. Supreme 
Court.  Forty-five (16.7 percent) total sample cases were appealed directly to the U.S. Supreme 
Court.  On Second Amendment cases, the U.S. Supreme Court’s rate of review was 11.1 percent 
on appealed cases, while the rate of successfully getting the original ruling overturned was 6.7 
percent.  Certiorari was denied in the U.S. Supreme Court 88.9 percent of the time. Both the rate 
of review and overturn rate on Second Amendment cases coming from state supreme courts were 
higher than the traditional rates often cited by scholars.  
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APPENDIX I 
Relevant Appellate Circuit-Level Data Set Tables 
U.S. Courts of Appeals by Sample Three-Judge Panel Appearance, 1960-2009 
Name Circuit Panel 
Appearances 
Tenure Appointing 
President 
Party 
William J. Bauer 7 10 1974-Present Gerald Ford R 
James Wilkinson, III 4 9 1984-Present Ronald Reagan R 
Ilana K.D. Rovner 7 9 1992-Present George H.W. Bush R 
Richard A. Posner 7 8 1981-Present Ronald Reagan R 
Richard F. Suhrheinrich 6 7 1990-Present George H.W. Bush R 
Diane P. Wood 7 6 1995-Present Bill Clinton D 
Juan R. Torruella 1 6 1984-Present Ronald Reagan R 
Stephan R. Reinhardt 9 6 1980-Present Jimmy Carter D 
Phyllis A. Kravitch 5, 11 6 1979-Present Jimmy Carter D 
Gerald W. Heaney 8 6 1966-2006 Lyndon Johnson D 
Peter T. Fay 5, 11 6 1976-Present Gerald Ford R 
Arthur L. Alarcon 9 5 1979-Present Jimmy Carter D 
Edward E. Carnes 11 5 1992-Present George H.W. Bush R 
Frank H. Easterbrook 7 5 1985-Present Ronald Reagan R 
Michael S. Kanne 7 5 1987-Present Ronald Reagan R 
Gilbert S. Merritt, Jr. 6 5 1977-Present Jimmy Carter D 
Kenneth F. Ripple 7 5 1985-Present Ronald Reagan R 
Norman H. Stahl 1 5 1992-Present George H.W. Bush R 
William W. Wilkins 4 5 1986-2008 Ronald Reagan R 
Source: LexisNexis Academic Legal Database and the Federal Judicial Center. 
 
 
U.S. Courts of Appeals by Sample Majority Rulings Authored, 1960-2009 
Name Circuit Opinions 
Authored 
Tenure Appointing 
President 
Party 
Bobby R. Baldock 10 3 1985-Present Ronald Reagan R 
William J. Bauer 7 3 1974-Present Gerald Ford R 
Theodore McMillian 8 3 1978-2006 Jimmy Carter D 
Ilana K.D. Rovner 7 3 1992-Present George H.W. Bush R 
James Wilkinson, III 4 3 1984-Present Ronald Reagan R 
Source: LexisNexis Academic Legal Database and the Federal Judicial Center. 
 
 
U.S. Courts of Appeals by Review/Ruling Type, 1960-2009 
Type of Review/Ruling # of Cases 
En Banc Review 3 
Per Curiam Ruling 43 
Source: LexisNexis Academic Legal Database. 
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U.S. Courts of Appeals Second Amendment Rulings by Year, 1960-2009 
 
Year Number of Rulings Year Number of Rulings 
1960 2 1986 2 
1961 0 1987 2 
1962 0 1988 2 
1963 1 1989 2 
1964 1 1980s Total 24 (10.9 percent) 
1965 0 1990 8 
1966 0 1991 8 
1967 0 1992 11 
1968 0 1993 8 
1969 0 1994 5 
1960s Total 4 (1.8 percent) 1995 9 
1970 4 1996 18 
1971 8 1997 7 
1972 4 1998 6 
1973 2 1999 8 
1974 2 1990s Total 88 (40.2 percent) 
1975 1 2000 9 
1976 2 2001 7 
1977 3 2002 4 
1978 3 2003 4 
1979 2 2004 3 
1970s Total 31 (14.2 percent) 2005 6 
1980 3 2006 6 
1981 1 2007 7 
1982 3 2008 3 
1983 3 2009 23 
1984 4 2000s Total 72 (32.9 percent) 
1985 2 Total Cases 219 (100 percent) 
Source: LexisNexis Academic Legal Database. 
Note: n=219 cases. 
This table shows that the last two decades, 1990-2009, provided the vast majority of 
Second Amendment activity in the U.S. Courts of Appeals.  In fact, 73.1 percent (160) of 
cases in the entire fifty year sample were decided between 1990 and 2009.  The most active 
year for Second Amendment decisions was 2009, as 10.5 percent (or 23 cases) of all cases in 
the sample were decided in the calendar year.  The least active decade for Second Amendment 
decisions were the 1960s.  Only four sample cases (1.8 percent) were decided during the entire 
ten year period (1960-1969), while seven years during the period didn’t even have one Second 
Amendment case decided during the year.   
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The findings from this table suggest that litigants on both side of the Second 
Amendment gun debate only started to chiefly use the federal court system to litigate gun 
issues until the last twenty years.  Seeing the success of gun rights litigants in cases, such as 
Heller, others have attempted to bring selected Second Amendment cases and issues before 
the federal courts to a larger degree in recent years.  Unlike the state supreme courts, when 
33.1 percent of all cases in the full sample of cases were decided during the 1970s, the federal 
appellate courts reaction to the three political assassinations and other causation from the 
1960s happened two decades later when American conceptions of the Second Amendment 
where changing. 
 
U.S. Courts of Appeals Second Amendment Cases by Ruling Types, 1960-2009 
Majority Ruling Type Number of Cases 
Gun Control 160 (73.1 percent) 
Gun Rights 59 (26.9) 
TOTAL 219 (100 percent) 
Source: LexisNexis Academic Legal Database. 
Note: n=219 cases. 
This table illustrates the extent of U.S. Courts of Appeals Second Amendment majority 
ruling types. 73.4 percent of all federal appellate Second Amendment cases were decided in 
favor of gun control, while only 26.6 percent of all cases in the full sample supported gun 
rights.  When compared with the same findings in the state supreme courts (53.1 percent of 
cases supported gun control), this finding suggests that when federal appellate judges are 
forced to decide matters regarding the gun statutes they are much more likely to ere on the 
side of gun control than their state court of last resort colleagues.   
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U.S. Courts of Appeals Second Amendment Rulings by Appellate Circuit, 1960-2009 
 
Appellate Circuit Gun Rights Rulings Gun Control Rulings Total Rulings 
First 1 13 14 
Second 2 12 14 
Third 4 3 7 
Fourth 4 20 24 
Fifth 5 12 17 
Sixth 6 24 30 
Seventh 9 21 30 
Eighth 2 18 20 
Ninth 10 20 30 
Tenth 4 6 10 
Eleventh 12 11 23 
TOTAL 59 (29.6 percent) 160 (73.1 percent) 219 (100 percent) 
Source: LexisNexis Academic Legal Database. 
Note: n=219 cases. 
This table demonstrates how both types of Second Amendment Second Amendment 
ruling were divided among the eleven appellate circuits.  Only two appellate circuits out of the 
eleven had a majority of Second Amendment gun rights rulings.  In fact, seven of the eleven 
appellate circuits had majority Second Amendment gun control ruling totals which surpassed 
gun rights rulings by more than ten rulings.  Only the Third, Fifth, Tenth, and Eleventh Circuit 
Courts of Appeals had gun control ruling totals that were within ten rulings of the total gun 
rights rulings.  Only the Third (Delaware, New Jersey, and Pennsylvania) and the Eleventh 
(Alabama, Florida, and Georgia) Circuit Courts of Appeals had total rulings that favored gun 
rights.  In both instances, the majority gun rights rulings total only surpassed gun control 
rulings by a single decision.  This table also shows that the total amount of gun control rulings 
far exceeded the amount of total gun rights rulings in the full sample. 
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U.S. Courts of Appeals Second Amendment Majority Partisan Appointment Panels, 1960-
2009 
 
 Gun Control Rulings Gun Rights Rulings Total Majority Panels 
Majority DEM Panels 59 (26.9 percent) 21 (9.6 percent) 80 (36.5 percent) 
Majority GOP Panels 101 (46.1) 38 (17.4) 139 (63.5) 
Total Majority Panels 160 (73.0 percent) 59 (27.0 percent) 219 (100 percent) 
Source: LexisNexis Academic Legal Database and the Federal Judicial Center.  
Note: n=219 cases. 
During the fifty year study period, Republican President’s controlled the White House 
for twenty-nine of the fifty years.  This table illustrates this fact. Because Republican’s held 
the executive branch for eight more years than Democrat’s, they held the power of judicial 
appointments for a longer time.  In fact, Republican-appointed federal appellate judges held 
the majority on the three-judge U.S. Courts of Appeals Second Amendment panels in 63.5 
percent of all cases during the study period.  However, traditional conceptions about the policy 
preferences of the two political parties did not hold with regard to Second Amendment cases.  
Traditionally, the Republican Party has supported gun rights, while the Democratic 
Party has not.  In spite of this, the two political parties had a very similar rate of support for 
gun rights when each held the majority on the three-judge federal appellate panels.  Only 27.3 
percent of the Republican-appointed majority U.S. Courts of Appeals panels supported gun 
rights, while 26.3 percent of the Democratic-appointed majority panels supported gun control.  
These findings support and back-up the statistics found regarding support for gun rights in the 
full sample and outlined in other tables. 
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U.S. Presidential Appellate Nominations and Sample Appellate Panel Judges, 1960-2009 
 
U.S. President Political Party # of Judges Nominated 
Herbert Hoover Republican 1 (0.3 percent) 
Franklin Roosevelt Democrat 4 (1.1) 
Harry Truman Democrat 8 (2.2) 
Dwight Eisenhower Republican 13 (3.5) 
John Kennedy Democrat 24 (6.5) 
Lyndon Johnson Democrat 31 (8.4) 
Richard Nixon Republican 24 (6.5) 
Gerald Ford Republican 27 (7.3) 
Jimmy Carter Democrat 28 (7.5) 
Ronald Reagan Republican 61 (16.4) 
George H.W. Bush Republican 45 (12.2) 
Bill Clinton Democrat 52 (14.0) 
George W. Bush Republican 51 (13.7) 
Barack Obama Democrat 2 (0.5) 
Total Democrat Democrat 149 (40.2 percent) 
Total Republican Republican 222 (59.8 percent) 
TOTAL 7 DEM  // 7 GOP 371 (100 percent) 
Source: LexisNexis Academic Legal Database and the Federal Judicial Center. 
Note: 371 total federal appellate judges served on Second Amendment case panels, 1960-2009. 
 
This table demonstrates the figures of partisan presidential appointments to the U.S. 
Courts of Appeals as they appeared in the full case sample.  Because the full sample had 219 
cases, a total of 657 judges could have been a part of these Second Amendment three-judge 
panels.   However, only a total of 371 judges took part.  This is because multiple federal 
appellate judges were randomly assigned numerous sample panels.  As for presidential 
nominations, it is no surprise that Republican President’s federal appellate appointments vastly 
outnumbered those of Democratic President’s.  
Of the 371 federal appellate judges to sit on a Second Amendment panels in the 
sample, 59.8 percent were appointed by Republican presidents.  In fact, the last three 
Republican President’s, serving during the heart of the study period, Reagan, Bush (41), and 
Bush (43), accounted for the nominations of 42.3 percent of the federal appellate judges in the 
full sample.  President’s who served for two full terms during the study period also appointed 
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more judges then their counterparts to the U.S. Courts of Appeals.  Another interesting aspect 
of the sample of judges that heard Second Amendment cases are the judges that were 
appointed by President Franklin Roosevelt and President Herbert Hoover each of whom 
served in the first part of the 1900s.  These judges heard Second Amendment cases during the 
1960s and had served twenty to thirty years on the U.S. Courts of Appeals before their 
appearances in the full case sample. 
U.S. Courts of Appeals Second Amendment Cases by Issue, 1960-2009 
 
Ten Most Litigated Second Amendment Issues # of Cases 
Felon in Possession of a Firearm 38 (17.4 percent) 
Denial of Personal Firearms License 28 (12.8) 
Denial of Federal Firearms Marketing/Sale License 25 (11.4) 
Possession of Semi-Automatic/Automatic/Assault Weapon 24 (11.0) 
Concealed Weapons Violation 17 (7.8) 
Unregistered Firearms Violation 16 (7.3) 
Local Ban on Gun Show Sales/Exhibitions 14 (6.4) 
Gun Club Related Issues 13 (5.9) 
Local Firearms Ban 11 (5.0) 
Local Gun Registration Issues 9 (4.1) 
Various Other Issues 24 (11.0) 
TOTAL 219 (100 percent) 
Source: LexisNexis Academic Legal Database. 
Note: n=219 cases in the full sample. 
This table presents finding regarding the issues associated with Second Amendment 
U.S. Courts of Appeals cases in the full sample.  Much like the Third Chapter, the most 
prevalent issue associated with the Second Amendment cases in the U.S. Courts of Appeals 
was felons arrested for possessions of firearms.  In these felony firearms possession cases, the 
felon that was arrested claimed that state or federal laws banning the possession of firearms by 
formerly incarcerated individuals violated their constitutional right to bear arms that is 
protected under the Second Amendment.  The stringent nature of federal gun laws forbade 
future legal purchase, possession, and usage of firearms for all defendants in these cases.   
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An issue area where Second Amendment defendants were exceedingly successful was 
in denial of federal firearms marketing/sale license cases.  In these sample cases, U.S. Courts 
of Appeals defendants had a 76 percent (19 of 25 cases) rate of success in getting the federal 
courts to over turn U.S. Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms (A.T.F.) directives that 
forbade companies from purchasing federal firearms licenses that allow the marketing and 
selling of registered firearms to qualified individuals based on mandated background checks.  
In several case instances, the U.S. Courts of Appeals that made a ruling regarding A.T.F. 
firearms marketing permits called the denial of these permits arbitrary or completely based off 
personal discretion.  
Tracking Second Amendment Cases in the U.S. Courts of Appeals, 1960-2009 
Type of Action Judicial Level # of Cases 
None --- 183 (83.6 percent) 
Case Reviewed En Banc U.S. Courts of Appeals 3 (1.4) 
Original Ruling Overturned U.S. Courts of Appeals 1 (0.4) 
Case Appealed U.S. Supreme Court 33 (15.1) 
Case in which Certiorari was Denied U.S. Supreme Court 24 (11.0) 
Case Reviewed U.S. Supreme Court 9 (4.1) 
Case Overturned U.S. Supreme Court 5 (2.3) 
TOTAL --- 219 (100 percent) 
Source: LexisNexis Academic Legal Database. 
Note: n=219 cases. 
 
This table shows how cases in the full sample were dispensed with in the U.S. Courts of 
Appeals and beyond.  The vast majority (83.6 percent) of all sample Second Amendment cases 
ended when the respective U.S. Courts of Appeals panel handed down a ruling, while three of 
the 219 cases we re-tried en banc in the same federal appellate circuit with 33 percent (1 of the 3 
cases) rate of overturning the original decision during review.  Because the U.S. Courts of 
Appeals are the federal appellate circuit directly below the U.S. Supreme Court in terms of 
hierarchy, most of the cases that were appealed (91.7 percent) went to the U.S. Supreme Court.  
The rate of review of Second Amendment U.S. Courts of Appeals cases in the U.S. Supreme 
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Court was high at 27.3 percent.  Of the nine Second Amendment cases which were granted 
certiorari was granted, five (55.6 percent) of those cases were successful in getting the original 
U.S. Courts of Appeals decision overturned.  Certiorari was denied by the U.S. Supreme Court 
72.7 percent of the time. 
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